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1.  Controversial Speakers, Moral
Disagreements, and the
Middlebury Moment
Ashley Floyd Kuntz, university oF AlAbAmA, birminghAm
Abstract: Student protests have developed on campuses throughout the 
country in response to controversial speakers. Overwhelmingly, these protests 
have been framed as conflicts over the right to free speech and the importance 
of free inquiry on college campuses. This essay reframes conflicts like these as 
moral disagreements over the role of individuals and institutions in produc-
ing and disseminating knowledge that supports or undermines justice within 
a pluralistic, democratic society. Using the specific case of Charles Murray’s 
visit to Middlebury College in spring 2017 and drawing insight from social 
moral epistemology, the essay aims to clarify the moral concerns at stake in 
clashes over controversial speakers and to identify possibilities to advance the 
moral aims of institutions of higher education in response to such events.
Keywords: controversial speakers, moral epistemology, cognitive bias, deliber-
ative democracy, higher education 
In recent years there has been no shortage of incidents on college and university 
campuses involving protests of invited speakers.1 To offer just a few examples, 
protests have erupted: at UC-Berkeley in response to alt-right speaker Milo 
Yiannopoulos; on the campus of Whittier College when conservatives chanted 
“Build That Wall” to deter California’s Attorney General Xavier Becerra from 
speaking; at the College of William and Mary as Black Lives Matter activists 
1 This chapter was initially presented at the American Educational Research Association’s 
Annual Meeting in New York in April 2018.
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shouted down Virginia’s ACLU executive director Claire Guthrie Gastañaga; 
and within the City University of New York Law School to delay a talk by con-
servative professor Josh Blackman.2 Middlebury College experienced similar 
conflict when students from the campus chapter of the American Enterprise 
Institute (AEI), a right-leaning think tank, invited Charles Murray to discuss 
his book, Coming Apart: The State of White America, 1960–2010.3 Clashes like 
these have been the subject of extensive media coverage, and the events at Mid-
dlebury, in particular, sparked a joint statement on truth-seeking and freedom 
of inquiry signed by more than 4,500 academics. Additionally, multiple state 
houses have proposed legislation regarding free speech on university campuses,4 
and the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a special meeting in June 
2017 to discuss “The Assault on the First Amendment on College Campuses.”5
These conflicts and the ways they are framed in public discourse raise sev-
eral important questions for institutions of higher education. Who should 
be allowed to speak on campus and under what circumstances? How should 
campuses handle dissenting voices, including disruptive protests? Should uni-
versities prioritize free speech above other democratic values? Are universities 
responsible for limiting harmful speech, and if so, how? Clashes over controver-
sial speakers illuminate underlying tensions over how to negotiate sometimes 
competing aims of higher education, including free speech and inclusion.
National surveys conducted by Gallup, the Knight Foundation, and the 
American Council on Education find broad support among college presidents, 
faculty, and students for both protecting speech and creating an inclusive learn-
ing environment.6 When asked about whether offensive or biased speech should 
be permitted, 96% of college presidents support allowing even these contentious 
2 John Lederman and Scott Jaschik, “Amid Violence, Yiannopoulus Speech at Berkeley 
Canceled,” Inside Higher Ed, February 2, 2017; Scott Jaschik, “Presidents and Provosts 
Gather to Consider Free Speech Issues,” Inside Higher Ed, October 16, 2018; Jeremy 
Bauer-Wolf, “ACLU Speaker Shouted Down at William & Mary,” Inside Higher Ed, 
October 5, 2017; Scott Jaschik, “Shouting Down Talk on Campus Free Speech,” Inside 
Higher Ed, April 16, 2018.
3 “The Charles Murray Event at Middlebury College,” Newsroom, http://www.
middlebury.edu/newsroom/Information-on-charles-murray-visit.
4 Chris Quintanta and Andy Thomason, “The States Where Campus Free-Speech Bills 
Are Being Born; A Rundown,” Chronicle of Higher Education, May 15, 2017.
5 Senate Committee on the Judiciary, “Free Speech 101: The Assault on the First 
Amendment on College Campuses,” June 20, 2017, https://www.judiciary.senate.
gov/meetings.
6 Knight Foundation, “Free Expression on Campus: What College Students Think About 
First Amendment Issues,” http://www.knightfoundation.org/reports; Lorelle Espi-
nosa, Jennifer Crandall, and Philip Wilkinson, “Free Speech and Campus Inclusion: A 
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forms of speech, as do 70% of students and 69% of faculty. Yet, 49% of students 
also indicated support for college and university policies to restrict biased speech 
using student codes of conduct, suggesting that students are conflicted about 
the best path forward to create both open and inclusive learning environments. 
While these data reveal differences in degree of support for certain policies sur-
rounding the execution of citizens’ free speech rights, they also call into question 
the narrative of an “assault” against the First Amendment on college campuses.
In this chapter, I offer an alternative narrative, one in which clashes occur-
ring on college campuses are better understood as moral disagreements over 
the role of individuals and institutions in producing and disseminating knowl-
edge that supports or undermines justice and fairness in a pluralistic, demo-
cratic society. These cases are typically framed in terms of free speech rights, 
which focuses our attention on protecting speech in a legal sense and justifying 
the importance of free inquiry on college campuses. By reframing these cases 
as moral disagreements, I aim to emphasize their consequences for achieving 
moral aims of institutions of higher education. I use the protests at Middlebury 
College in response to Charles Murray’s visit as a case study to clarify the moral 
concerns at stake in clashes over controversial speakers. Drawing from social 
moral epistemology, I then argue that colleges and universities play a key role 
in supporting the true beliefs of knowers, which, in turn, support their capacity 
to make moral judgments as citizens and thus contribute to a more just society.7 
Finally, I consider possibilities to advance moral aims of colleges and universities 
in response to recurring conflicts over controversial speakers.
Moral and Civic Aims of American Higher Education
Colleges and universities have long been understood to have moral aims 
and, in many cases, these aims are spelled out directly in mission or value 
Survey of College Presidents,” Higher Education Today, April 9, 2018; Samuel Abrams, 
“Professors Support Free Speech,” The American Interest, April 18, 2018.
7 I take a primarily liberal egalitarian view of justice throughout the chapter in that I am 
concerned with equality of opportunity, unequal background conditions, benefiting the 
least advantaged, ensuring fairness and nondiscrimination, and the like. That being said, 
I am concerned with non-ideal theory. In writing about American higher education’s 
responsibility to correct historical injustice, philosopher Lionel K. McPherson outlines 
several “practical obstacles” to achieving justice in the non-ideal case, including “lack of 
compliance, absence of political will, inadequate resources, and legacies of past injustice” 
(114). To this listing, social moral epistemology adds another obstacle: cognitive errors, 
such as bias and epistemic deference (discussed at length later in the chapter), which 
undermine our moral functioning as citizens and thus serve as an obstacle to achieving 
justice.
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statements. Such statements not only typically focus on student development 
goals (e.g., developing ethical student leaders) but also include statements 
on the university’s contributions to creating a more just society through the 
advancement of knowledge.8 Additionally, many universities include language 
in mission statements about serving diverse populations and creating inclusive 
communities.9 As Brighouse and McPherson have argued, even when univer-
sities do not expressly state their commitments to moral aims, the decisions 
they make regarding who has access to education, what students learn, and 
how the university impacts society are unavoidably connected to larger con-
cerns of morality and justice.10
While there are any number of valid moral aims colleges or universities 
might pursue, this chapter focuses primarily on the role universities play in 
supporting the moral functioning of students and faculty. I use the term mor-
al functioning to encompass one’s moral and civic dispositions and behav-
iors, broadly speaking. As others have before, I make the assumption that 
“the moral and civic are inseparable” in that morality involves “prescriptive 
judgments about how one ought to act in relation to other people.”11 This 
relational definition of morality emphasizes the other-oriented consequences 
of individual moral functioning. Morality, then, is not just about personal, 
micro-moral decisions but also about how the dispositions we develop and 
the behaviors we exhibit contribute to our capacity as citizens to support 
macro-moral democratic values such as justice and fairness. Our moral func-
tioning is a facet of our development as citizens and speaks to our capacity to 
make decisions of moral consequence when we enter the public sphere (e.g., 
as voters, advocates and activists, community servants).
Educational institutions have the potential to support development of 
these capacities—not only in preparing individuals to assess the rationality of 
8 Anne Colby, Thomas Ehrlich, Elizabeth Beaumont, and Jason Stephens, Educating 
Citizens: Preparing America’s Undergraduates for Lives of Moral and Civic Responsibility 
(San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass, 2013), 13.
9 Erin Kelly, “Modeling Justice in Higher Education,” in The Aims of Higher Education, 
eds. Harry Brighouse and Michael McPherson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2015), 143. Kelly argues that colleges and universities are not like democracies in 
many respects (e.g., students do not vote in the president), but they can help prepare 
individuals for civic life by modeling justice on their campuses, including: ensuring 
fair opportunity and distribution of educational goods, cultivating moral and civic dis-
positions such as empathy and perspective-taking, and including diverse stakeholders 
in decision making.
10 Harry Brighouse and Michael McPherson, The Aims of Higher Education (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2015), 2.
11 Colby et al., Educating Citizens, 15.
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public policies or civic actions but also in preparing them to make normative 
decisions about the right course of action. Empirical research has consistently 
demonstrated that college attendance, in particular, supports moral reasoning 
development in that college students begin to shift toward principled deci-
sion-making based less on personal interest or social convention and more on 
shareable moral ideals.12 Additionally, Allen Buchanan’s work in social moral 
epistemology has called attention to “the role of social practices in helping 
to form, preserve, and transmit those classes of beliefs that are typically es-
pecially important for the well-functioning of our moral powers: our ability 
to engage in moral reasoning, to make moral judgements, and to experience 
moral emotions, such as sympathy or a feeling of indignation in the face of 
injustice.”13 Buchanan argues that social institutions, such as colleges and 
universities, play a key role in establishing social practices that either support 
true beliefs or promote false beliefs. These false beliefs, often rooted in bias 
or epistemic deference to authority, can disrupt moral functioning and thus 
undermine democratic aims.
This responsibility of colleges and universities to support the moral func-
tioning of faculty and students (and, in turn, their civic capacities) has been 
given insufficient consideration in the dominant discourse concerning clashes 
over controversial speakers. In the following section, I turn to the particular 
case of protests at Middlebury College in response to Charles Murray’s visit. 
I first call attention to educational policies and practices that contributed to 
the conflict and its aftermath before taking a closer look at written statements 
prepared by Middlebury faculty and students. I aim to emphasize features of 
the Middlebury case that have been overlooked in existing accounts, particu-
larly those that speak to the potential for Middlebury to impact the moral 
functioning of its students and faculty through the production and dissemi-
nation of knowledge.
12 Patricia King and Matthew Mayhew, “Moral Judgment Development in Higher Edu-
cation,” Journal of Moral Education, 249.
13 Allen Buchanan, “Education and Social Moral Epistemology,” in The Aims of Higher 
Education, eds. Harry Brighouse and Michael McPherson (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 2015), 98. Buchanan does not make the strong claim that developing 
these classes of beliefs will always result in advanced moral functioning, and the empirical 
literature makes clear that individuals may know the right thing to do and yet not take 
moral action. That being said, the argument here is that true beliefs support one’s capa-
city to make sound moral judgments, and such judgments are one important facet of 
overall moral functioning (for a more detailed discussion on the relationship between 
moral judgment and holistic moral development, see: James Rest et al., Post-Conventio-
nal Thinking: A Neo-Kohlbergian Approach (Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum, 1999)).
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The Case
The Middlebury College case is unique in several respects. First, Middle-
bury’s administration had greater autonomy over decisions made in response 
to Charles Murray’s invitation to speak than many administrators have on 
other campuses. When controversial speakers are invited to public colleges 
and universities, those institutions are typically limited in how they can re-
spond. For example, Auburn University, a public university in Alabama, at-
tempted to cancel a speech by white nationalist Richard Spencer, but a federal 
judge ruled that doing so would violate the First Amendment. Private col-
leges like Middlebury, however, have a greater degree of freedom in deciding 
which speakers to allow on their campuses and setting the parameters for such 
visits. Middlebury did not have to support the student chapter of the AEI in 
inviting Murray to campus, nor did their department of Political Science have 
to agree to cosponsor the event. Yet, a combination of preexisting policies, 
stated principles, and institutional practices resulted in their decision to pro-
vide Murray with a forum to speak.
Another reason for selecting this particular case is that it is so well-docu-
mented, not only by national news sources but also by the institution itself. 
Middlebury has elected to catalog the details of this event on their website 
and to establish a special collection at the college library entitled “The Mid-
dlebury Moment.”14 Unlike other incidents on college campuses, interested 
scholars can watch a video of Murray’s talk and the associated protests, read 
thoughtful statements from faculty and staff, review numerous national news 
accounts, and evaluate disciplinary measures taken by the College. The writ-
ten statements made by Middlebury faculty and students are particularly use-
ful in understanding the assumptions and principles undergirding the moral 
disagreement in this case, which may be salient for other, similar cases. Thus, 
while Middlebury College is a small, elite institution that is not representative 
of American higher education in many ways, it is a compelling and well-doc-
umented example of the types of incidents we see occurring on college and 
university campuses.15
14 “The Charles Murray Event at Middlebury College,” Newsroom, http://www.middle 
bury.edu/newsroom.
15 In their book on the Aims of Higher Education, Harry Brighouse and Michael McPher-
son have also argued that elite institutions like Middlebury are worth examining closer 
given that graduates of these institutions are overrepresented in positions of power and 
influence within our society, and these institutions have historically been complicit in 
reinforcing power structures that result in systemic injustice.
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Murray’s Visit
On March 2, 2017, Charles Murray visited Middlebury College at the invi-
tation of the student chapter of the AEI. Murray is a well-known libertarian 
thinker and author of controversial books, including The Bell Curve: Intelli-
gence and Class Structure in American Life and Coming Apart: The State of 
White America. He had been invited to discuss Coming Apart, in which he 
argues that there has been a profound cultural shift in the last fifty years that 
has led to the “demoralization and deterioration” of the white working class 
while simultaneously creating a new upper class of cognitive elites. Though 
the college did not fund Murray’s visit, the Department of Political Science 
elected to cosponsor the event in keeping with a prior policy, which states that 
they will cosponsor events relevant to political science when asked by official 
student organizations. President Laurie Patton also attended the event and 
gave introductory remarks, consistent with her policy to attend student or-
ganization events when invited and not otherwise engaged. Allison Stanger, 
professor of political science, agreed to serve as interlocutor.
Middlebury students began voicing dissent during the prefatory re-
marks. Though they applauded President Patton for stating unequivocally 
that she did not share Murray’s views, they were less pleased with her de-
scription of Murray as a controversial, yet influential speaker and rejected 
the reasons she gave for allowing Murray to speak and deciding to attend 
the event herself. They also booed and heckled two of their peers, Ivan 
Valladares and Alexander Khan, both of whom were student leaders in the 
AEI campus chapter. For example, when Khan called for Middlebury to be 
a place for liberal thought, an audience member countered that it should be 
a place for inclusive thought.16
Charles Murray’s arrival to the podium was met with more booing, then 
physical and verbal protests. Students first rose silently and turned their bod-
ies away from him. They then read a prepared statement in unison, which 
referred to his talk as hate speech. For the next twenty minutes, they shouted 
a series of call-and-response chants, including “Who’s the enemy? White Su-
premacy!” and “Charles Murray, go away! Racist, sexist, anti-gay!” Eventual-
ly, Murray and Stanger were moved to a remote location and began video-re-
cording their remarks but were interrupted several times by fire alarms being 
pulled. As Murray and Stanger were leaving the building, they encountered a 
smaller, violent group of protesters, one of whom assaulted Stanger and gave 
16 Will DiGravio, “Students Protest Lecture by Charles Murray at Middlebury College,” 
March 2, 2017, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=a6EASuhefeI.
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her a concussion. Middlebury ultimately disciplined 74 students to varying 
degrees, but the police department was unable to determine who may have 
been responsible for injuring Professor Stanger.17
Responses to the Protests
The protests at Middlebury resulted in a firestorm of national media coverage, 
including articles in the Wall Street Journal and New York Times and stories on 
major news outlets such as Fox News and NPR. Robert George and Cornel 
West, both of whom hold faculty appointments at other institutions, issued a 
joint statement on “Truth Seeking, Democracy, and Freedom of Thought and 
Expression” calling for the cultivation and practice of intellectual virtues essen-
tial to democracy, which was signed by more than 4,500 individuals.18
To a large extent, public discourse surrounding the protests at Middle-
bury has focused solely on assessing the legal right to free speech and justi-
fying its importance in free inquiry on college campuses. These are impor-
tant considerations, but I contend they provide an incomplete philosophical 
engagement with the foundational disagreements that led to the events at 
Middlebury and contribute to similar instances on other college campuses. 
Written statements by Middlebury faculty and students reveal other substan-
tive issues at play in the protests. While the faculty statement foregrounds 
the importance of free speech above and beyond other democratic values, 
the student statement raises concerns about justice and fairness that have not 
been given adequate attention to date. In many ways, faculty and students are 
speaking past each other as they emphasize different aims of higher education 
and prioritize different features of the case.
Faculty Statement
On March 6, four days after Murray’s visit to Middlebury, the Wall Street Jour-
nal printed a statement from Middlebury faculty, which was later posted online 
to the website of Heterodox Academy. This statement, “Free Inquiry on Cam-
pus,” was signed by 31% of Middlebury faculty.19 The statement focuses largely 
17 “The Charles Murray Event at Middlebury College,” Newsroom, http://www.
middlebury.edu/newsroom.
18 Robert George and Cornel West, March 14, 2017, https://jmp.princeton.edu/
statement.
19 Jay Parini and Keegan Callahan, “Free Inquiry on Campus,” March 6, 2017, https://
freeinquiryblog.wordpress.com. For simplicity’s sake, I use the terms “Middlebury 
faculty” and “faculty statement” throughout the chapter to refer to the signatories of 
the faculty statement, even though two-thirds of the faculty did not sign the statement.
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on critiquing the manner in which students protested Murray’s speech and 
affirming the importance of free inquiry on campus. It is rooted in what faculty 
perceived to be the purposes of American higher education, namely:
1. to expose faculty and students to ideas, even if these ideas counter 
their previously held positions or make them uncomfortable,
2. to refrain from promoting “any particular political or social agenda,”
3. to cultivate the mind and its capacity for rational deliberation, and
4. to instill intellectual humility and open-mindedness with regard to 
one’s own perspectives.
Faculty claim that “genuine higher learning is possible only where free, rea-
soned, and civil speech and discussion are respected.” In a subsequent prin-
ciple, they express concern that the “incivility and coarseness” on display in 
American politics is spilling over into debates on college and university cam-
puses. Faculty affirm students’ rights to “protest non-disruptively” but con-
demn disruptive protests (i.e., loud and continuous chanting) as “coercive” 
acts. In addition to concerns about the expression of dissent, faculty make 
claims about how knowledge is produced and disseminated, which they use 
to justify the importance of free inquiry on college campuses. At the heart 
of their argument is this assumption: “Only through the contest of clashing 
viewpoints do we have any hope of replacing mere opinion with knowledge.” 
Faculty do not reference any particular philosophical theories, but this as-
sumption is consistent with arguments for deliberative democracy expressed 
by Gutmann and Thompson, Dryzek, and others who argue that democracy 
is best served by open, rational debates of controversial issues and who have 
faith that the best ideas will win the day in such deliberative contexts.20
Building upon this assumption about the contestation of discourses, fac-
ulty assert that professors and students do not have the right to decide which 
opinions other students may entertain. Further, they state that professors and 
students do not have the “right to determine for the entire community that 
a question is closed for discussion.” This principle appears to take aim at a 
particular point of contention with students—that Charles Murray’s views, 
especially those expressed in The Bell Curve, have already been discredited 
and thus should not be brought up for discussion again (a claim the students 
made in advance of the event and reiterated in their own written statement). 
The faculty statement does not directly comment on the scientific integrity or 
20 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge: 
Harvard, 1996); John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2002).
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trustworthiness of Murray’s work. Instead, its primary focus is on the impor-
tance of free and unrestrained production and dissemination of knowledge 
within a democratic society.
Finally, the faculty statement attempts to address perceived points of con-
tention with student protesters. First, faculty state that it is impossible to 
create “a perfectly egalitarian sphere of free discourse,” but this impossibility 
does not justify restricting speech. This is perhaps the only moment their 
statement gets close to addressing what students perceive as issues of justice 
and fairness. Second, faculty express their conviction that speech is not vio-
lence. Prior to the event, students raised concerns that Murray’s viewpoints 
were particularly harmful to people of color, women, and other marginalized 
students. Faculty countered that the presence of a controversial speaker is not 
a violent act against marginalized members of the community.
Student Statement
Six days after the faculty statement was published in the Wall Street Journal, 
students responded with their own statement: “Broken Inquiry on Campus: 
A Response by a Collection of Middlebury Students.”21 The statement was 
posted online and signed by more than 150 (6%) students.22 The student re-
sponse quoted each of the principles outlined by faculty, then offered a para-
graph or more of reasons for why the faculty principles were limited, misguid-
ed, or unjust. Students took issue with administrative decisions surrounding 
Murray’s visit, including limited time for community deliberation about his 
invitation and legitimacy afforded to his visit (i.e., official sponsorship by an 
academic department and opening remarks by the president of the college). 
Additionally, students disagreed with faculty referring to the principles they 
outlined as being “unassailable” and argued instead that these principles war-
ranted “robust, nuanced, and continuing civil debate.” Importantly, the stu-
dent statement explicitly expanded the scope of the conversation beyond free 
speech to larger concerns of justice and fairness in our current context.
21 “Broken Inquiry on Campus,” March 12, 2017, https://brokeninquiryblog.wordpress.
com.
22 Again, I will refer to “Middlebury students” and the “student statement” for ease 
throughout the chapter, acknowledging that only a small percentage of the student 
body signed the statement. It is unknown why such a small percentage of the student 
body signed the statement. Some, including AEI members, presumably disagreed with 
the principles. Others may have feared punishment, as Middlebury administration made 
clear that protesters would be sanctioned to varying degrees for violating school policies. 
Still others may have been ambivalent and/or uninformed about the event.
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On the view of students, part of creating a just and fair campus envi-
ronment is prioritizing inclusion. They express concern that many minor-
itized students feel as if they have to continually justify their presence at Mid-
dlebury, and thus argue that students who are underrepresented within the 
community be given a seat at the table to derive, in a democratic fashion, 
community principles surrounding invited speakers. They take issue with the 
faculty’s dismissal of an egalitarian sphere of free discourse. Even if a perfectly 
egalitarian space is not possible, students argue that universities ought to at 
least aim for this type of space.
Additionally, Middlebury students take a stand against intellectual and 
moral relativism throughout their statement. They describe the views of 
Charles Murray as having been “academically discredited,” which is to say 
that they believe certain perspectives can be supported by evidence while oth-
ers cannot. On their view, colleges and universities ought to be disseminating 
knowledge that can be supported with sound evidence rather than giving a 
forum to outdated or disproven ideas. Thus, they do not view Murray as a 
credible speaker worthy of an invitation to speak at an elite liberal arts college 
like Middlebury. They argue that Middlebury erred “by elevating bigotry and 
engaging with it in open debate under the misguided view that all ideas must 
be respected,” which risks “elevating biased opinions with no solid, factual 
foundation into the realm of ‘knowledge.’”
Students claim that universities have a role to play in articulating parameters 
for which viewpoints are worthy of being given a hearing. They make the case 
for using two basic criterion: (1) whether the views are supported by strong 
evidence and have not been discredited by other scholars and (2) whether the 
views respect the basic human dignity of all members of society. The first crite-
rion rejects intellectual relativism, while the second takes aim at moral relativ-
ism—both of which students perceive to be dangerous to democracy. Indeed, 
students argue that “a commitment to open-mindedness is compatible with the 
decision to reject intolerance. We musn’t be required to ‘hear both sides’ when 
one side seeks to undermine the core values of a free, democratic society.”
From the perspective of students, knowledge claims are intertwined with 
issues of justice and fairness. Murray’s presence is a moral problem for them, 
and they refer to him using the term “racist,” which has obvious moral con-
notations. They argue that the College’s decision to let Murray speak is not 
neutral; it reinforces biases and prejudices which undergird policy decisions 
that negatively impact marginalized communities. In this way, the College’s 
decision is an intellectual failure in advancing rigorous research and a moral 
failure of its “duty to provide an environment that supports [students] as 
equals and humans.”
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Building upon these ideals of advancing knowledge and protecting human 
dignity, the students repeatedly position themselves as advocates for justice. 
While the faculty statement makes no mention of justice, the student statement 
includes eight references to justice, injustice, and fairness. They contend that 
disruptive protest is an acceptable means of seeking justice and point to the 
Civil Rights Movement and Vietnam War protests as examples of disruptive 
resistance. Though they unequivocally reject the physical violence that resulted 
in Dr. Stanger’s injury, they argue that chanting is a nonviolent form of protest, 
even if it is disruptive. Further, they point to what they see as inconsistencies in 
how we categorize civic actions, noting that “in our society, disruptive protest 
is often considered violence, while the stripping of healthcare from millions, 
policy.” Students clearly see themselves as advocates for justice who are pushing 
against social and intellectual norms that legitimize individuals like Murray and 
provide them with a forum to express views that undermine equality. To do 
nothing in the face of injustice is morally unacceptable to them.
It is important to note that this moral conviction is grounded in the be-
lief that knowledge and the pursuit of knowledge are contextual. Murray’s 
visit, on their view, must be understood in the context of increased white 
supremacist activity throughout the country, Murray’s prior work and public 
comments, and the present moment in which many students still feel mar-
ginalized with the Middlebury College community. In this context, Murray’s 
views are not just “academically discredited” but also potentially harmful to 
the well-being of students and, in a larger sense, democracy.
A Moral Disagreement
As discussed previously, the events that unfolded at Middlebury have been 
largely described in the press and in written statements from Middlebury 
faculty and other academics as a conflict over the legal right to free speech 
and the importance of free inquiry on college campuses. The concern being 
emphasized here is that free speech is essential to the production of knowl-
edge and vital to democracy. Students, both those who signed the Middle-
bury statement and those polled in national surveys, appear to agree that free 
speech is important to democracy. That being said, the Middlebury student 
statement emphasizes another important feature of democratic life—justice. 
In particular, Middlebury students are concerned with the consequences of 
knowledge production and dissemination in reinforcing prejudices, biases, 
and unjust power structures within a pluralistic democracy. In light of these 
competing ideals, I argue that the Middlebury case is best understood as a 
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moral disagreement, one which may have implications for other clashes on 
college campuses in response to invited speakers.
Moses characterizes moral disagreements as those concerning “enduring, 
contested, public issues involving values, relationships, and ideals.”23 Unlike 
personal disagreements, these disputes have societal impact. They stem from 
differences in underlying theories of justice or differences in moral evaluation 
(i.e., what action to take in response to an injustice). While Moses takes an 
optimistic view of moral disagreements and argues they can contribute to 
social change, it is also possible for moral deadlock to occur when conflicting 
moral ideals are not resolved.24
Political philosophers have given considerable attention to how to re-
solve such moral disagreements. Gutmann and Thompson’s work on delib-
erative democracy developed in response to the presence of moral disagree-
ments and has since been challenged and refined by other scholars. Briefly, 
Gutmann and Thompson argue that citizens within a democracy should 
justify their decisions to one another by engaging in public reason-giving. 
On their view, this approach is the most justifiable way to resolve moral 
disagreements in democratic societies. They specify that such instances of 
rational deliberation must be based on the moral claim of reciprocity, which 
requires that people be treated as autonomous agents deserving of mutual 
respect. Importantly, they understand deliberative democracy to be a dy-
namic process—reasons are given in favor of or against positions, a decision 
is made to resolve the conflict, and that decision is then subject to further 
discussion and future reconsideration as part of an ongoing democratic di-
alogue.25 Actors may not be fully in agreement, but through the delibera-
tive process, they can avoid deadlock by reaching a reasonable decision and 
moving forward.
Statements from Middlebury faculty, President Patton, and George and 
West are all built upon this assumption that deliberative democracy is indeed 
the most justifiable approach to resolving conflicts about controversial issues. 
The Middlebury faculty statement expresses the strong belief that it is the 
clashing of viewpoints that results in greater knowledge production. Further, 
the structure of the event agreed upon by AEI members and the Department 
of Political Science, which included an interlocutor with contrasting views, re-
23 Michele Moses, “Why the Affirmative Action Debate Persists,” Educational Policy 20, 
no. 4 (2006): 569.
24 Ronald Milo, “Moral Deadlock,” Journal of the Royal Institute of Philosophy 61 (1986): 
453–471.
25 Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2004), 1–56.
14 Ashley Floyd Kuntz
flects a core commitment to deliberative democracy. The assumption underly-
ing this structure is clear: controversial views should be publicly challenged in 
a rational manner with each side giving reasons for their claims.
George and West extend this argument further by connecting the contes-
tation of ideas to the functioning of democracy. They admonish citizens, and 
particularly those on college and university campuses, to “listen attentively 
and respectfully to intelligent people who challenge one’s beliefs and who 
represent causes one disagrees with and points of view one does not share.”26 
Given that we are all fallible, George and West argue that we should also all be 
eager “to engage with anyone who is prepared to do business in the curren-
cy of truth-seeking discourse by offering reasons, marshaling evidence, and 
making arguments.”27
In a similar fashion, President Patton’s article in the Wall Street Journal 
makes clear that she prioritizes rational, public discourse over other essential 
features of democratic life. For her, free speech, open debate, and inclusion 
of diverse perspectives are all hallmarks of university life within a democratic 
society. That being said, she advises other university leaders to “Let students 
know that, when these values come into conflict, as they did at Middlebury 
this past spring, educational institutions have a primary obligation to foster 
open and civil discourse.”28
Thus, the statements from faculty and other academic leaders are rooted 
in a firm commitment to the basic tenets of deliberative democracy. They 
believe that free speech and public discourse should be preserved, even in 
the face of morally repugnant views. This position is shared by Dryzek, who 
considered whether some views that are antithetical to democratic life should 
be excluded from discursive democracy. He ultimately decided in favor of 
including these views in rational deliberation for two reasons: (1) delibera-
tion provides a forum to challenge oppressive discourses and (2) we can have 
faith in deliberation to “root out bad arguments and sectarianism.”29 Though 
Dryzek outlined a more expansive view of discourse—one that also allowed 
for rhetoric, humor, storytelling, testimony, and other forms of communica-
tion—he still concluded that airing ideas publicly is important and that when 
we enter into such discursive moments, we ought to be open to changing our 
minds in light of claims made by others.30
26 Robert George and Cornel West, “Truth Seeking,” March 12, 2017.
27 Ibid.
28 Laurie Patton, “The Right Way to Protect Free Speech on Campus,” Wall Street Journal, 
June 9, 2017.
29 Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy, 169.
30 Ibid., 170.
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Students appear to be working from a different set of assumptions, one 
that directly challenges the effectiveness of deliberative democracy in our cur-
rent context. Their statement raises several challenges in response to the claim 
that a contestation of ideas is unequivocally supportive of a healthy democ-
racy. First, they argue that the condition of reciprocity is not being met in 
this case, claiming that Murray “denies the basic equality of those invited to 
engage in such discourse, and therefore undermines the foundation of such 
discourse.” For students, Murray’s body of written work and public state-
ments over the last several decades are evidence of racist, sexist, and classist 
viewpoints that are antithetical to the principle of equality and undermine the 
potential for mutually respectful deliberation.31
Second, students express concern that the type of deliberation faculty have 
in mind privileges a certain style of discourse and often excludes marginalized 
individuals. Indeed, students reject what they refer to as “the hegemony of ra-
tional thought-based perspectives often found in a university setting” and affirm 
that “experiences and emotions are valid ways to see the world.” The forced di-
chotomy on rationality and emotion aside, what students are suggesting is that 
reasons communicated with emotion or grounded in daily lived experiences 
are given less epistemic weight on college campuses. Sanders articulated similar 
concerns against deliberative democracy in general, suggesting that “The invi-
tation to deliberate has strings attached. Deliberation is a certain kind of talk: 
rational, contained, and oriented to a shared problem.”32 Importantly, these 
strings may reinforce existing power structures in which individuals from more 
privileged backgrounds are given greater credibility within deliberative spaces 
due to the ways in which they articulate their concerns (i.e., in a manner that is 
perceived as intellectually sophisticated and socially acceptable).33
31 Assessing the validity of Murray’s body of work and the allegations that his views are 
racist, sexist, and classist is outside the scope of this chapter, though I will provide limited 
examples in subsequent sections of the potential for his work to tap into existing biases. 
Suffice it to say, students are not alone in raising concerns about his work. Scholars 
have critiqued Murray’s work in both the popular press (e.g., Siegel, 2017; Turkheimer, 
Harden, & Nisbett, 2017) and academic journals and books (e.g., Bullen, & Kenway, 
2004; MacDonald & Marsh, 2001; Winship & Korenman, 1997). The Southern Pover-
ty Law Center (2018) also alleges that Murray ascribes to a White Nationalist ideology.
32 Lynn M. Sanders, “Against Deliberation,” Political Theory 23, no. 3 (June 1997): 370.
33 Recall, for example, that George and West encourage individuals to “listen attentively 
and respectfully to intelligent people” (emphasis added). Though they do not specify 
what they have in mind by intelligence, in the context of their other statements about 
reasoned debate, it would seem that their qualification of listening to intelligent people 
would be subject to the concerns raised by Sanders.
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Moreover, students emphasize the contextual nature of knowledge pro-
duction and dissemination and thus reject the notion that deliberation is essen-
tial to challenging oppressive discourses. Instead, they argue that giving such 
views a public forum increases their legitimacy and serves to reinforce societal 
prejudices and biases at a time in which white supremacist activity is reemerging 
in very public ways both in society at large and on university campuses.
Finally, the student statement reveals a foundational disagreement with 
faculty and President Patton about the positive impact of deliberative democ-
racy. In her prefatory remarks, President Patton echoes Dryzek’s confidence 
in the capacity for deliberation to root out bad arguments contending that 
“…if there ever was a time for us to challenge influential public views with 
better reason, better research, better logic, and better data, it is now.”34 Stu-
dents take a less optimistic view of the potential for deliberative democracy to 
root out bad arguments. Indeed, they argue that Murray’s views have already 
been academically discredited, and yet they continue to be discussed within 
the academy as open questions subject to further consideration. For students, 
the fact that Murray continues to be provided with forums to share his views, 
and that these views continue to be influential, casts doubt on the effective-
ness of deliberative democracy.
Public intellectual and journalist Ta-Nehisi Coates articulates a similar lack 
of faith in the deliberative process, one that may be relevant given the timing of 
the protests, which followed the 2016 US presidential election. Drawing from 
an interview with President Obama held during the campaign, Coates writes that 
Obama expressed confidence in the American people to evaluate racist, sexist, 
and anti-immigrant statements being made by candidate Trump and others in his 
campaign and to use the ongoing public debates concerning these statements to 
inform their decision-making. Coates wanted to believe that such public, rational 
deliberation would result in the most defensible views defeating the most damag-
ing ones, but he reflected that his own life experiences as a black man in America 
convinced him that the opposite outcome was also possible.35 The presence of 
public, rational debate did not ensure a positive outcome. Perhaps at least one 
way of understanding the recent protests on college campuses, including Middle-
bury, is to understand them as symptomatic of this lack of faith in the capacity for 
rational thought to win the day and for views that are antithetical to democracy 
to be defeated using better reason, research, logic, and data.
34 DiGravio, “Students Protest Lecture.”
35 Ta-Nehisi Coates, We Were Eight Years in Power: An American Tragedy (New York: 
Penguin, 2017).
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In this section, I have outlined foundational assumptions made by faculty 
and students and framed them in terms of a moral disagreement. Though many 
would argue that deliberative democracy is the most justifiable way to resolve 
such moral disagreements, this approach may not be feasible when students 
question its effectiveness and appropriateness within the current context. Fac-
ulty and student statements, as well as national media coverage of this incident 
and others on college campuses, paint a picture of moral deadlock. Students 
engage in disruptive protests, they are chastised for doing so, colleges take dis-
ciplinary action, and the cycle begins again. In the next section, I argue that 
social moral epistemology provides greater clarity into the moral issues at stake 
in these types of cases and illuminates possibilities for colleges and universities 
to promote the moral functioning of faculty and students.
Social Moral Epistemology
Briefly stated, social moral epistemology is concerned with the ways in which 
social practices inform our epistemic beliefs, which, in turn, impact moral 
functioning at individual and institutional levels.36 In describing the con-
nection between the epistemic and the moral, Talisse contends that certain 
“normative epistemic commitments are prior to or at least as basic as our 
moral commitments.”37 One can think of many examples of this connection 
and its impact on civic life. For example, false beliefs about the intellectual 
and physical fragility of women resulted in paternalistic moral commitments 
within families (e.g., focusing on preparing daughters for domestic life, rather 
than providing them with formal education) and public policies that treated 
women as second-class citizens (e.g., not allowing women to vote). Buchanan 
refers to this phenomenon as the “ethics of believing” and argues that insti-
tutional virtues contribute to developing factual beliefs that support greater 
moral functioning.38 On the other hand, institutional vices, such as ignoring 
the psychological processes at play in developing false beliefs, can result in 
decreased moral functioning at the individual level and harmful policies and 
practices that undermine justice and fairness at the societal level.
Thus, social moral epistemology informs our understanding of the mor-
al implications of knowledge production and dissemination. Drawing from 
36 Buchanan, “Education and Social Moral Epistemology,” 2015.
37 Robert Talisse, “Toward a Social Epistemic Comprehensive Liberalism,” Episteme 5, 
no. 1 (2008): 68.
38 Allen Buchanan, “Philosophy and Public Policy: A Role for Social Moral Epistemology,” 
Journal of Applied Psychology 26, no. 3 (2009): 285.
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empirical studies in cognitive psychology, social moral epistemologists paint 
a more accurate description of knowers as they actually are, not as we wish 
them to be, and calls attention to the ways in which existing biases and cog-
nitive limitations undermine moral functioning. Of particular concern to so-
cial moral epistemologists is the epistemic deference we give to individuals 
deemed to be “experts” in our society. We are all more epistemically depend-
ent on others than we would like to admit, and our deference to authority 
figures has real consequences for our moral decisions and actions as citizens.39 
By heightening our awareness of these limitations within ourselves and other 
knowers, social moral epistemology aims to improve moral functioning and 
thus contribute to a more just society.
Buchanan’s recent work on social moral epistemology as an aim of higher 
education has particular bearing on the Middlebury case for two reasons: (1) 
he identifies four “morally crucial factual beliefs” that institutions of higher 
education should treat with special scrutiny and (2) he addresses the moral 
implications of advancing knowledge using deliberative democratic methods 
given what we know about our cognitive limitations.40
First, Buchanan outlines beliefs that “undermine moral performance in cat-
astrophic ways.”41 He is particularly interested in beliefs that have contributed 
to mass violence, including false-factual beliefs concerning genetic differenc-
es between groups of citizens, false historical claims about these groups, false 
alarm over our own group’s vulnerability in relation to others in society, and 
fabricated blame ascribed to certain groups for social ills. Buchanan identifies 
both formal and informal ways in which these beliefs are socially transmitted. 
These informal methods of transmission are particularly insidious in that they 
do not directly question moral principles but rather utilize “folk psychology 
that is accurate enough to work for their purposes.”42 Buchanan points out that 
some of the most egregious consequences of these beliefs developed within 
liberal democracies with free speech rights and were promulgated using existing 
structures of epistemic deference found within institutions of higher education. 
He cites the obvious example of eugenics research and the rise of Nazism, but 
other examples are readily available. Consider that in the 1990s multiple social 
scientists warned of a rising wave of “superpredator” youth, instilling fear in cit-
izens and politicians. This false belief resulted in irreparable damage by ushering 
39 Talisse, “Social Epistemic Comprehensive Liberalism,” 2008.
40 Buchanan, “Education and Social Moral Epistemology,” 2015.
41 Ibid., 98.
42 Ibid., 108.
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in a wave of “tough on crime” policies that contributed to mass incarceration.43 
In light of historical examples, Buchanan cautions colleges and universities to 
apply strict scrutiny to such beliefs.
With regard to the Middlebury case, there is reason to suggest that Mur-
ray’s views warrant such strict scrutiny. Students claim that Murray’s views have 
been academically discredited, and certainly many scholars have criticized Mur-
ray’s work over the years, including an edited volume devoted solely to his 
claims about IQ and race.44 Still, Murray continues to find an audience for 
what psychologists Turkheimer, Harden, and Nisbett refer to as his “slipshod” 
logic and methods.45 And, as President Patton acknowledges in her prefatory 
remarks to his speech, Murray remains a controversial, yet influential, public 
presence. Siegel argues that the reason academics have never been able to fully 
defeat Murray’s views is that they have failed to attack them at their most vul-
nerable point: prejudicial premises.46 It’s not that Murray cites incorrect data; 
it’s that he asks questions that are prejudicial and uses data that are accurate 
enough to support illogical leaps and gross generalizations.
Take, for example, Murray’s now famous remark that “No woman has 
been a significant original thinker in any of the world’s great philosophi-
cal traditions.” Murray defends this remark by saying that he is not arguing 
women are genetically inferior but rather drawing conclusions from existing 
data about the number of women who have won major prizes for intellectual 
activity. He then goes on to state what he believes to be self-evident claims 
about sex differences in parenting (e.g., men can forget about their kids when 
they go to work but women cannot) and argues, without providing empirical 
evidence, that these perceived sex differences are tied to the “neurophysiolo-
gy of being female.” He concludes that women are more motivated to have 
children and to rear them and thus deemphasize professional accomplish-
ment.47 What makes claims like these so potentially harmful is that they play 
into existing cognitive biases given the society in which we live. Gender dis-
43 Retro Report, “The Superpredator Scare,” New York Times, https://eji.org/videos/
superpredator-scare.
44 Bernie Devlin et al., eds., Intelligence, Genes, & Success (New York: Springer-Verlag, 
1997).
45 Eric Turkheimer, Kathryn Paige Harden, and Richard Nisbett, “Charles Murray Is Once 
Again Peddling Junk Science about Race and IQ,” Vox, May 18, 2017.
46 Eric Siegel, “The Real Problem with Charles Murray and ‘The Bell Curve,’” Scientific 
American, April 12, 2017.
47 Charles Murray, “No, I Don’t Think Women Are Genetically Inferior,” American 
Enterprise Institute Ideas, http://www.aei.org/publication/charles-murray-no-i-dont-
think-women-are-genetically-inferior/.
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crimination is a well-documented problem within the United States and con-
tributes to tangible injustices such as a persistent pay gap between men and 
women (one that has an even worse impact upon women of color).48 Within 
that context of socially distorted biases regarding men and women, Murray’s 
statements can tap into confirmation bias, in which previously held prejudicial 
beliefs are reinforced when encountering new information.49
Moreover, given that Murray cites data, holds an academic appointment 
with a think tank, and otherwise makes his claims in a manner consistent 
with the trappings of an expert, individuals may fall prey to the novice–expert 
problem in which they assign epistemic deference to someone with a greater 
level of perceived expertise. Murray does not have to state that women are 
genetically inferior to men; the way in which he presents correlational data 
can play into existing biases and leave others to infer genetic inferiority.
This leads to Buchanan’s second point, which concerns the moral impli-
cations of advancing knowledge using deliberative democratic methods. The 
underlying assumption on the part of Middlebury faculty and other academ-
ics responding to this case is that a free market of ideas will, over the course of 
time, advance knowledge within liberal democracies. With time and rational 
deliberation, the best ideas will rise to the top and the weaknesses of inferior 
or harmful ideas will be exposed. Buchanan argues that this belief is based on 
what we wish to be true about knowers but not what science tells us they are 
actually like. He warns of a widespread, mistaken belief in our own epistemic 
independence in which we think we are more rational than we are.
Instead, Buchanan describes knowers as having “flawed and limited cogni-
tive faculties…aware of only a fraction of the available information, with the bits 
of information he or she is aware of already endowed with epistemic weights 
attached through the mediation of defective social epistemic practices that sub-
ject him or her to moral and prudential risks to which he or she is largely obliv-
48 AAUW, The Simple Truth About the Gender Pay Gap (Washington, DC: AAUW, 2018).
49 Similar issues arise with respect to Murray’s book Coming Apart: The State of White 
America, 1960–2010, which was the subject of his invited lecture to Middlebury. As 
Nicholas Confessore outlined in his New York Times review of the book (February 
10, 2012), Murray uses statistical data to paint a bleak picture of the white working 
class. When compared to what Murray describes as a high IQ elite class, working-class 
individuals are more likely to have children outside of marriage, more likely to be on 
disability, and less likely to have a job. These statistics feed into existing stereotypes about 
working-class individuals and are predicated upon certain normative assumptions (e.g., 
the superiority of having children within a legally recognized marriage). As Confessore 
points out, Murray glosses over or fails to include data concerning social policies that 
contribute to an underclass (e.g., a lack of affordable healthcare).
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ious.”50 One way in which these epistemic weights can undermine knowledge 
production, rational deliberation, and equality is that they contribute to a form 
of testimonial injustice in which we unfairly discredit the views of another given 
our biases and prejudice.51 When we bring these undue biases into spaces of ra-
tional discourse, we may give too much credit to some individuals because they 
hold similar positions to our own or articulate these positions in a socially ac-
ceptable manner and, at the same time, assign too little credibility to individuals 
who present contrasting views or express these views in ways we find unclear or 
uncomfortable.52 The point here is not that knowers are completely incapable 
of rational deliberation, but rather that they are prone to committing cognitive 
errors, and they are largely unaware of their own cognitive limitations. These 
errors and limitations, or ethics of believing, have very real consequences for 
moral functioning at the individual level in that epistemic beliefs contribute to 
moral commitments and undergird moral actions; in turn, the moral function-
ing of individuals impacts society at large as individuals take these commitments 
with them into the public sphere as citizens.
Advancing Moral Aims
In the preceding sections, I have attempted to reframe the existing narrative in 
response to conflicts over invited speakers to college and university campuses. 
Rather than emphasizing the legal right to free speech and the importance of 
free inquiry, I have called attention to the moral ramifications of knowledge 
production and dissemination given what we know about the cognitive lim-
itations of knowers. I turn now to the potential for college and universities 
to support the moral functioning of individuals on their campuses as they 
wrestle with who should be given a forum to speak, why, and in what manner. 
Specifically, I contend that educators at Middlebury and others throughout 
the country are allowing opportunities for moral education to pass by when 
they work from within the dominant narrative (i.e., the right to free speech), 
rather than foregrounding the moral disagreements at play over the produc-
tion and dissemination of knowledge within a pluralistic, democratic society.
50 Buchanan, “Education and Social Moral Epistemology,” 2015, 106.
51 Miranda Fricker, Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2007).
52 Rebecca Taylor and Ashley Kuntz, “Protecting Speech, Seeking Truth, and Cultivating 
Intellectual Fairness in American Higher Education” (American Educational Research 
Association, New York, April 2018).
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One factor to consider at the outset is the extent to which biases against 
college students may undermine such educational opportunities. It may be 
that educators are overlooking the possibilities for moral learning given a 
chorus of voices in recent years questioning the moral capacities of emerging 
adults. College students are credited with multiple ethical failures, including 
increased instances of sexual assault and cheating,53 and they are depicted as 
aimless and deficient in moral reasoning.54 They are also alternately described 
as being snowflakes who are overly morally sensitive55 and, at other times, 
not sensitive enough to the complexities of moral and social problems.56 
Ebels-Duggan suggests that perhaps we have misdiagnosed the problem and 
thus employed the wrong medicine; in her view, college students are best un-
derstood not as lacking in moral beliefs but rather as being overconfident in 
the views they do hold.57 When Middlebury students allege in their statement 
that faculty have bought into false narratives about them which undermine 
their credibility, these are the types of narratives they may have in mind.
Yet, in this case we see potential for a different narrative about college stu-
dents. The Middlebury student statement rejects intellectual and moral relativ-
ism, takes principled stances, expresses empathy for peers, and demonstrates a 
beyond-the-self motivation. Indeed, students note that they put themselves at 
risk of college sanction and subjected themselves to national scorn in an effort 
to promote a more inclusive campus environment that respects the inherent 
dignity and equality of all Middlebury students. Video from the event clearly 
shows that protesters came from multiple racial and ethnic backgrounds, indi-
cating that underrepresented students and allies worked together to advance a 
principle they believed to be important. Moreover, these students raised rea-
sonable concerns about the moral implications of unlimited free speech in pro-
ducing and disseminating knowledge that undermines democratic aims.
With only a week’s notice of Murray’s visit, students voiced their con-
cerns in the form of petitions, signs, and shouting down the speaker. Perhaps 
53 Thomas G. Plante and Lori G. Plante, Graduating with Honor: Best Practices to Promote 
Ethical Development (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2017).
54 Christian Smith et al., Lost in Transition: The Dark Side of Emerging Adulthood (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 2011).
55 Bradley Campbell and Jason Manning, “The End of Academe: Free Speech and the 
Silencing of Dissent,” Chronicle of Higher Education, January 21, 2018.
56 Paul Weitham, “Academic Friendship,” in The Aims of Higher Education, eds. Harry 
Brighouse and Michael McPherson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
57 Kyla Ebels-Duggan, “Autonomy as Intellectual Virtue,” in The Aims of Higher Educa-
tion, eds. Harry Brighouse and Michael McPherson (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 2015).
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indicative of the types of “strings attached” to rational deliberation that Sand-
ers describes,58 the faculty statement appeared to miss the concerns for justice 
and fairness students were raising early in their dissent. Instead, their written 
response focused on staking a claim for free inquiry. Thus, one takeaway from 
the Middlebury case may be to pause and consider not just the manner in 
which dissent is being voiced but also what foundational disagreements are 
underlying that dissent and how those disagreements can be addressed in a 
way that supports moral learning.
There is potential for moral learning to go both ways in this case. Facul-
ty are right when they claim that “a good education produces modesty with 
respect to our own intellectual powers and opinions as well as openness to 
considering contrary views.”59 They, along with President Patton and other 
academics, make several important points about the importance of free inquiry 
in producing knowledge, which is undoubtedly an aim of higher education. 
Faculty can and should take time to educate students on the ways in which free 
speech can support equality and justice within society, especially when it is used 
to protect oppressed individuals speaking out against unjust social practices.
That being said, students call attention to radical changes within the US 
and American higher education, and faculty may need to reevaluate deeply held 
beliefs in light of this shifting context. Take, for a moment, these contempo-
rary realities: (1) colleges comprise increasingly diverse student populations, 
(2) the number of hate groups is on the rise in the United States, nearing his-
toric highs,60 and (3) white supremacist activity on college campuses tripled in 
2017.61 Within this context, students rightfully point out that university com-
mitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion must extend beyond merely recruit-
ing racially, ethnically, and socioeconomically diverse individuals to campus. It 
must also include supporting the well-being of these individuals, inviting them 
to the proverbial table, and treating them as equals. Students do not disagree 
with faculty—they are capable of hearing offensive speech. They simply ques-
tion whether a college that repeatedly expresses a commitment to inclusion 
ought to provide a public forum to someone whose views run counter to this 
commitment, and in light of the current sociopolitical context, add to the bur-
den minoritized students already feel on campus and within society at large.
58 Sanders, “Against Deliberation,” 370.
59 Jay Parini and Keegan Callahan, “Free Inquiry on Campus.”
60 Southern Poverty Law Center, “Hate Groups 1999–2017,” https://www.splcenter.
org/hate-map.
61 Anti-Defamation League, “White Supremacist Propaganda Surges on Campus,” January 
29, 2018, https://www.adl.org/resources/reports/white-supremacist-propaganda-
surges-on-campus.
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This question gets at the heart of the role of colleges and universities in 
producing and disseminating knowledge that either supports or undermines 
democratic aims. Faculty argue that a chief aim of education is to cultivate the 
mind and its capacity for rational deliberation, and they see the contestation of 
ideas as the mechanism to achieve this aim. Yet, students point to the moral im-
plications of providing certain speakers with a public forum, especially one that 
is legitimized by formal sponsorship from an academic department and includes 
an appearance by the president. They do not view all ideas as equally worthy of 
consideration, and they do not view free inquiry as neutral in its impact.
Buchanan’s work sheds light on what is at stake from a moral perspective 
in situations like these—both with regard to supporting the moral function-
ing of individuals and with regard to supporting justice and fairness within 
society.62 History is replete with examples of harmful ideas based on shoddy 
science that have been advanced in societies with free speech protections and 
promulgated by institutions of higher learning, even to the point of mass 
violence.63 Additionally, new insights from social epistemology and cognitive 
science have made us more aware of our own cognitive limitations and biases 
and the errors we are all prone to making. Thus, as Buchanan argues, colleges 
and universities would be wise to heed “the crucial dependence of our mor-
al performance on our epistemic performance.”64 Doing so would require 
moving beyond a commitment to teaching critical thinking and promoting 
rational deliberation and also give attention to preventing moral damage in 
the advancement of knowledge. Buchanan encourages universities to use his-
torical case studies to prepare students to evaluate the premises of arguments 
and also to make them aware of the consequences of particularly dangerous 
false-factual beliefs. This type of deliberation that is mindful of epistemic bi-
ases stands to advance justice by subjecting ideas to moral scrutiny. Colleges 
that create environments where such conversations can unfold can produce 
and disseminate knowledge that reduces harm and supports inclusion.
Conclusion
Conflicts over invited speakers show no sign of decreasing on our college 
and university campuses, and conversations about how best to respond to 
these conflicts are ongoing. Middlebury has continued to engage students in 
discussion of the events that unfolded during Murray’s visit and to explore 
62 Buchanan, “Education and Social Moral Epistemology,” 2015.
63 Ibid.
64 Ibid., 109.
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possibilities for more inclusive dialogue about free speech and justice. In this 
chapter, I have identified features of the Middlebury case that may be use-
ful in responding to similar conflicts on other campuses. Specifically, I have 
argued that we need to give consideration to not only the legal right to free 
speech and the importance of free inquiry in producing knowledge but also 
the moral implications of disseminating knowledge.
As mentioned earlier, it is not always possible for colleges and universi-
ties to decide who can speak on their campuses. However, even if they must 
provide a forum for a speaker, they do have some autonomy over the circum-
stances surrounding the speaker’s visit. When considering which speakers are 
invited and the format used for their lectures, it is important to consider what 
Buchanan refers to as the responsibility of institutions of higher education 
to not only teach critical thinking but also to reduce harm. On his view, re-
ducing harm involves recognizing the epistemic limitations of knowers and 
how easily we all fall prey to the pitfalls of bias and epistemic deference. For 
that reason, we ought to apply strict scrutiny to false-factual beliefs that un-
dermine moral functioning by playing into existing stereotypes about certain 
groups or assigning blame for social ills to certain classes of people. When 
possible, colleges and universities should mitigate the reach of speakers who 
propagate such false-factual beliefs.
Additionally, colleges and universities should recognize and authentically 
respond to the very real lack of trust students have in rational deliberation to 
advance knowledge and support democratic aims. Students in this case, and 
potentially others, did not have faith that the best ideas would win the day 
and the worst and most damaging ideas would be relegated to the margins. 
To avoid moral deadlock in cases like these, faculty and administrators must 
engage students in conversations about balancing protecting speech and pro-
moting justice. Retrenching into debates over free speech, without addressing 
the moral consequences of such speech at both the individual and societal lev-
el, is unlikely to move the conversation on our campuses forward. Instead, we 
must tackle the very real complications that arise in a society in which speech 
is protected, knowers are subject to cognitive limitations and epistemic biases, 
and producing and disseminating knowledge can support or undermine the 
moral functioning of citizens and thus democracy as a whole.
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2.  The Neoliberal and Neoracist
Potentialities of International
Doctoral Student of Color
Admissions in Graduate
Education Programs
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Abstract: The increasing internationalization and globalization of higher edu-
cation exist in relation to a globalized capitalistic economy driven by neoliberal 
ideologies. Based on neoliberal and neoracist theory, this essay begins a conver-
sation on the ways that the recruitment and admissions of graduate-level interna-
tional students of color in Education programs bolsters the academic capitalist/
knowledge regime to the detriment of understanding the nuances of the human 
experience on college campuses. International students are recruited from coun-
tries with high economic potential, admitted to producing prestige-bolstering 
outputs, exploited to provide financial capital to the university, and treated as 
dehumanized commodities. This essay, therefore, peels away layers exposing the 
related and perceived purposes of international student recruitment and the ne-
glectful treatment of those students. It points to a nuanced understanding of 
international admissions that must be considered in higher education.
Keywords: graduate, admissions, international, neoracism, higher education 
As states continue to reduce funding to higher education, institutions are left to 
find new ways to reduce costs and increase income. At the same time, globali-
zation persists in shaping the international marketplace, and universities have 
capitalized by increasing internationalization efforts on their campuses in part to 
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offset lost revenue.1 Post-World War II, institutions increased their presence in 
countries around the world “as part of the nation’s cultural, political, economic, 
and military forms of domination”2 while also maintaining and increasing the 
internationalization of research and scholarship on home campuses.3 Increased 
multinational university systems (e.g., U.S. branch campuses in other countries), 
lack of access to education in many countries, and the United States’ widely 
recognized institutional prestige and “massification” of higher education led to 
increased numbers of international students who sought out higher education in 
the United States and points to an important juncture in understanding higher 
education broadly.4
Rhoads and Liu (2008) argued that increasing internationalization and 
globalization of higher education exist in relation to a globalized capitalis-
tic economy driven by neoliberal ideologies. Neoliberalism is a global social 
and economic theory that understands society to be organized around mar-
ket-based values of individualistic capital gain, fiscal austerity across a range of 
social structures, and an increased competitive ethos.5 As it relates to interna-
tional student enrollment in the United States, neoliberalism suggests that uni-
versities admit students from outside the United States because they pay higher 
tuition rates and/or may be supported by their countries financially. These stu-
dents increase production that boosts a university’s competitive advantage via 
research production6 but universities provide fewer resources to support them 
(e.g., funding, mental health, job placement, English-skills training, writing 
support, assimilation support). Lastly, universities tout international students 
as successful and diverse students of color in marketing materials, thereby con-
tinuing to capitalize on their physical bodies.7
1 Philip G. Altbach, Global Perspectives on Higher Education (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
Press, 2016).
2 Jeong-eun Rhee and Mary Ann Danowitz Sagaria, “International Students: Construc-
tions of Imperialism in the Chronicle of Higher Education,” The Review of Higher 
Education 28, no. 1 (2004): 80.
3 Scott Andrew Schulz, Jenny J. Lee, Brendan J. Cantwell, George McClellan, and Doug 
Woodard, “Moving Toward a Global Community: An Analysis of the Internationali-
zation of Student Affairs Graduate Preparation Programs,” NASPA Journal 44, no. 3 
(2007): 610–632.
4 Altbach, Global Perspectives on Higher Education, 2016.
5 Henry A. Giroux, “Democracy in Crisis, the Specter of Authoritarianism, and the Future 
of Higher Education,” Journal of Critical Scholarship on Higher Education and Student 
Affairs 1, no. 1 (2015): 101–113.
6 Altbach, Global Perspectives on Higher Education, 2006.
7 Jennifer F. Hamer and Clarence Lang, “Race, Structural Violence, and the Neolibe-
ral University: The Challenges of Inhabitation,” Critical Sociology 41, no. 6 (2015): 
897–912.
The Neoliberal and Neoracist Potentialities 31
The potential dehumanization and commodification of international stu-
dents of color by way of monetizing them for capitalistic gain is the focus of 
this chapter, a phenomenon examined through the perspectives of College of 
Education faculty of color engaged in a doctoral admissions cycle. While not 
the initial purpose of the research study, findings emerged that pointed toward 
a troubling trend in the field of education as it related to graduate admissions. 
This field was selected due to a stated engagement with work that affects diver-
sity and equity-related campus outcomes, a historic mission to focus on social 
justice and inclusion in curriculums and research in the field, and continued 
calls to supporting all students in their learning development.8 Therefore, it 
is thought that faculty would be more cognizant of the potentially troubling 
results of international student admissions within their discipline. As people 
of color, a political term9 used in racial solidarity projects with multiple racial 
groups, faculty are also theorized to have a personal investment in the success 
of students of color and a nuanced understanding of diversity in the admissions 
process as they both engaged in those processes as students and now engage 
as faculty members. As a result of data collection, these claims proved true. 
This is not to conclude that faculty were aware of and utilized frameworks that 
centered an analysis of neoliberalism or neoracism by name, but rather that 
they were constructing understandings of international graduate admissions 
that provide an apt scholarly analysis using those lenses. In this engagement, 
they trouble the neoliberal global marketization of higher education broadly 
by recognizing the problematic nature of international admissions for under-
standing the neoracist climate, explained in the next section, within which in-
ternational students enter the academy in the United States, the purposes for 
those student’s admissions, and for recognizing the unique experiences of both 
domestic and international students of color.10
With a 72% increase in international student enrollment since 2000, almost 
1.1M students are international, making up 5.3% of total graduate enrollment.11 
In Science, Technology, Engineering, and Math (STEM) fields, international 
8 American Council on Education, The Student Personnel Point of View (Washington: 
American Council on Education, 1949).
9 Kimberle Crenshaw, “Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color,” Stanford Law Review, 43 (1993): 1241–1299.
10 Brendan Cantwell and Jenny Lee, “Unseen Workers in the Academic Factory: Per-
ceptions of Neoracism among International Postdocs in the United States and the 
United Kingdom,” Harvard Educational Review 80, no. 4 (2010): 490–517.
11 IIE (Institute of International Education), Open Doors 2017 Executive Summary. Retrie-
ved from https://www.iie.org/Why-IIE/Announcements/2017-11-13-Open-Doors-
2017-Executive-Summary (2017).
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graduate students make up anywhere from 50 to 70% of enrolled students.12 
Students also tend to come from certain countries. In 2017, there was a 12.3% 
increase in enrollment of students from India, 6.8% from China, and 20% from 
Nepal.13 There were drops in enrollment from some countries due to the end-
ing of State-subsidized tuition programs14 and the travel ban including in places 
like Iran, India, and Saudia Arabia. Other countries saw upticks in enrollment 
including Brazil that saw a 34% increase in 2014, for example.15 Overall, there 
was a 1.9% increase in graduate enrollment in 2017,16 following steady year-
over-year increases such as a 9.8% increase in 2014.17 The U.S. Department of 
Commerce placed the domestic contribution at over $39B in 2016, $4B more 
than in 2015.18 Therefore, the purposes of international admissions and the 
subsequent experiences of students is of contemporary importance.
The research question for this study is: How do faculty in education pro-
grams make sense of increasing international doctoral admissions and enroll-
ment in predominantly white institutions (PWIs)? Based on neoliberal and 
neoracist theory, I begin to reveal the ways that the recruitment and admis-
sions of international students of color skew an arguably historic public good 
mission of higher education for the purposes of bolstering the academic cap-
italist/knowledge regime19 at the detriment of understanding the nuances of 
the human experience on college campuses. I posit that through an academic 
capitalist knowledge regime, fueled by neoliberal principles, international stu-
dents are recruited to campus from particular countries with high economic 
and wealth potential, admitted to campus to produce outputs that bolster 
the prestige of universities, exploited to provide necessary financial capital to 
the university coffers, and are treated as commodities and dehumanized in 
the process.20 This chapter, therefore, peels away layers exposing the related 
and perceived purposes of international student recruitment, the neglectful 
12 Stuart Anderson, The Importance of International Students to America (Arlington: Na-
tional Foundation for American Policy, 2013).
13 IIE (Institute of International Education), Open Doors 2017 Executive Summary, 2017.
14 Ibid.
15 H. Okahana and E. Zhou, International Graduate Applications and Enrollment: Fall 
2017 (Washington: Council of Graduate Schools, 2018).
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
19 Sheila Slaughter and Gary Rhoades, Academic Capitalism and the New Economy: Mar-
kets, State, and Higher Education (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2004).
20 Philip G. Altbach, Liz Reisberg, and Laura E. Rumbley, “Tracking a Global Academic 
Revolution.” In Global Perspectives on Higher Education, edited by Philip G. Altbach 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 2016).
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treatment of those students, and points to a nuanced understanding of inter-
national admissions that must be considered in higher education.
Theoretical Foundations
In order to understand the climate surrounding international graduate stu-
dent of color admissions, I draw from foundational understandings of glo-
balized neoliberalism,21 imperialism,22 and the concept of neoracism in higher 
education.23 Through these lenses, I began to observe the continued con-
struction of an academic capitalist/knowledge regime24 that guides the ac-
tions of the university toward the commodification of bodies of international 
students toward economic gains and uncovers “the hidden cultural stereo-
types that dictate”25 the experiences of international students.
Neoliberalism
Neoliberalism in its most basic form is a theory, practice, and mindset that aims to 
deregulate capitalistic endeavors in order to provide unrestricted capital gain, with 
little attention paid to human dignity. An embedded exercise engaged across all 
neoliberal contexts is globalization.26 Within higher education, neoliberalism pre-
sents itself expansively; however, for the purposes of this chapter, I highlight the 
academic capitalist knowledge regime27 and link it to a globalization enterprise.
Globalization, and its intended resultant, neocolonial economic domi-
nation, is integral to the success of neoliberal logic.28 Altbach (2016) called 
higher education-related globalization “the new neocolonialism” (87). 
Rhoads and Liu (2008) described globalization as local and worldwide social 
relations and human interactions that have
altered the very nature of society…[and] increasingly shape[d] the operations 
and functions of the nation-state and its foundational institutions, including the 
21 Peter Evans and William H. Sewell, “Neoliberalism: Policy Regimes, International 
Regime, and Social Effects.” In Social Resilience in the Neoliberal Era, edited by Peter 
A. Hall and Michèle Lamont (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013).
22 Rhee and Sagaria, “International Students,” 77–96.
23 Jenny J. Lee and Charles Rice, “Welcome to America? International Student Perceptions 
of Discrimination,” Higher Education 53, no. 4 (2007): 381–409.
24 Brendan Cantwell and Ilkka Kauppinen., eds., Academic Capitalism in the Age of Glo-
balization (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2014).
25 Cantwell and Lee, “Unseen Workers in the Academic Factory,” 497.
26 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).
27 Slaughter and Rhoades, Academic Capitalism and the New Economy.
28 Rhee and Sagaria, “International Students,” 77–96.
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university. [Globalization] raises the issue of neoliberalism and the ways in which 
the world economy is being shaped by a particular view of capitalism and global 
economics…where in fact, neoliberalism’s most dangerous and oppressive effects 
often are intentionally concealed. (276)
This chapter begins to unveil these concealed effects.
In theory, states should reduce restrictions for goods to pass between 
borders in order to facilitate global exchange.29 Ordorika and Lloyd (2015) 
aptly recognized that globalization’s development provides the ability for 
goods, politics, people, and cultures to “transcend national borders” (137). 
In higher education, this is seen through the ways that universities leverage 
resources behind academic services that assist students in obtaining visas and 
send admissions counselors abroad to recruit, among many others.30
Neoliberalism specifically addresses economic capital accumulation, al-
though it may do so through the eradication of a country’s cultural, political, 
and social idiosyncrasies in the name of freedom and thereby employing im-
perialistic principles in the name of U.S. economic and social domination.31 
Altbach (2016) wrote, “most international students pay for their own studies, 
producing significant income for host countries and a drain on the economy 
of the developing world [or home country].” Additional resource depletion 
and the consumption of foreign markets as resources and commodities ensues 
feeding a continued imperialistic reign.32
The Institute of International Education found that international stu-
dents contributed over $39B to the U.S. economy in 2017, international 
graduate students add to university prestige and rankings, and they have a 
direct and positive impact on patent applications and grants.33 These benefits 
speak directly to neoliberal policy and practice and the academic-capitalist 
knowledge regime. Even though Posselt (2014) found that graduate faculty 
at elite institutions do believe that international students are important to 
include in institutional definitions of diversity, few spoke to the concerns asso-
ciated with the admission of those students. She argued for more research on 
this conflation, and this study provides nuance for this continued discussion.
29 Evans and Sewell, “Neoliberalism,” 35–68.
30 Stephanie Saul, Recruiting Students Oversees to Fill Seats, Not to Meet Standards. Retrie-
ved from http://nyti.ms/1SrJR13.
31 Altbach, Global Perspectives on Higher Education.
32 Rhee and Sagaria, “International Students,” 77–96.
33 Gnanaraj Chellaraj, Keith E. Maskus, and Aaditya Mattoo, “The Contribution of Inter-
national Graduate Students to US Innovation,” Review of International Economics 16, 
no. 3 (2008): 444–462.
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Critical Race Theory
Critical Race Theory (CRT) was developed from Critical Legal Studies and 
has five tenets: (a) race and racism are endemic to U.S. society and influence 
and organize every part of our society; (b) liberal, meritocratic, and color-
blind analyses are insufficient lenses from which to study race and racism; (c) 
intersectional identities should be taken into account when studying people 
of color; (d) the voices of people of color are central to creating a counter-
narrative of the dominant, white narrative often highlighted in research; and 
(e) social justice and action-taking are key outcomes of utilizing CRT.34
Important to this study, deconstructing liberal, meritocratic, and color-blind 
rhetoric unveils the ways that racism historically and currently shapes the higher 
education landscape.35 Essentially, liberal, meritocratic, and color-blind ideologies 
are born from the belief that each person should have the same chances and op-
portunities for success; however, this thinking is also void of historicized under-
standings of systems of oppression such as racism, classism, or ableism inherent 
within U.S. society. In this study, one can apply this tenet to better understand 
the ways that policies are applied “equally” across all student groups despite un-
derlying constructions of dehumanizing capitalistic gain created from the utili-
zation of their bodies. By resituating the experiences of people of color within 
the context of white supremacist historicity, critical race theorists are better able 
to illuminate the mechanisms utilized to maintain white domination including 
standardized tests and the various forms of capital necessary for successfully pur-
suing advanced education. Additionally, CRT can reveal the “racist epistemologies 
[that] are deeply embedded in the meaning-making structures that inform the 
naturalization or oppression and the normalization or racial inequality” in higher 
education,36 thereby providing a space for reconstructing those systems toward 
equity and liberation. Essentially, in revealing racist epistemologies that dictate 
decision-making processes, one can unveil the ways that practices stemming from 
racist thinking against “the other” work to maintain a racially stratified workforce.
CRT is an appropriate lens from which to study this subject because insti-
tutions of higher education were created to forward a white, elite, and religious 
dogma from the moment colonial settlers landed in the country.37 Additionally, 
34 David Stovall, “Out of Adolescence and into Adulthood: Critical Race Theory, Retrench-
ment, and the Imperative of Praxis,” Urban Education 51, no. 3 (2016): 274–286.
35 Gloria Ladson-Billings and William F. Tate, Toward a Critical Race Theory of Education 
(New York: Routledge, 2017).
36 Garrett Albert Duncan, Critical Race Ethnography in Education: Narrative, Inequality, 
and the Problem of Epistemology (New York: Routledge, 2017), 74.
37 Craig Steven Wilder, Ebony and Ivy: Race, Slavery, and the Troubled History of America’s 
Universities (Bloomsbury Publishing USA, 2013).
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universities were quite literally built on the backs of enslaved Africans and Indig-
enous peoples of the land now known as the United States of America.38 There-
fore, the epistemologies of these first white inhabitants and university architects 
have extended through time and space in the ways that universities currently 
organize themselves.39 CRT helps to excavate the ways that universities continue 
to enact racist violence on certain communities and maintain white supremacy. 
CRT also provides for people of color’s voices to be central to the exploration of 
this topic as their voices are often silenced or whitewashed.40 Lastly, CRT does 
not allow for taken-for-granted assumptions related to the experience of people 
of color; everything is suspect through a critical examination.41 The application 
of a CRT lens interrogates underlying thought and processes of the participants 
in order to more clearly articulate a racist social structure.
Neoracism
Neoliberal and racialized projects of globalization and internationalization also 
fuel a secondary outcome as a result of the commodification of international 
students of color called neoracism, or racism stemming from a national origin 
that is described mainly by culture and ethnicity.42 Neoracism is the deploy-
ment of neocolonial mindsets that homogenizes diverse international identities, 
commodifies bodies, and creates third-class citizenship (arguably the first being 
whites and the second being domestic students of color). Neoracism does not 
erase historical U.S. understandings of racism; however, it provides a “way to 
discriminate by using new categories.”43 Therefore, one can mask their racism 
with arguments against national origin.44 Neoracism leverages the whiteness of 
an organization against the international bodies of color as well as domestic bod-
ies of color when those domestic students are misidentified as “foreign” even as 
38 Ibid.
39 Leigh Patel, “Desiring Diversity and Backlash: White Property Rights in Higher Edu-
cation,” The Urban Review 47, no. 4 (2015): 657–675.
40 Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory (New York: New York Uni-
versity Press, 2001).
41 Bradley A. Levinson, Jacob P.K. Gross, Christopher Hanks, Julia Heimer Dadds, Kafi 
Kumasi, and Joseph Link, Beyond Critique: Exploring Critical Social Theories and Edu-
cation (New York: Routledge, 2015).
42 Lee and Rice, “Welcome to America? International Student Perceptions of Discrimina-
tion,” 381–409.
43 Christina Yao, “‘They don’t Care about You’: First Chinese International Students’ 
Experiences with Neo-Racism and Othering on a U.S. Campus,” Journal of the First-
Year Experience and Students in Transition 30, no. 1 (2018): 89.
44 Lee and Rice, “Welcome to America? International Student Perceptions of Discrimina-
tion”, 381–409.
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diversity remains a desired commodity.45 As it relates to this chapter, neoracism, 
Lee and Rice (2007) argued, may affect the types of student services provided 
to international students, writing that “many support services at [internation-
al students’] U.S. institution, including admission, registration, residence life, 
and dining do not well accommodate international students despite the greater 
needs such students have as compared to native students” (386). Through this 
logic, I argue that neoracism manifests in the commodification of bodies of 
international students by using them to raise the academic capitalist knowledge 
regime by not providing them necessary services or developmental opportuni-
ties. Neoracism is an apt theory from which to view this project as it grounds a 
specific understanding of the treatment of international graduate students.
Methodology
This study specifically focuses on the perspectives of the faculty of color at 
PWIs in the United States, a position in line with the Critical Race Meth-
odology that guided this study.46 This group is underrepresented on college 
campuses and therefore sits in the margins.47 As people of color, they are also 
subject to ongoing and pervasive racism and racial projects in our country.48 
As mentioned previously, faculty of color were theorized to have direct insight 
into the admissions processes and had an understanding of their institutional 
context for communities of color, acted in solidarity with other racialized 
groups, and worked in a field with a social justice and equity guiding princi-
ple. The methods guiding this research were chosen as they centralize the ex-
periential knowledge of the faculty of color and are based on transdisciplinary 
perspectives.49 Additionally, critical race methodologies center the voices of 
people of color and challenge the liberal, meritocratic nature of education by 
analyzing the power and oppression inherent within the educational system. 
As a result, justice for marginalized racialized groups is reached through an 
application of findings to higher education contexts, or praxis.
45 Patel, “Desiring Diversity and Backlash,” 657–675.
46 Daniel G. Solórzano and Tara J. Yosso, “A Critical Race Counterstory of Race, Racism, 
and Affirmative Action,” Equity and Excellence in Education 35, no. 2 (2002): 155–168.
47 Kimberly A. Griffin, Marcela M. Muñiz, and Lorelle Espinosa, “The Influence of 
Campus Racial Climate on Diversity in Graduate Education,” The Review of Higher 
Education 35, no. 4 (2012): 535–566.
48 Michael Omi and Howard Winant, Racial Formation in the United States from the 1960s 
to the 1990s, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 1994).
49 Solórzano and Yosso, “A Critical Race Counterstory of Race, Racism, and Affirmative 
Action,” 155–168.
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Participants
For this study, each participant (a) must identify as a person of color. A per-
son of color is a person who identifies as a racial/ethnic minority (e.g., Black, 
Asian, Latinx/Hispanic, multiracial) and not exclusively as white; (b) is an 
assistant or newly tenured (1–2 years tenured) associate faculty member at a 
predominantly white U.S. university; (c) works in a doctorate-granting High-
er Education and Student Affairs program (or its aptly named equivalent). In 
total, I recruited 14 participants, 13 untenured faculty and one newly tenured 
faculty member through Facebook and discipline listservs. A total of 13 insti-
tutions were represented and were geographically dispersed across the Unit-
ed States and represented various institutional types. Participants later noted 
that they shared the call with colleagues who fit the criteria. For the broader 
study, understandings of how lack of tenure affected decision-making agency 
as people of color in the admissions process were important to analyze. Upon 
consent to participate, participants completed a demographic form where 
race, gender, years in the position, stated epistemology, and other demo-
graphic information were gathered. These data assisted me in understanding 
the participants’ intersectional identities as it related to their experiences.
Methods
Three primary methods of data collection were utilized, including a critical dis-
course analysis (CDA) of university mission and diversity statements, semi-struc-
tured interviews, and a focus group. A demographic questionnaire was used to 
collect relevant information about the faculty including their stated epistemolo-
gies, which were stated to be anywhere from constructivist to critical. Addition-
ally, an analysis of university documents and websites provided me with a better 
understanding of the context of each university and its relation to globalization 
and internationalization of the campus. Broad demographic data, percentages of 
international students, mission and vision statements, and strategic plans all pro-
vided clues to better understand the context of the faculty members’ experience.
CDA is both method and methodology that addresses deep social prob-
lems such as racism, sexism, and ableism50 in text and images and helps ex-
amine how language is linked to society.51 Both graphic and text (“images”) 
were analyzed through the conceptual lens outlined for the given study.
50 Teun A. Van Dijk, “Principles of Critical Discourse Analysis,” Discourse and Society 4, 
no. 2 (1993): 249–283.
51 Margaret R. Rogers and Ludwin E. Molina, “Exemplary Efforts in Psychology to Re-
cruit and Retain Graduate Students of Color,” American Psychologist 61, no. 2 (2006): 
143–156.
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I analyzed the following documents: (1) institutional mission statements 
and (2) institutional diversity statements. I chose to only review these docu-
ments because each participant’s university had these two documents while 
other potential documents (e.g., strategic plans, program-level diversity state-
ments) were not available for all universities. In these analyses, I examined 
what language was utilized to “talk” about, activate, or forward diversity, 
equity, and justice52 utilizing Gee’s (2014) Building Tasks. I first open coded 
the documents for diversity, equity, and justice text, including information on 
globalization, neoliberalism, and racism. I also looked at the positioning of 
a diversity-related word (e.g., how early it shows up in a mission statement, 
where the word is on a website). Fourteen codes were utilized.
Second, I utilized Gee’s (2014) Building Tasks to conduct the CDA. Gee 
(2014) identified four tools of analysis to analyze discourse. Those are so-
cial languages (e.g., formal, vernacular), discourses (e.g., combination of lan-
guage, actions, beliefs that make up identity), intertextuality (e.g., references 
to other texts), and conversations (e.g., common themes that are publicly 
known, ongoing public conversations such as global warming, terrorism). 
The analysis of these documents took place before the one-on-one interview 
to provide me with context for the interview and to better understand how 
diversity, equity, and justice are engaged in each participant’s university.
Semi-structured interviews were completed with all faculty. All interviews 
were recorded, lasted approximately 60 minutes each, and took place in Feb-
ruary 2015 through Skype or Google Voice.53 An initial open coding round 
revealed 82 codes.54 Those were collapsed into 12 axial codes that were then 
organized into the themes of the broader study.55 The theme and data associ-
ated with international graduate admissions are presented in this manuscript. 
Three auditors assisted me in open coding at least two interviews each and 
discussing and fine-tuning the initial open coding and 12 axial codes.
After interviews, three faculties took part in an in-person focus group and two 
took part in an online focus group. The focus group protocol provided the first 
opportunity for faculty to member check my findings from the interviews and to 
be in community with other faculty of color as they may have been isolated on 
52 Sara Ahmed, On Being Included: Racism and Diversity in Institutional Life (Durham: 
Duke University Press, 2012).
53 Hannah Deakin and Kelly Wakefield, “Skype Interviewing: Reflections of Two Doctoral 
Researchers,” Qualitative Research 14, no. 5 (2014): 603–616.
54 Johnny Saldaña, The Coding Manual for Qualitative Researchers (Thousand Oaks: Sage, 
2015).
55 Ibid.
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their campuses.56 The focus group lasted 120 minutes long. Two additional note 
takers provided memos from the focus group for analysis. All transcripts were cod-
ed with the 12 axial codes because the focus groups were used mainly as a member 
check method, thereby reifying my understanding of the faculty’s perceptions. 
After completing the data analysis (i.e., open and axial coding) and composing the 
findings, results were sent to participants for final member checking.
Presentation of Findings
The data are presented in two sections. The first subsection provides a brief 
overview of the CDA of mission and diversity statements found in an earlier 
publication.57 The second section presents the findings regarding how faculty 
think about issues of diversity in international admissions.
Globalization and Internationalization in Mission and  
Diversity Statements
Presenting an overview of the institutional context sets up the analysis of faculty 
recognition of neoliberal and neoracist undercurrents in international graduate 
student admissions. This section will not explicitly identify any university as to 
protect the identities of the faculty. What became clear in this analysis is that 
universities are content with continuing “happy talk” rhetoric58 around diversi-
ty issues; that is, language that is welcoming and inclusive of diverse bodies with 
little, if any, attention to systemic oppressions facing those communities or rec-
ognition of the realities of those groups’ experiences on the college campus.59
As it relates to internationalization and globalization, most universities did 
recognize the place of the university as situated within a global context. For 
instance, one university noted that it “strives for a culturally diverse community 
that reflects the state and nation” and does so mainly through international pro-
grams and study abroad. Another university noted that “globalization is a pri-
ority.”60 In an additional mission statement, the word “world” was mentioned 
twice, in the first and last sentence of the statement, providing place-based im-
56 bell hooks, Yearning: Race, Gender, and Cultural Politics (Boston: South End Press, 
1990).
57 See Dian D. Squire, “Shifting Narratives in Doctoral Admissions: Faculty of Color 
Understandings of Diversity, Equity, and Justice in a Neoliberal Context” (PhD diss., 
Loyola University, Chicago, 2015).
58 Ahmed, On Being Included: Racism and Diversity in Institutional Life.
59 Squire, “Shifting Narratives in Doctoral Admissions.”
60 Ibid.
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portance on the word by framing the rest of the statement. It also did so by 
relating the “world”-orientation to being a part of the Association of American 
Universities (AAU) of which there are only 62 research institutions. Inherent in 
that relationship is an elite status that is bolstered by top research dollars, grants, 
publications, and global notoriety. This relationship between institutional type 
(high-research) and words relating to globalization and internationalization was 
unequivocal (e.g., global challenges, global partnerships). Only one statement 
mentioned an overt goal of admitting international students.
As it relates to the neoliberal underpinnings of the institution, picking up 
on the linguistic inferences was important. For instance, one university men-
tioned that a mission was to convert research into products. At this public insti-
tution, the university takes public dollars to create public ideas, which are then 
sold in, produce revenue for, and are accessible to private industry.61 Another 
university mentioned technology transfer processes; and yet another the crea-
tion of online and distance education. Neoliberalism and globalization must be 
paired with understandings of neocolonial, neoracist, historical, and geograph-
ical impacts. Technology transfer, distance education, and the privatization of 
public goods are not inherently value-neutral, or value-positive entities.
In an interesting combination of both diversity rhetoric and neoliberal 
rhetoric, one university discussed diversity as giving the university a compet-
itive advantage. Rather than situating diverse student bodies as having edu-
cational value, it rather provides the university with the ability to “win” in a 
business marketplace. In this statement, one sees the most explicit statement 
regarding the commodification of diverse bodies and the leveraging of those 
bodies for a competitive advantage. Language that refers to the university as 
an “enterprise” is synonymous with corporation or companies.
A Big Push
The analysis of faculty interviews around understanding issues of diversity in 
graduate admissions revealed a disturbing trend around understanding in-
ternational admissions as an opportunity for universities to make additional 
revenue while providing little support to these students. The interests of the 
university in admitting international students are predominantly linked to the 
positive outcomes of higher rankings and income for universities.
In line with universities recognizing globalization as a priority in their 
mission statements, Greg reflected on the role that internationalization plays 
in this admissions process on his campus. He noted:
61 Slaughter and Rhoades, Academic Capitalism and the New Economy.
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The international piece is a big push. We end up attracting a lot of international 
students in our program as well. In our program, we have people from Portugal, 
Spain, from Jamaica, from all over, Saudi Arabia. It’s a big piece. A big piece to 
that. A lot of times a lot of the faculty push back on [the fact that we are] focused 
on these international things at the expense of some of these domestic issues that 
are really pressing around access to college and things like that.
What is most reflective of Greg’s statement is that the push is from countries 
where students who enroll will be seen as “diverse,” or not-white. Not only 
are universities aiming to admit international students, but they are also hop-
ing to admit students of color outside of a domestic context. Universities get 
both students of color and increased tuition dollars. As a result, they receive 
double benefits in both capital and visible racial diversity metrics.
Amber reflected on this homogenization of identity across race, ethnicity, 
and nationality, a result of neoracist thinking about international students. 
She stated, “The other thing is at the university level; the phrase that is used a 
lot is ‘diverse students.’ And that’s a catchall phrase for any person of color…
it’s okay to talk about race and ethnicity and nationality.”
Jennifer agreed to note that there’s “a lot of conflation between popula-
tions of color…they would report the number of racially and ethnically mi-
noritized students…. And then when we go back in the numbers really we’re 
talking about international students and not domestic racially and ethnically 
minoritized populations.” Kathleen called the creation of this narrative of a 
massification of students of color a “myth.” Jennifer reflected, “at my insti-
tution we have more students from one country than all domestically racially 
and ethnically minoritized students together.”
This conversation harkens to a threat of neoliberal rhetoric creeping into 
doctoral admissions that challenges a historic focus on remedying the margin-
alization of domestic students of color. There is a continued narrative on cam-
puses that having visually diverse students on campus raises the quality of edu-
cation.62 New students are looking for diverse campuses and if universities can 
show that diversity in pamphlets, websites, and in their numbers, and do it with 
international students as well as domestic students of color, then they “win.”63
Once again, the intertwining nature of a capitalistic enterprise and the admis-
sion of students of color challenges education for education’s sake and instead de-
humanizes international students, reducing them to a dollar sign and the bottom 
62 Ellen Berrey, The Enigma of Diversity: The Language of Race and the Limits of Racial 
Justice (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2015).
63 Nana Osei-Kofi, Lisette E. Torres, and Joyce Lui, “Practices of Whiteness: Racialization 
in College Admissions Viewbooks,” Race Ethnicity and Education 16, no. 3 (2013): 
385–405.
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line. Kathleen continued discussing her understanding of the international grad-
uate admissions process. She explicitly noted the financial component. She stated:
You think about the interest that these students are serving the institution, espe-
cially in the graduate level, I know there’s like a financial component. If you’re 
an international student, I know that you have to show that your parents can pay 
or that you have enough money to pay or your government has to be funding 
you. So there’s this monetary incentive for the university, for universities broadly 
to bring in international students and they pay more. So, I think that it just really 
works out for the business model, capitalist way we see the trend of higher edu-
cation broadly, so I think it may not even really be about diversity.
Complicating the understanding of international students as a monolith, the fac-
ulty in this study were acutely aware of the countries where the students were 
heavily recruited from and their ability to pay for and attend the university with 
little institutional support. Reflecting back to these faculty members’ under-
standings of the purpose of higher education, some faculty felt a tension between 
admitting affluent students and providing broad access. Greg clarified this point:
All these international folks—[they] are affluent international folks for the most 
part. The international students tend to be more affluent, so in many ways, it 
doesn’t speak to a lot of the issues and the mission of the university. I do ques-
tion that around this international piece. The challenge is that, yeah, there’s this 
globalization, but the globalization is really from people that have access to the 
internet and all of these resources.
He continued, “when we’re saying ‘international,’ we’re really talking about 
students who are Asian; students from China. Let’s not pretend like ‘Oh, look 
at that student from Germany!’…. They’re really talking about Asian students 
because it’s visible and there’s a large population.”
Roger and Amber echo Greg’s sentiment with comments on their expe-
riences, noting that these students are a “cash cow” (Roger) and “bodies to 
fill” (Amber); that is, institutions see international students as easy money 
and as a way to meet diversity quotas. What is less discussed by institutions, 
but understood by these faculty, is that students are seen as commodities, and 
treated as such once they arrive at the institution. Little attention is paid to 
the intricacies of national dynamics, language barriers, and college readiness.
Kathleen noted, “My question in the faculty meeting has always been ‘How 
are we constructing environments for these students to be successful?’ Because 
we’re not.” She continued by stating that it is “real cute” that universities want 
to admit students, but when they arrive on campus, the lack of support is “re-
ally problematic.” As evidenced through interviews and collected demographic 
data, these faculties are concerned not only with knowledge dissemination, but 
also knowledge creation, equitable classroom environments, and issues of di-
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versity and inclusion, including examination of structural oppressions. Jennifer 
added, “institutions do a lot around international student recruitment, but ya 
know, really not very much at all around their engagement, success, or persis-
tence which I think goes back to the whole interest convergence piece.”
For many international students, success is dependent on being able to 
engage with faculty and other students despite language ability, and may also 
mean engaging with peers, socially acknowledging the complicated histories 
of their home countries. Faculty in this study were aware of some of these dy-
namics as a result of their experiences teaching in the classroom and working 
with an international student through research and noted that many of their 
faculty peers were not concerned with these dynamics despite the importance 
of understanding them.
Kathleen noted:
a lot of the doc students are coming with high TOEFL (Test of English as a 
Foreign Language) scores, and when they get into the classroom there’s a lot 
of low conversational English proficiency and so a number of faculty members 
have been like ‘Okay so we’re not really sure what, ya know, what’s happening?’ 
We’re not really sure about the learning environment about the community—the 
learning communities that are or are not being built in the classroom spaces, and 
we haven’t as a faculty had conversations about our role in creating those spaces.
Faculty noted that when they are unsure about student admissions, they will 
interview students to attempt to assess readiness or ask for writing samples. 
However, they may ultimately admit those students due to institutional artic-
ulation agreements. This was reflected in Kathleen’s experience in particular 
around her idea of “automatic admission.”
“The writing issue has come up in our admissions decisions. Do all inter-
national students write well? They need support, sometimes a lot of support. 
But we admit them with poor writing skills,” Kathleen said. “A lot of what 
we’re seeing is do we have articulation agreements with certain universities in 
China? So most students are coming from these particular institutions, there 
also seems to be this sense of like an automatic admission for them.”
Lastly, concerning language dynamics, Roger shared his experience around 
admitting students from countries that has historical national conflicts, in this 
case between China and Indonesia. He asked rhetorically, “So did anybody ever 
think about the fact that like China and Indonesia there are some issues between 
these two places? And we’re bringing students and not really talking about like 
sort of what kind of environment we wanna make it.” Once again, there are 
dynamics within international graduate admissions that are often overlooked or 
not understood when only considering the economic impact of admitting those 
students rather than considering them multifaceted human beings.
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Analysis and Discussion
Since WWII, universities expanded their global footprint, and the United 
States solidified itself as the premier country of study for doctoral students 
from around the world.64 However, faculty of color in this study resisted 
very specific practices around international student of color admission dur-
ing the enrollment management process that conflated domestic students of 
color with international students of color and treated international students 
of color as commodities. This resistance to a neoliberal shift in admissions 
practices that concurrently has neoracist implications points to a nuanced un-
derstanding of how neoliberalism plays out in international admissions.
As one participant noted, “The international piece is a big push” and 
reflects an institutional reframing of diversity that conflates international stu-
dents of color with domestic students of color. Analysis of these faculty narra-
tives unveils a change on the participants’ campuses that highlights a neoliber-
al project of capital gain, domestic minority community dissolution, prestige 
increase, and global expansion vis-à-vis international admissions.65 This global 
project is supported through recruiting and admitting international students, 
particularly those students from Asian countries such as China, India, Viet-
nam, and Nepal and South American countries like Brazil.66 It is theorized 
that university leaders are rejecting individualization of student identity (in 
this case country of origin and the racialization of student body upon entry 
to a U.S. context) for a more convenient understanding of a “racial minority” 
student in order to drive capital accumulation and at the same time bolster 
prestige by highlighting “multicultural” campuses. Greg discussed that his 
university enrolled students from a few countries where there are affluent, 
well-educated students who bring their wealth to the United States and also 
countries that are “of color.” Therefore, not only is international student ad-
mission a neoliberal project, but the combination of internationalization and 
the need for “good” bodies of color makes it a neoracist project.
The intertwining phenomenon of universities stressing racial diversity, yet 
turning a liberal eye toward the circumstances by which many communities of 
color have been kept out of higher education requires administrations to then 
falsely justify reliance on international students of color at the expense of the 
64 Robert A. Rhoads and Amy Liu, “Globalization, Social Movements, and the American 
University: Implications for Research and Practice.” In Higher Education: Handbook 
of Theory and Research, edited by J. C. Smart (New York: Springer, 2008), 273–315.
65 Hamer and Lang, “Race, Structural Violence, and the Neoliberal University,” 897–912.
66 Imanol Ordorika and Marion Lloyd, “International Rankings and the Contest for Uni-
versity Hegemony,” Journal of Education Policy 30, no. 3 (2015): 385–405.
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enrollment of domestic students of color. As a secondary outcome, the uni-
versities are bolstered in prestige and regard. International students require 
less institutional financial support and are mainly supported by their coun-
try,67 are productive in ways that support an academic capitalism regime (e.g., 
patents, adjunct teaching; Chellaraj, Maskus, and Mattoo 2008; Slaughter 
and Rhoades 2004), and as a result positively impact rankings and institu-
tional prestige.68 Some universities such as Iowa State University and the 
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign impose a “tuition tax” onto inter-
national student tuition, thereby shifting the burden of supporting students 
back onto the students rather than the institutions that recruit and admit 
them. Ultimately, universities increase their profit margins, even at nonprofit 
universities.69 Altbach (2016) wrote, “the universities that attract the most 
international students and scholars and host the largest numbers of postdocs 
and visiting scholars may tend to be ranked higher than others” (136).
Jennifer confirmed this when she said, “really we’re talking about inter-
national students and not domestic racially and ethnically minoritized popu-
lations” when she referred to diversity admissions. As market logics have crept 
into higher education since the mid-1970s,70 the community has become less lo-
calized and more transnational and “universities shifted from their social institu-
tion character to their industry form to cope with attacks on their legitimacy.” 71 
Therefore, international admissions are highly valued despite a continuing need 
to create equitable admissions opportunities for domestic students of color. In 
essence, a public good mission of higher education has now become privatized.
Faculty in this study are particularly attuned to this continuing shift and 
engagement in market behaviors and the fact that their university leadership is 
engaging in a public deception, or “myth” as Kathleen called it, in conflating 
statistics on international students of color with domestic students of color and 
the issues that ensue when campuses do not take particular measures to support 
international students of color. This rhetoric has the implication of shifting the 
67 IIE (Institute of International Education), Open Doors 2017 Executive Summary, 2017.
68 Blanca Delgado-Márquez, Nuria E. Hurtado-Torres, and Yaroslava Bondar, “Interna-
tionalization of Higher Education in University Institution Rankings: The Influence of 
National Culture,” Journal of International Education and Leadership 2, no. 1 (2012): 
1–17.
69 Philip G. Altbach and Jane Knight, “The Internationalization of Higher Education: 
Motivations and Realities,” Journal of Studies in International Education 11, no. 3/4 
(2007): 290–305.
70 Giroux, “Democracy in Crisis, the Specter of Authoritarianism, and the Future of 
Higher Education”, 101–113.
71 Rhoads and Liu, “Globalization, Social Movements, and the American University,” 
273–315.
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narrative of diversity discourse away from remedying historical representation 
and equity work for domestic students of color. What ensues is the creation and 
replication of a neoracist society.
Though neoracism as a framework has not been applied widely in higher 
education literature, the experiences of the faculty in this study lend credence 
to this theory. Neoracism reveals itself in the ways that liberal notions of iden-
tity are implicated in the (under)resourcing of campuses to support students. 
The lack of a critical understanding of the sociopolitical histories, languages, 
cultures, and experiences of international students applied to a U.S. context 
adds nuance to a CRT analysis of the experiences of students of color in 
higher education. Much like students of color are asked to fit into a system 
that is violent toward their bodies and being, international students of color 
are asked to do the same. Their bodies are racialized within the context of 
the United States and therefore are, at the minimum, susceptible to similar 
experiences of domestic students of color. Neoracism provides an additional 
layer of understanding the ways that, once again, language, cultural norms, 
histories, and ways of being influence the human experience. In these faculty 
member’s views, university leaders can invest little aid and campus resources 
in international student admissions and success (Jennifer: “[institutions don’t 
do] very much around their engagement, success, or persistence”), meet or 
exceed diversity measures (Amber: “Like bodies to fill”), and increase prestige 
and income (Roger: “they come from a privileged background”).
Importantly noted by the faculty, there is also the potential for less academic 
success for international students of color as they deal with the resultants of neo-
racism. As Kathleen noted, “it’s real cute that you want to recruit Chinese inter-
national students here, but then they get here, and they need things in order for 
them to be successful, and we aren’t providing them, and so I think that’s really 
problematic.” Many universities are not situated to support international stu-
dent learning and language challenges. There is also concern that some faculty 
do not have a significant understanding of global issues that may affect student 
interrelationships. As Roger noted, “we’re bringing students and not really talk-
ing about like sort of what kind of environment we wanna make it and how we 
wanna help build community.” As Hamer and Lang (2015) write, neoliberalism 
has the intended side effect of the dissolution of community in order to protect 
elite property, physical or otherwise, to maintain and increase capital assets. A 
lack of community formation may lead to the consequence of drop out, extend-
ed time to degree, and the continued dehumanization of international students.
While faculty noted that they fully supported the admissions of international 
students, they did not want the admissions of international students to take away 
from the admission of domestic students of color. They also did not want to make 
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those admissions decisions without the necessary support for international stu-
dent success. As Kathleen questioned in her interview, “Do all international stu-
dents write well? They need support, sometimes a lot of support.” Faculty of color 
understand their own experiences of marginalization and recognize the potenti-
alities of marginalization for international students. This marginalization stems 
from some international students’ lack of capital, particularly those associated with 
navigational, linguistic, and social72 stemming from poor student services, general 
cultural adaptation, and a normative understanding of excellence situated within 
a majoritarian white supremacist context.73 Faculty of color are concerned with 
the student experience of international students, how they and their faculty peers 
can support international students, and lack of support services for those students.
Implications
This study revealed the ways that faculty are perceiving the role of international 
admissions, the lack of support for international students, and therefore student 
experience and development. Implications support three areas of possible change. 
First, university administrators must be clearer about the purposes of international 
admissions and clearly explicate the role of international admissions as it relates 
to the broader mission and vision of the university. Beyond that, administrators 
should also delineate the ways that international student enrollment can fulfill cer-
tain outcomes that domestic students of color or other populations cannot wheth-
er that be around diversity-related outcomes, financial enhancements, or other-
wise. To this end, universities must be more transparent about who is considered 
“diverse” by being specific when reporting statistics. International students of 
color are not the same as domestic students of color in experience, historicity, sub-
jectivity, or knowledge-base. Therefore, conflating statistics of both groups to in-
flate racial diversity statistics does more to marginalize communities of color than 
it does to improve institutional prestige when the campus reality is inaccurate. It 
also reifies a liberal notion of identity and success at the detriment of all students 
of color. This is not to suggest that international students should not be admitted 
to U.S. institutions. Rather, these steps should be taken to provide a clear path of 
understanding for how each unit should be working with these students toward 
their overall success within the scope of the university’s mission.
Second, university administrators must find funding structures that will 
support the academic and social transition of international students into U.S. 
72 Tara J. Yosso, “Whose Culture Has Capital? A Critical Race Theory Discussion of 
Community Cultural Wealth,” Race Ethnicity, and Education 8, no. 1 (2005): 69–91.
73 Lee and Rice, “Welcome to America? International Student Perceptions of Discrimina-
tion,” 381–409.
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institutions. One way this may be done is through allocating the differential 
between domestic and international student tuition to student affairs units or 
specialized offices that support international students in the logistical maneu-
vering of visas, but more importantly, in the navigation of academic and social 
barriers to success. In these cases, money is being spent on international stu-
dents and also does not place a tax upon them. International students should 
not be paying more than domestic students for support. These include conver-
sational language skills, reading comprehension, understanding local cultural 
contexts, way-finding activities such as navigating a new city or finding housing 
and learning about institutional realities (e.g., policies, programs). Additionally, 
the university must create intentional spaces for domestic community members 
to interact in authentic dialogues with international community members.
Last, to address neoracism, faculty (including staff-instructors and contin-
gent faculty) can begin to modify curriculums to include the narratives of inter-
national students in course readings and other curriculums. There is an inherent 
belief currently that international students are expected to perform and compete 
with domestic students by assimilating into a U.S. program. In situating interna-
tional students of color as a commodity, it dehumanizes them and regards their 
success or lack thereof as secondary to income those students bring.
By addressing dehumanization by faculty, faculty create inclusive courses that 
signal to international students the importance of their lived experiences and 
to domestic students that this is an important community to provide focus. In 
STEM fields, where many of these students study, this may not be a major con-
cern. However, datasets that include international students, examples that utilize 
international student issues, and conversations that are pertinent to global issues 
are keen areas where inclusion of international students in STEM are valid. Ad-
ditionally, international students should be given the opportunity to meet with 
faculty outside of class time to review materials, prepare questions and comments 
ahead of a course session, and practice conversational English in order to be pre-
pared for larger class discussion and to receive feedback. Faculty must address any 
instances of discrimination occurring within their purview and explain why dis-
crimination is not a value of the university and the importance of diverse students 
and perspectives on campus. Faculty can then begin to question and illuminate 
the ways that systems of oppression are affecting international students.
Conclusion
These findings give nuance and expand upon the conversation around a grow-
ing issue on college campuses and within graduate education, internation-
alization, and globalization. Through these findings, there is a revealing of 
market-based logics, situated within the neoliberal theory, that define diversity 
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in broad terms that may be problematic (e.g., including international students 
in diversity). These trends reveal a troublesome myth spreading across U.S. 
college campuses. The myth argues that the current human economy in the 
United States is not sufficient and that universities must reach globally to seek 
superior collective mindfulness and economic growth. The myth forwards a 
liberal ethos that all students are the same regardless of ethnicity, nationality, 
generational status, ability, and gender. The myth highlights only the positive 
effects of globalization ignoring two centuries (and more) of structural white-
ness built on a foundation of colonial rule. The myth is overtaking campuses 
to the detriment of the good public mission of higher education, in full fa-
vor of a capitalistic regime74 and at the peril of the humanity of international 
graduate students.75 Faculty of color in this study, who have lived racialized 
experiences, understand the opportunity for systemic oppressions and margin-
alization to affect the international student community and are resisting those 
behaviors while highlighting the ways that neoliberalism and neoracism play 
out in this sector of enrollment management. Ultimately, this broad paradigm 
shift warrants attention and faculty of color have the potential to provide in-
sight on how to make that shift happen.
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3.  Student Complaints: Performative
or Passionate Utterances?
AmAndA FulFord, edge hill university,  
And ClAire sKeA, leeds trinity university
Abstract: In a well-documented case from late 2016, Oxford University graduate, 
Faiz Siddiqui, sued his alma mater, claiming that the “appallingly bad tuition” 
he received cost him the first-class degree that he felt he should have received. In 
tracing how the rise in such complaints seems ineluctably linked to the increasing 
commodification of the sector, we ask what it means for a student to express her 
voice within the university. In doing this, we draw a contrast between the (safety 
of the) formal procedures to which many students resort when making a com-
plaint, and the possibilities of addressing issues in a face-to-face encounter. To 
understand the differences in these two approaches, we make an unusual move 
to consider the work of J. L Austin (1962). We then outline Stanley Cavell’s 
criticisms of the formal procedures that underlie such utterances. We suggest that 
a commitment to passionate utterance along Cavellian lines, highlights not only 
the place of emotion in a complaint, but also the responsibility, and answerability, 
of each party to the other.
Keywords: student complaints, Cavell, Austin, passionate utterance, performatives
The Rise in Numbers of Student Complaints
In a current and well-documented legal case, Faiz Siddiqui, a graduate from 
Oxford University in the UK, sued the prestigious institution for £1 million 
pounds. In his claim for loss of earnings, Siddiqui argued that the ‘appallingly 
bad’ teaching he received as an undergraduate prevented him from getting a 
first-class degree, thus impacting upon his career outcomes, and preventing 
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him from becoming an international commercial lawyer (Pells 2017). He also 
claimed that receiving an upper second-class degree impacted on his health, a 
further factor in his claim for damages. The University stated that Siddiqui’s 
case was baseless, but Siddiqui’s claim was judged as legally reasonable, and 
in January 2017, the UK High Court ruled that ‘the university has a case to 
answer, and that a trial should take place as soon as possible’ (Pells 2017).1 
In a case from the United States, Jennifer Wright sued Walden University as 
part of a class action suit alleging that the University misled students about 
the time and money required to obtain advanced degrees online. She, along 
with other plaintiffs, alleged that the University, part of the parent distance 
learning company, Laureate Education, misrepresented how long it would 
take to gain a degree, and constantly changed study requirements. This left 
her $224,000 in debt, and still without her doctoral degree (Schecter 2016).
These high-profile cases highlight not only the rise in the overall numbers of 
student complaints across the Higher Education (HE) sector, but also the meas-
ures that students are taking in terms of escalating complaints, and seeking forms 
of redress and compensation (Jones 2006). This rise in student complaints can be 
seen as a consequence of the increasing marketization, ‘customerization’ (Love 
2008, 18) and ‘corporatization’ of higher education (Marginson 2013, 355). As 
student identities are reframed in marketized terms, that is, as ‘customers’ and 
‘consumers’ of HE, the implication is that students have higher expectations 
of what they should receive from universities (Guolla 1999; Rolfe 2002; Mark 
2013). ‘Value for money’ becomes akin to a ‘gold standard’ for Higher Educa-
tion Institutions wishing to maintain their competitive advantage in an ever-ex-
panding market (Wilkins et al. 2012; Dean and Gibbs 2015; Higdon 2016). If 
universities do not meet or exceed student expectations—a prerequisite for posi-
tive evaluations of service quality (Alves and Raposo 2009)—then complaints are 
likely to be made, whether this is done informally via word of mouth or more for-
mally through an array of procedures and regulatory bodies (Khoo et al. 2017).
In such a highly marketized culture, perhaps it is not surprising that ‘price 
consciousness’ exists (Gursoy et al. 2007, 358), and that there is a direct link 
between price and propensity for complaining (Cooper-Hind and Taylor 
2012). But the picture is far more complex, with complaints behaviour influ-
enced by a whole range of personality and behavioural factors (Harris 2007; 
Hart and Coates 2010). Moreover, the number of formal complaints received 
may only be the tip of the iceberg, as students who are ‘private complainers’—
1 This case has now been formally resolved through the UK courts. The judge stated 
that Oxford University tutors could not be held responsible for Siddiqui achieving a 
2:1 classification rather than a 1st, and he was not awarded financial compensation for 
this. For further information, see Rudgard (2018).
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those confining their concerns to social media and feedback mechanisms—
largely outnumber the ‘voicers’ who persist with seeking institutional redress 
(Millward 2016, 137–138). The dominance of market imperatives is seen in 
the strategic importance that universities give to rapid and effective settlement 
of complaints. Dissatisfied students can affect future student recruitment and 
funding by engaging in negative word of mouth comments, by refraining from 
making alumni contributions, and/or by going elsewhere for subsequent edu-
cational services (Khoo et al. 2017). As Wilkins et al. state, ‘achieving positive 
word of mouth from current students and alumni is a vital element of every 
institution’s promotional mix’ (2012, 544). Ensuring positive word of mouth 
comments and student–consumer loyalty—of fundamental importance to cor-
poratized universities—is contingent upon student satisfaction (Vuori 2013; 
Santini et al. 2017). Any dissatisfaction, evidenced in student complaints, must 
be addressed before it is formalized, thus securing institutional reputation.
Complaints tend to be in relation to academic provision and programme de-
livery (including teaching, supervision or feedback); deficiencies in facilities (in-
cluding car parking), and the behaviour of individual members of staff (Harris 
2007). However, complaints in relation to academic matters heavily outweigh 
those related to services (Behrens 2015). Students evaluate the potential costs and 
benefits of making a complaint, considering issues such as the timescales (Coop-
er-Hind and Taylor 2012), negative impact on grades and the lecturer’s ‘punish-
ment power’ (Lala and Priluck 2011, 241). While it is inevitable that there are 
power relations inherent in the academic-student relationship, these concerns are 
often addressed in codes of practice that emphasize confidentiality. Cooper-Hind 
and Taylor (2012) argue that, despite such codes, students still have worries over 
confidentiality that may prevent them from making a complaint, especially if the 
complaint is about a senior member of staff (given that they may have influence 
over the complaints procedure itself). Of course, universities seek to resolve com-
plaints informally to minimize cost and reputational risk, but Behrens (2015) 
highlights that students are resorting to escalating complaints to bodies external 
to their university. It is to a discussion of the use of these formal procedures for 
complaints, independent of academic institutions, that we now turn.
The Externalizing and Formalizing of Student Complaints
We are less interested here in the types of informal complaints such as nega-
tive conversation that can take place between students, than in those formal 
complaints which are recorded and actioned, and which are increasingly com-
mon in a marketized system where students are re-positioned as consumers 
(Fulton Philips 2004; Lala and Priluck 2011). In particular, we want to high-
light the way in which student complaints are not only formalized internally 
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in the university, but also to draw attention to the move to have them dealt 
with externally by independent bodies, and the courts. In the UK, the Qual-
ity Assurance Agency2 has developed a framework for universities to follow 
in order to deal with student complaints effectively, and there are rights of 
appeal to the Office of the Independent Adjudicator (OIA) in England.3 In 
the United States, if student concerns are not addressed by the formal college 
procedures, then the complaint can be escalated to the State Department of 
Education or State Higher Education Agency, the final arbiter prior to litiga-
tion. In formalizing and externalizing student complaints, government and 
state bodies, as well as the courts, often refuse to deal with matters that are 
presented in terms of disagreements over ‘academic judgement’.
However, this is not the case where litigation is brought under consumer 
rights legislation. In Australia, for example, student complaints can be considered 
through the courts as matters of ‘consumer protection’, whereby bad teaching is 
dealt with as a case of ‘educational malpractice’ (Fulton Philips 2004, 42). From 
the students’ point of view, invoking the formal procedures of the university’s 
complaints system demonstrates that the matter is being taken seriously. Having 
a clearly defined complaints policy, with strict timescales and reporting mecha-
nisms, does something more: it ensures that complaints are treated fairly, and that 
outcomes are broadly consistent, thus avoiding the reputational risk of complaints 
being escalated externally. However, there is a further consequence in that aca-
demic judgement, and trust, risks being diminished, though others view academic 
judgement as merely a ‘Get-Out-of-Jail-Free Card’ (Palfreyman 2010, 114).
The formalizing and externalizing of complaints is representative of a 
wider shift towards contractual student-academic, or student-institution, re-
lationships. In a well-publicized legal ruling in the case of Moran v. University 
College Salford (1993), the court applied a ‘conventional contractual analysis 
to the student-university relationship’ (Fulton Philips 2004, 41).4 Nearly a 
2 The body for safeguarding standards of UK Higher Education wherever it is delivered 
around the world.
3 There is scant literature that discusses whether student complaints are more likely to 
be put forward in for-profit/private universities, or those publicly funded institutions. 
However, in England, all for-profit/private universities have been required, since 2015, 
to join the scheme set up by the OIA which hears cases referred from universities when 
internal procedures have been exhausted (see Behrens 2015).
4 In November 1993, Paul Moran brought a student complaint through litigation to 
be examined under contract law. Because of a clerical error, Moran was incorrectly 
offered a place on a University College Salford course; he accepted this offer but then 
the university refused him entry as he did not meet the requirements. Moran sought a 
mandatory injunction that he should be allowed onto the course but the judge ruled 
against this (Magrath 1993).
Student Complaints: Performative or Passionate Utterances? 59
quarter of a century later, the idea of a contractual relationship is once again 
at the heart of higher education; indeed, it is now trumpeted as a guardian of 
student rights and protection. In one example, England’s Office for Students 
consulted in December 2017 on the introduction of student contracts to 
address a perceived lack of consistency in universities’ adherence to consumer 
protection law, and to guarantee standards in what amounts to the introduc-
tion of formal service-level agreements. Universities, mindful of such chang-
es, take legal advice with regard to what is put into prospectuses and mar-
keting campaigns, and so are concerned with limiting their liabilities (Jones 
2006). In a startling example of this, the University of Chester, UK, has an 
explicit policy to limit its liabilities for: ‘loss of profit, loss of earnings, loss 
of opportunity, disappointment, distress or injury to feelings’ (Harris 2007, 
571). Of course, the dangers with such contractual obligations are first, that 
the contract assures the student of a particular outcome, and second, that the 
contract could support weak forms of student entitlement that reduces the 
idea of a higher education to the supply of, and payment for, certain services 
(Finney and Finney 2010; Palfreyman 2010).
What the use of regulatory bodies and litigation shows is that there is an 
increasing tendency to resort to the safety of formal procedures in securing 
an effective outcome. Students value the ‘safety’ of the structured procedural 
approach that avoids the risk of embarrassing confrontation with faculty staff. 
Universities, for their part, rely on their own internal formal procedures to 
protect their interests in cases where their preferred use of informal resolu-
tion has failed, and so avoid the exposure that appeals to external agencies 
and litigation can bring. But there is a further issue here to which we want 
to draw attention; this concerns the way in which such developments affect 
university communications with their students in the complaints process, and 
more particularly, the kinds of dialogue that take place between academics 
and students in the invoking of a complaint. To illustrate this, we offer below 
a dialogue. Although it is a fictional account, it draws heavily on our respec-
tive experiences of working and studying in a contemporary university.
Scenario
A final year university student and her friend from the same course have come 
to see their Head of Department (HoD). They are all in the HoD’s office, the 
students sat opposite the HoD across a large desk.
HoD:  Good morning, how are you?
Student: Fine, thanks.
HoD:  How can I help today?
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Student:  Well, I’ve come to see you because we wanted to talk to you about 
something. I, er, want you to…It’s about my research project 
course.
Friend:  (interrupts) She wants to complain…
HoD:  Oh, ok (shuffles papers nervously) I just want to be clear. Are you 
both wanting to make a complaint, or is it just one of you?
Friend:  No, it’s just her (gesturing to her friend)
HoD:  (addressing the student’s friend) Well, it’s fine that you’re here to 
support. That’s ok, and it is in the University Regulations. But 
you must let your friend give me all the details—you understand?
Friend:  Yeah
HoD:  (turning towards the student) Now, what’s this all about?
Student:  I don’t really know what I’m meant to be doing for my research 
project. My supervisor—well, he’s not helping me at all. Other 
students in the group are getting lots of help from their supervi-
sors, and I haven’t had any proper feedback. He said it was ok—
what I was going to do—then when I showed him it again, he said 
it wasn’t very good. I just don’t know what to do next. I need to 
get a good mark for this.
HoD:  I see. Who’s your supervisor?
Student:  Dr Jones—I’ve only met him a couple of times. When he’s in his 
office he’s always really busy and says the project is about inde-
pendent learning, but others in the group are getting a lot more 
help. I just don’t think that’s fair.
Friend:  (interrupts) Yeah, I’ve seen some of the emails she’s sent, asking 
for help, and if she gets a reply, the advice is really vague and con-
fusing…
HoD  (interrupts) I know this is frustrating, but if it’s your friend who’s 
making the complaint, I really need to hear from her. (addressing 
the student again) So, are you saying that you haven’t had any 
tutorial support for your project?
Student:  Erm, well, I had a couple of meetings when we started, last month, 
but then it’s just been by email, and he’s not answering my ques-
tions really; I’m not getting the right support. I don’t want to get 
a bad mark, and the handbook says that we should have meetings 
every 2 weeks with our supervisor, and that we should get detailed 
feedback.
HoD:  And those meetings aren’t happening?
Student:  No…not really. So I’m complaining.
HoD:  (after a brief pause) Have you spoken to Dr Jones about this?
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Student:  Er…No, erm, not really.
HoD:  But I think that would be a sensible course of action; things might 
be resolved easily if you said to Dr Jones that you need to see 
him for support with your project. Perhaps follow it up with an 
email with some specific questions too. You could copy me into 
the email if that helps (smiles broadly at the student in a reassuring 
way).
Student:  I know, I’ve tried to say I need more support, but…but I’d rather 
just make a complaint. I want to know something’s going to be 
done.
HoD:  Well, if you feel so strongly about this, then there is the University 
complaints procedure. Have you read it? I’ll print you off a copy. 
Do you really want to go down this route?
Student:  Yeah…Not sure…I suppose…(shrugs her shoulders in an indiffer-
ent manner)…if it gets things done without having to speak to 
him; that’d be embarrassing.
HoD:  Well, the procedure is you will need to put your complaint in writ-
ing, stating all the details, people, dates etc, and what you have 
tried to do to resolve this already. The university will acknowl-
edge your complaint within 5 working days, and then the Dean 
of School will appoint someone to make a formal investigation. 
We will then write to you within 4 weeks detailing what action 
will be taken. You also have the right to appeal if your complaint 
is unsuccessful. It’s all here in the complaints procedure (handing 
the student a document).
Student: Thanks
HoD:  One last thing: I need to have this in writing from you before I 
invoke the procedure. Ok? And it’s important that you don’t try to 
sort things out yourself now while the investigation is ongoing. Just 
keep any appointments that you have for supervision, and keep on 
doing your work. It’s important that you keep this process confi-
dential and don’t talk about it with others in the group—or with Dr 
Jones, of course (laughs nervously). You don’t appear terribly upset 
by all of this—even though this is, of course, a difficult time for 
you—but if you need any extra support, remember you can always 
talk to your personal tutor, or there’s the University Counselling 
Service. Is all that clear, or do you have any further questions?
Student: No, it’s fine. Thanks. Bye.
****
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Many academics working in contemporary universities, and even students them-
selves, may well recognize aspects of the conversation in the scenario above. 
We use this scenario as a heuristic to open up our thinking about the kinds of 
dialogue that characterize many instances of student complaints. Based on our 
experiences of working in higher education, and of encountering and address-
ing complaints, we are not suggesting that complaints always follow this kind 
of process, or escalate as quickly as this example suggests.5 Rather the purpose 
of the scenario is merely to illustrate that complaints tend to follow strict formal 
procedures. More importantly, it highlights the proceduralized forms of lan-
guage that inevitably dehumanize and hinder the dialogue in common between 
human subjects. Just as the language used is constrained by a ‘script’ (for what 
is acceptable to say, and by whom), so too the relationship itself seems limited 
to what the procedures allow (what the role of each party is and how they are 
responsible to each other). In our scenario, the language used is ineluctably 
linked to the making of the complaint itself; the language used is the initiation 
of the procedure—a kind of performance. Of course, we are not saying that 
formal procedures are unnecessary. Having clearly laid out procedures is helpful 
for students and for faculty staff; there is protection for all parties and this helps 
to ensure that complaints are dealt with fairly and with a degree of consistency. 
However, our aim is to draw attention to where procedures are valorized at the 
expense of engagement with the other in dialogue.
Our scenario illustrates a kind of over-reliance on, or prioritization of, the 
procedural over the personal. The Head of Department, keen to resolve the 
student’s complaint, turns to, and relies heavily on, the university’s formal 
procedures. This is shown in the way she talks to the friend: the regulations 
stipulate that the complainant can bring a friend to act as a support, but must 
make the complaint herself. And so we see the Head of Department enforc-
ing this regulation, and preventing the friend from speaking. So she follows 
policy and procedure, but in so doing, is stripped of her academic judgement 
to resolve matters locally. And the student is happy to proceed in this way 
(because she does not want to engage in dialogue with Dr Jones, and now 
perceives that she is being taken seriously, and feels safe in the process. The 
student perhaps also recognizes that the Head of Department is either inept 
at communicating, or feels constrained in what she should say).
In thinking further about the language in our scenario—typical, perhaps, 
of some contemporary universities where there is an increasing culture of 
5 This example demonstrates that formal procedures are clearly in place for dealing with 
student complaints; however, they tend to be institutionally specific, with a range of 
formal appeal processes at a state or national level.
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student complaints—we turn to the work of J.L. Austin on performatives in 
language, and to Stanley Cavell’s development of Austin’s ideas in his concept 
of passionate utterance. This may appear, at first, a somewhat awkward and 
unusual move. But we will show how certain characteristics in the conversa-
tion in the scenario are significant for thinking about the procedures involved 
in making a complaint (and we will lay these out in relation to Austin’s work), 
and for re-thinking the complaint as a site of encounter (for which we turn to 
Stanley Cavell’s writing about passionate utterance). First, in order to provide 
the context for our discussions, we will give a brief overview of Austin’s work 
on language and, in particular, on the idea of the performative.
Austin and Performatives
One of John Austin’s major contributions to contemporary philosophy has 
been his idea that some uses of language have a performative dimension. This 
is in contrast to what Austin calls the concern of the other philosophers of 
language with ‘constatives’—assertions concerning the state of affairs that can 
be analysed in terms of their truth or falsity. Austin’s particular interest was 
in types of utterance that could not be thought of in terms of truth or falsity, 
but were equally not nonsense statements. He called these ‘performatives’ 
and claimed that their special quality was that in their saying, they effected 
an action that could not usually be performed by any other means. In his lec-
tures in Sweden (1959), the recordings of which have recently come to light, 
Austin gives the following as examples of performatives: I name this ship the 
Queen Elizabeth; I apologise; I beg your pardon; I bid you welcome; I warn 
you, and I advise you. Austin writes this about such utterances: ‘If a person 
makes an utterance of this sort we should say that he is doing something 
rather than merely saying something…In saying what I do, I actually perform 
that action…I am indulging in it’ (Austin 1979, 235). For Austin, to say the 
words ‘I pronounce you man and wife’ (as part of the marriage ceremony), 
the priest is not merely reporting the fact to the assembled guests that the 
couple are now legally married, he is effecting their marriage through uttering 
a particular form of words. To say the words is—in some senses—to perform 
the action.6
6 We cite Austin’s original texts here. However, since the original publication of these, 
there has been a long debate not only over speech act theory itself, but also over its 
educational implications. Jacques Derrida has critiqued Austin for being overly con-
cerned with the external context of speech acts without considering the ‘iterability of 
language’ itself (1988; Munday 2010, 286). For a fuller discussion of this, see Munday 
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But Austin warns that to simply say the words is not all that is necessary to 
perform the action. A number of conditions must be satisfied for an utterance 
to be classed as performative. Austin provides six rules, or conditions, that need 
to be met in order for the utterance to be classified as a performative—for it to 
be ‘happy’ (Austin 1979). The utterance must take place as part of a conven-
tional procedure, where the context and people involved are appropriate. The 
procedure must be executed completely and in an appropriate fashion, and 
the utterance must be backed by appropriate feelings by the people involved. 
These people must conduct themselves accordingly afterwards. Austin (1962) 
calls these happiness or ‘felicity conditions’ for performative utterances. So, for 
example, actors saying the words ‘I do’ as part of a wedding enacted in a film 
is not a performative utterance; they are not enacting their marriage. In this 
example, a number of Austin’s felicity conditions are not met: the words are not 
spoken in an appropriate context (they are uttered on the film set rather than in 
the church or registry office); the words are not backed by appropriate feelings 
(of love, commitment etc.) by the couple involved; and they do not conduct 
themselves as a married couple afterwards (off the set).
Austin’s felicity conditions lay out the formal procedures for the effective 
operation of performatives in language. Having set these out, Austin (1962) 
then discovers that what holds for performatives also holds for constatives—
that for a performative utterance to be happy, it must also be true (there 
would be no sense, for example, in saying, ‘I apologise’ if the person saying it 
does not have the feelings of remorse, and so for a performative to be happy, 
it must also be true). But this ‘crisis’ in Austin’s account, to which Cavell 
draws our attention (2005, 166), is not the main point for our discussions 
here. It is rather that the strict and formal procedures for performatives are 
foregrounded over—as Cavell notes—the issue of the emotions and the ex-
pressive in speech (and so the motivation for the speech). Cavell puts it like 
this: ‘Austin’s avoiding as far as he could the issue of passion or expression 
in speech leaves what he does say about it with the air of conceding that the 
passional side of utterance is more or less a detachable issue’ (2005, 163).
To see how the formal procedures of the felicity conditions that mark 
the performative play out in language, let us return briefly to the scenario. 
That we are dealing with a performative here is clear: when the student says: 
(2011). In terms of how Austin’s ideas have been taken up and discussed in education, 
Renia Gasparatou’s recent work (2018, 1) has advocated that we ‘revisit speech act 
theory and treat it as an educational theory’. Austin’s work has also been more broadly 
discussed specifically in relation to higher education (see Peters 2004; Fisher 2010; 
Munday 2010; Fulford 2012; Skilbeck 2014).
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‘I’m complaining’, she is not merely reporting a complaint, she is effecting it, 
bringing it into being, so to speak. But the felicity conditions for the perform-
ative here are also evident in this scenario. First, the context is appropriate, 
and there is a conventional procedure for complaining (that the student first 
tries to resolve matters with the tutor concerned; that there is a formal pro-
cedure to which matters can be escalated; that there is a procedure for inves-
tigation of a formal complaint). Second, the persons involved are appropriate 
(note how the Head of Department is assiduous in allowing only the student 
involved to effect the complaint). Third, there is a procedure that must be fol-
lowed (the written complaint must come from the student before the Head 
of Department can investigate further). Fourth, the student seems to have 
appropriate feelings to justify a complaint, and is reminded how to conduct 
herself following the meeting as someone who has lodged a complaint.
While we have used the scenario as an example of performative utterance 
that is felicitous according to Austin’s criteria, it also illustrates three particular 
aspects of student complaints that we further want to highlight: (i) First, that 
there is an avoidance of engaging with the other: the student chooses to avoid 
an encounter with Dr Jones, or to make her complaint to him directly. She pre-
fers to escalate the issue, and to invoke formal procedures, partially to avoid the 
embarrassment of having to speak to her tutor, but also just to get something 
done. (ii) Second, the reliance on formal procedures affords a measure of ‘safe-
ty’ for the student, yet leaves little room for the relational and the expression 
of emotion. The student shrugs indifferently when asked about the complaint, 
and the Head of Department notices how unmoved the student seems by mak-
ing the complaint. Of course, this is not to say that all students behave in this 
way when making a complaint, or that complaints are not genuinely felt. But it 
is to highlight what Cavell calls the ‘imperative of expression’ in our language 
that is ‘less in need of weeding than nourishment’ (2005, 188). Without this 
expressiveness, we are, as Cavell puts it: ‘stopped short in the obligation to 
make our desires, hence our actions, intelligible…and hampered in our demand 
and right to be found intelligible in those desires and actions’ (2005, 188). (iii) 
Third, there is a sense here that there is a lack of risk (of embarrassment, of 
exposure etc.) in the invoking of the formal procedures, and the confidentiality 
that these bring. These features strengthen the felicity of the formal complaint 
procedure for the student. Cavell’s concern is not with the conventional pro-
cedures of Austin’s performatives, but with the expressiveness inherent in what 
he calls our ‘passionate utterance’ (2005, 155).7
7 While Cavell is not normally considered a philosopher who writes directly about edu-
cation, the educative force of his work has been widely recognized (Fulford 2012; 
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Cavell and Passionate Utterance
The American philosopher Stanley Cavell outlines how, in the face of crit-
icism of the binary distinction between constatives and performatives, 
Austin develops a ternary model of different aspects in language: the lo-
cutionary force of words (where we simply say something meaningful); 
the illocutionary force (where we do something in saying something) and 
the perlocutionary effect of our words (we do something by saying some-
thing). The illocutionary force of our words relates to acts of performance, 
to performatives—hence Austin’s interest in them. But for Cavell, things 
are rather different; if Austin is somewhat dismissive of perlocutions, then 
Cavell pursues them. Cavell finds that the idea of doing something by say-
ing something is ineluctably linked with the idea of an encounter with the 
other that is marked by the passion in our speech. He critiques Austin for 
being ‘skittish about emotion’; that in his focus on the felicity conditions 
which make an utterance count as a performative, he neglects the ‘passions, 
or say, the expressive, in speech’ (2005, 159). Ian Munday argues that, for 
Cavell:
Taking seriously the importance of the perlocutionary effects of language is to 
acknowledge the individual/expressive uses of speech in which people establish 
relationships with another (2009, 63).
For Cavell, the perlocutionary effect of language is seen in what he terms ‘pas-
sionate utterance’. This idea might seem suggestive of strong desire, and per-
haps brings to mind certain contexts: the intimate exchange between lovers, 
or even a frenzied argument between sworn enemies. Though these might 
well be the scene of passionate utterance, they are extreme examples. Cavell’s 
passionate utterance might well take place in much more mundane contexts 
(the conversation between a Head of Department and a student, perhaps?). 
It is not as if Cavell is always thinking of the extreme points of passion, but 
also of the everyday expression of our feelings that are characteristic of our 
ordinary lives. In this sense, even the expression of a feeling of indifference 
might be thought of as passionate utterance. Indeed, one of Cavell’s examples 
of passionate utterance is, ‘I’m bored’ (2005, 177).
In developing his examples, Cavell takes Austin’s six felicity conditions for 
performatives, and provides analogous conditions for passionate utterances, in 
Saito and Standish 2012). The relevance of Cavell’s work on passionate utterance for 
education – particularly moral education – has been explored (see Munday 2010; Skil-
beck 2014).
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an attempt to extend Austin’s theory. Cavell writes that he is trying to: ‘deter-
mine how…[Austin’s] theory of speech as action may be extended, in a sense 
re-begun, in order to articulate a theory of speech as passion’ (1997, 28). We 
now briefly outline these moves below.
From Avoidance to Invitation to Exchange
In passionate utterance, one is moved to put oneself, and one’s relationship 
with the other, at risk. This is not merely invoking a procedure as in Austin’s 
performatives, but inviting exchange; this might be accepted by the other, but 
equally might be denied, postponed or left unfulfilled. In inviting exchange, 
there is a ‘demand from you for a response in kind, one you are in turn 
moved to offer’ (Cavell 2005, 181). What it is we are doing in conducting a 
passionate utterance is nothing less than ‘staking our future’ together (Cavell 
2005, 185), putting the future of our relationship at risk—if you decline my 
invitation to exchange then there is inevitably nothing left to say. Cavell sum-
marizes it like this: ‘in acknowledging a mode of speech… through which…
in confronting you, I declare my standing with you…demanding a response 
in kind from you…so making myself vulnerable…[we are] staking our future’ 
(2005, 187). It is this kind of invitation to exchange that is avoided in the 
scenario we presented. In the reliance on the security of proceduralized forms 
of ‘dialogue’, the Head of Department and the student both secure their 
own positions, thus avoiding any possibility of vulnerability. What is missing, 
however, is an encounter with the other in which there is the kind of dialogue 
founded on mutual understanding; it is marked not by separateness and de-
tachment, but rather by inescapable relation.
From the Procedural to the Passional
Whereas for Austin’s performatives to be felicitous, the staging and setting 
must adhere to conventional procedures, for Cavell, speaking from my pas-
sion is ‘grounded in my being moved to speak’. There are no formal proce-
dures. Cavell resists any succinct, or easy definition of passionate utterance, 
yet points (in a rather impish way) to Austin’s felicity conditions for per-
formatives (2005, 180–182), and suggests some analogous conditions for 
perlocutions. What these demonstrate is that, unlike the ritual performance 
that marks Austin’s performatives, there is no accepted conventional proce-
dure and effects for passionate utterances (or perlocutions). In passionate 
utterance, it is clear that passion itself has a role to play in successfully exe-
cuting the perlocutionary effects of our words. Cavell writes: ‘A performative 
utterance is an offer of participation in the order of law.’ But he goes on: ‘And 
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perhaps we can say: A passionate utterance is an invitation to improvisation in 
the disorders of desire’ (2005, 185). In passionate utterance we must actually 
be ‘suffering the passion’ (2005, 181). This means that we do not: ‘stop at 
what we should or ought to say, nor at what we may and do say, but take in 
what we must and dare not say, or have it at heart to say, or are too confused 
or too tame or wild or terrorized to say or to think to say’ (Cavell 2005, 185). 
Such dialogue is markedly absent from our scenario, which is marked instead 
by dispassionate speech in the name of objectivity and compliance with the 
procedures. In fact, the very thought of the student talking with her friends, 
or with Dr Jones, and perhaps of exposing the rawness of her emotion, leads 
the Head of Department to laugh nervously. Safety, it seems, is in the proce-
dural.
From Safety to Risk
The spoken exchange that is at the heart of Cavellian passionate utterance is 
one that does not sit easily with a view of conversation between individuals 
as chatter or mere idle talk. Using the title of another of Cavell’s works here, 
in answer to the question Must We Mean What We Say?, the appropriate re-
sponse seems to be a resounding yes. Munday writes that ‘the element of risk 
that characterises Cavell’s passionate utterance involves freedom to say what 
it is difficult to say—to be confrontational when necessary—to say what one 
has to say’ (2009, 71). There is something here that resonates with Michel 
Foucault’s discussion of the risk that parrhēsia, frank speaking, entails (2001). 
Such speaking is denied in the scenario, with the Head of Department direct-
ly instructing the student not to talk to Dr Jones. But Cavell reminds us that 
‘each instance of [the passionate utterance] directs, and risks, if not costs, 
blood’ (2005, 187).
Throughout Cavell’s work, we find him repeatedly returning to examples 
from literature, film and television, and music—among many others to Shake-
speare, Coleridge, Poe, to 1930s Hollywood film and to jazz. Vincent Co-
lapietro, in writing Cavell’s ‘literary achievement’, argues that ‘his philosoph-
ical accomplishment is inseparable from his literary practice’ (2012, 123). But 
it is in Cavell’s discussion of voice (in philosophy; his own philosophical voice, 
and the repression and recovery of voice) that he turns to opera. He writes: 
‘I provisionally characterise the medium of opera as music’s exploration of 
its affinities with expressive or passionate utterance…[it] allow[s] the study 
of opera to inspire philosophy’s interest in passionate speech’ (2005, 15). In 
finding a theory of passionate speech in opera, Cavell draws examples from 
the following: The Marriage of Figaro, Don Giovanni, Carmen, La Bohème, 
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Otello and Lucia di Lammermoor. In another example, he uses Wagner’s 
1845 opera, Tannhäuser (Cavell 2005). The plot, on the theme of sacred 
and profane love, runs like this: Heinrich Tannhäuser, a minstrel knight, re-
turns from the mythical world of Venus and her pleasures, and meets pilgrims 
who remind him of the beautiful Elisabeth (who has been pining for him in 
his absence). Tannhäuser and Elisabeth are reunited at a song contest where 
Elisabeth confronts Tannhäuser as to his absence. The libretto runs like this:
TANNHÄUSER
O princess!
ELISABETH
Heavens! Do not kneel! Leave me!
I may not see you here!
TANNHÄUSER
You may! O stay
and let me remain at your feet!
ELISABETH
Rise, I beg you!
You must not kneel here, for this hall
is your kingdom. Arise!
Accept my thanks for your return!
Where have you tarried so long?
TANNHÄUSER
Far from here,
in very distant lands. Dark oblivion
has fallen between yesterday and today.
All memory has suddenly deserted me
and one thing only must I remember,
that I never dared hope to greet you again
nor raise my eyes to you.
ELISABETH
What was it then that led you back?
TANNHÄUSER
It was a miracle,
a mysterious, mighty miracle!
ELISABETH
This miracle I praise
from the depths of my heart!
Forgive me if I know not what I say!
I am in a dream, and more foolish than a child.
helpless before the might of this marvel.
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I scarcely know myself any longer: o help me
solve the riddle in my heart!
To minstrels’ beguiling music I formerly
lent a willing and a constant ear;
their singing and their paeans
seemed a delightful recreation.
But what a strange new life
your song aroused in my breast!
Now I was as if wracked with pain,
now as if pierced with sudden joy.
Emotions I had never felt!
Longings I had never known!
What once had delighted me had vanished
before these yet unnamed raptures!
And then when you left us,
my peace and joy were gone;
the melodies the minstrels sang
seemed stale to me, and cheerless their ideas.
In dreams I felt dull pain;
waking, I was filled with troubled fancies;
joy had fled from my heart —
Heinrich! What did you do to me? (Wagner 1845, Act 2, Scene 2).
Cavell finds that Elisabeth’s emotional plea to Tannhäuser with the words: 
‘Heinrich! What did you do to me?’ is an example of passionate utterance. In 
fact, this section of the opera illustrates the features that Cavell finds definitive 
for such utterances. There are several invitations to exchange. First, Tannhäus-
er appeals to Elisabeth with the exclamation, ‘O princess!’ This invitation is 
initially declined when Elisabeth responds: ‘Do not kneel! Leave me! I may 
not see you here!’ But she then offers further invitations to exchange, as she is 
moved to ask: ‘Where have you tarried so long?’, and ‘What was it then that led 
you back?’ That the answers to her questions are not straightforward, and that 
despite these questions, what follows this meeting is a love duet, illustrates that 
passionate utterance is not marked, unlike Austin’s performative, by any con-
ventional procedure. The iterative nature of passionate utterance is highlighted 
by Cavell when he writes: ‘In the mode of passionate exchange, there is no final 
word, no uptake or turndown, until a line is drawn, a withdrawal is effected, 
perhaps in turn to be revoked’ (2005, 183). The passional in speech—at the 
extremes of emotion—is central to this scene. Both characters are moved to 
speak, and are suffering the passion. Elisabeth is being ‘racked with pain’ and 
‘pierced with sudden joy’. But the talk is also of the everyday: where Tannhäus-
er has been, and why he has been away so long. There is risk in this encounter, 
too. Risk that costs blood. In the closing scenes, the pair’s encounter leads not 
to happiness, but to their respective grief and death.
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Towards Passional Speech in Student Complaints
Cavell’s example from Tannhäuser may seem a long way from the encounter 
between the Head of Department and the student in the scenario we present-
ed. But there is something in the distinction between Austin’s performative, 
and Cavell’s idea of passionate utterance, that we find helpful in thinking 
about how complaints might be addressed in higher education. We stress 
that we are not seeking to suppress legitimate student complaints, nor are we 
claiming that there should not be published procedures for addressing com-
plaints. We are also not offering the idea of passionate utterance as a theory 
to repair—in the manner of a panacea—the kind of proceduralized dialogue 
that we argue tends to be relied on in addressing formal complaints. We are, 
however, drawing attention to the way that such procedures can, in seeking 
to provide a ‘safe’ and confidential process, lead to a form of detachment. 
In the invocation of formal procedures, and the escalation of complaints, 
the student is cocooned in a system (something like Austin’s ‘order of law’). 
The demand placed on the ‘other’ here is simply to fill in some paperwork—
to encounter the other genuinely would unnecessarily complicate and delay 
matters. While there is a kind of ‘safety’ and detachment built in to the com-
plaints process which is valuable in terms of keeping the process consistent, 
and indeed in ‘protecting’ the student, this is to the detriment of the expres-
sive in our speech—to participation in ‘the disorders of desire’ (Cavell 2005, 
185). The passional or expressive nature of the complaint is often lost in the 
drive to invoke and follow procedures correctly. What results is an apparent 
lack of emotion and avoidance of the other, with the passional aspects lost in 
the service of a means–ends calculation of utility.
Our scenario also showed that there was no “invitation to exchange”—at 
least in the way that Cavell understands this. No encounter or conversation 
(from the Latin com vertere—turning together) takes place between the stu-
dent who is complaining and the tutor concerned. For Cavell, such avoidance 
is nothing less than the ‘denial of the human self ’ in the process (1979, 154). 
As he puts it, ‘saying something is never merely saying something, but is say-
ing something with a certain tune and at a proper cue and while executing the 
appropriate business’ (Cavell 1994, 30). The thoughts, feelings and emotions 
that compel one to speak cannot be separated out from what is said and what 
is spoken about; instead these aspects of an utterance are central to the perlo-
cutionary speech act, to passionate utterance. Complaints made that engage 
the other; that are the context for a conversation in which we are moved to 
speak; that allow us to make ourselves intelligible to others, are those that are 
risky. But they are ones in which we are staking our future together.
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4.  The Autopsy of Quality in Online
Higher Education
mAtthew m. ACevedo, FloridA internAtionAl university
Abstract: The purpose of this essay is to critically and philosophically explore 
the role of and impetus for quality assurance regimes in online education and 
their most salient manifestation, the Quality Matters program. The author ar-
gues that online courses are particularly vulnerable to autopsic quality exami-
nations under neoliberal rationality as a result of their corporeal, digital nature.
This essay will also consider the implications for faculty and others who must 
abide by and perform quality in online higher education and will consider 
ways in which those facing the incursion of quality assurance in online educa-
tion can resist its threats and coercions, leveraging the promise of the libera-
tory aspects of distance education.
Keywords: quality assurance, distance education, Quality Matters, audit, autopsy
Online education has become a pervasive and embedded instructional mo-
dality in American higher education, with more than a quarter of all students 
taking some courses at a distance and another 14% enrolled in exclusively 
online courses. The vast majority of these students attend public institutions, 
dispelling any suggestion that this is a largely for-profit phenomenon.1 With 
no signs of abating in the public sector, online education is a space in need of 
increased and continued critical inquiry.
Concomitant with the growth in online education has been increased 
pressure from institutions, administrations, lawmakers, accreditors, and the 
1 I. Elaine Allen et al., “Online Report Card: Tracking Online Education in the United 
States,” 2016, http://onlinelearningsurvey.com/reports/onlinereportcard.pdf.
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public to regulate the quality of online courses. Mandates to ensure and cer-
tify online course quality have been initiated at the state, institution, and 
academic unit levels. For example, in my home state of Florida, the Florida 
Board of Governors has declared a goal of ensuring that 90% of online cours-
es at Florida’s public universities bear a “high-quality” rating.2 No such goal 
exists for other instructional modalities.
For some, this might lead to the question of why online courses have 
been subjected to higher levels of scrutiny. Is it because popular perceptions 
of online education as being of low quality continue to persist, despite a body 
of research suggesting otherwise? Or is there the possibility of a deeper, more 
complex machination at work, specific to the intricacies and vulnerabilities of 
online education?
The purpose of this chapter is to critically explore the role of and impetus 
for quality assurance regimes in online education, as well as the implications 
for faculty and others who must abide by and perform quality in online higher 
education.3 Furthermore, this chapter will consider ways in which those fac-
ing the incursion of quality assurance in online education can resist its threats 
and coercions, leveraging the promise of the liberatory aspects of distance 
education.
Quality and Online Higher Education
An inquiry into the roles of quality assurance should begin with an explora-
tion of what is meant by “quality.” The idea of quality assurance is an import 
from the world of business and finance, where the definition of “quality” 
has assumed different meanings in different historical and material contexts. 
These different definitions include conformance to specifications, value for 
money, and the degree to which the expectations of customers are met.4 
Even those who advocate the implementation of quality assurance programs 
struggle with defining it. Returning to my example of Florida, the Board of 
Governors Online Education 2025 Strategic Plan suggests that:
2 Florida Board of Governors, “Online Education 2025 Strategic Plan,” 2015, https://www.
flbog.edu/board/office/online/_doc/strategic_planning_online_ed/2015_11_05%20
FINAL_StrategicPlan.pdf.
3 I am fully aware that by defining quality assurance as a “regime,” I signal a certain 
criticality toward the topic. By regime, I broadly mean a system of institutionalized 
power with embedded practices and norms. This is my own definition. Making no claim 
of objectivity, I fully embrace the authoritarian connotation of the word.
4 Carol A. Reeves and David A. Bednar, “Defining Quality: Alternatives and Implicati-
ons,” The Academy of Management Review 19, no. 3 (1994): 419–445.
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the “quality” of online education can be complex and difficult to define. In fact, 
different organizations define quality in a variety of ways, including the number 
of students that are successfully completing courses, comparison to face-to-face 
instruction, the number of support services, or students’ assessments. Various 
organizations are also recognized as curating best practices, distributing those 
best practices, and developing guidelines for evaluating those practices based 
upon their organization’s viewpoint of quality. Each organization differs slightly 
in its definition of “quality.”5
Given the nebulous and contentious nature of the definition of “quality,” it 
may be useful, analytically, to position it in relation to a similar, but distinctly 
different discourse, that of “excellence.” Bill Readings’ compelling polemic 
on the corporatization of the university describes the shift in the purpose of 
the university from the University of Culture to the University of Excellence.6 
If, according to Readings, “excellence” refers to a discourse that is “entire-
ly meaningless, or to put it more precisely, non-referential,”7 then perhaps 
“quality” might be seen as a related (and possibly inverse) discourse that 
includes specific and measurable referents and corresponding performances, 
although the resultant degree of “meaning” may be similarly problematic or 
questionable. As in other quality assurance regimes in higher education, such 
as regional accreditation bodies, those in online education rely on rubrics or 
checklists of specific standards to determine the extent of the quality of the 
course or program in question; these standards comprise the specific referents 
of a given regime of quality.
In response to the increased scrutiny of quality in online higher educa-
tion, a veritable panoply of quality assurance regimes has emerged, including 
the Quality Matters (QM) Program, the Online Learning Consortium Qual-
ity Scorecard, the Blackboard Catalyst Exemplary Course Award, and the 
Open SUNY Course Quality Review (OSCQR). Notably, each of the popular 
programs except for OSCQR is operated by third-party organizations that are 
unaffiliated with higher education institutions, and both the QM rubric and 
Online Learning Consortium scorecard are only available to paid subscribers 
of their respective programs. This may raise questions about the proprietary 
nature of quality and the profit-seeking behavior of private firms that make 
claims on the quality of education. Despite the existence of these myriad 
quality assurance regimes in online higher education, I focus my analysis in 
5 Florida Board of Governors, “Online Education 2025 Strategic Plan,” 2.
6 Bill Readings, The University in Ruins (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 
1996).
7 Ibid., 22.
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this chapter on the QM program, as it seems to be the overwhelmingly pre-
dominant form used by institutions today.8
QM is a nonprofit organization that facilitates a peer-reviewed quality 
assurance program for online courses and online aspects of hybrid or blended 
courses. The QM program evaluates courses based on a rubric of eight cate-
gories, each containing between four and nine standards, comprising a total 
of 43 items that are weighted on a three-point scale. The broad categories in-
clude elements of course navigation, learner support, accessibility, and, most 
crucially, alignment between and among measurable course- and unit-level 
learning objectives, instructional materials, and assessment instruments.
QM reviews are conducted by a team of QM-certified peer reviewers 
comprising one reviewer who is a subject matter expert in the content area 
of the course being certified, at least one reviewer who is external to the 
institution submitting the course, and a QM-certified “Master Reviewer.”9 
These reviewers are granted access to a version of a completed, “mature,” 
online course that has been stripped of all student activity.10 The remaining 
course shell may contain the syllabus, instructional materials, assignments and 
tests, discussion prompts, meta-instructional items (such as instructions, lists 
of learning objectives, rubrics, and policies), and records of one-way commu-
nications from instructors to students. Independently, the reviewers evaluate 
the course and determine whether each standard has been “met” or “not 
met.”11 To successfully pass a QM review and be designated as a certified 
quality course, all standards reflecting a point value of 3 must be met and 85% 
of the total point value of all standards (or 84 of 99 points) must be earned.12 
As of September 2017, a fee of $1,400 is assessed for a QM review, or $1,000 
for QM subscriber institutions.13
8 I am unaware of any empirical evidence comparing adoption rates of different online 
education quality assurance programs. However, Quality Matters is the only program 
that has a series of regional and national conferences, special issues dedicated to it in 
academic journals, statewide initiatives like the one described herein, and so on. It is 
the only program whose parent organization exists only for quality assurance; the other 
programs are offshoots of organizations with broader aims.
9 Quality Matters, “Review Process for Course Design,” 2018, https://www.
qualitymatters.org/qm-membership/faqs/how-course-review-works.
10 Quality Matters, “Preparing for a QM Course Review,” 2017, https://www.
qualitymatters.org/qm-membership/faqs/course-review-preparation.
11 Quality Matters, “Review Process for Course Design.”
12 Quality Matters, “Quality Matters Rubric Standards, Fifth Edition, 2014, with Assigned 
Point Values,” 2014.
13 Quality Matters, “2017 Fees for Memberships,” 2017, https://www.qualitymatters.
org/qm-membership/faqs/2017-fees.
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The quality assurance review can be interpreted as a form of audit in that 
it is intended to responsibilize and accountabilize in what Power calls a “ritual 
of verification”: faculty members should be held answerable for ensuring that 
their courses meet certain standards of quality in order to provide students with 
the best possible learning experiences.14 These standards are external to and 
imposed on faculty, and the criteria of quality are presumed to be universal.
Similar to Readings’ characterization of excellence as “incontestable 
ground,”15 quality standards seem natural, normal, and unquestionable; “any 
question of…performance indicators is positioned as a resistance to public 
accountability, a refusal to be questioned according to the logic of contem-
porary capitalism.”16
According to Power, “the idea of audit shapes public conceptions of reg-
ulatory or control which reflects deeply held commitments to checking and 
trust.”17 Audit necessarily takes place in the context of institutionalized distrust; 
in online education, faculty members and instructional designers are assumed 
incapable of self-regulating the quality of their outputs. Furthermore, since 
auditing reflects “a system of values and goals which are inscribed in the official 
programmes which demand it,”18 quality standards are necessarily imbued with 
a certain normativity that privileges a narrow range of pedagogical choices. For 
example, a course will not pass a QM review if an instructor prioritizes out-
comes that may not be associated with particular observable and measurable 
behaviors or opts to forego the use of “tools that promote active learning.”
The QM audit can also be seen as a disciplinary mechanism of examination, 
which Foucault calls “a normalizing gaze, a surveillance that makes it possible 
to quantify, to classify and to punish. It establishes over individuals a visibility 
through which one differentiates and judges them.”19 The audit “manifests 
the subjection of those who are perceived as objects and the objectification of 
those who are subjected.”20 It configures courses and instructors into objects 
of knowledge which can be “described, judged, measured, compared with oth-
ers,…trained, corrected, classified, normalized, excluded, etc.”21
14 Michael Power, The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997).
15 Readings, The University in Ruins, 23.
16 Ibid., 27.
17 Power, The Audit Society, 7.
18 Ibid.
19 Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, 2nd ed. (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1995), 184.
20 Ibid., 184–185.
21 Ibid., 191.
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The QM rubric is applied universally to online courses regardless of con-
tent area, pedagogical priorities, student population, or curricular context—
an introductory biology course is expected to meet the same set of standards 
as a graduate philosophy course. It follows what Espeland and Stevens call a 
logic of commensuration, or “the expression or measurement of characteris-
tics normally represented by different units according to a common metric…a 
way to reduce and simplify disparate information into numbers that can easily 
be compared.”22 Commensuration further normalizes objects of inquiry by 
reducing or erasing differences among them; not only are the biology course 
and philosophy course evaluated by the same rubric, abiding by the expected 
quality performances reduces the difference between them. Both courses, per 
the QM rubric, must have a network of behavioral objectives or competen-
cies, must be organized in easily consumed “modules,” must have “instruc-
tional materials that are current,” must have “assessment instruments [that 
are] sequenced, varied, and suited to the learner work being assessed,” must 
ask “learners to introduce themselves to the class,” must have multiple pro-
visions that support “ease of use”—as though a learning experience is simply 
something to be used, must provide expectations for etiquette for commu-
nications and state “requirements for learner interaction,” and so on.23 The 
QM rubric creates a norm—an archetype—by which all courses are compared 
and judged. In this way, not only do regimes of quality limit pedagogical 
choices, reducing the agency and autonomy of the teacher, they, as Espeland 
and Stevens put it, “create what they purport to describe.”24 This fundamen-
tally and necessarily represents a process of educational homogenization.
Digital Artifacts and the Autopsy of Quality
Despite research indicating no significant differences between learning out-
comes in face-to-face and online courses,25 the emphasis on quality assurance 
in online education seems to be outpacing that in face-to-face courses. For 
example, returning to the case in Florida, the Quality Workgroup of the On-
line and Innovation Committee of the Florida Board of Governors (such a 
thing exists) has announced its intention to implement QM as the statewide 
22 Wendy Nelson Espeland and Mitchell L. Stevens, “Commensuration as a Social Pro-
cess,” Annual Review of Sociology 24 (1998): 315–316.
23 Quality Matters Rubric Standards, Fifth Edition, 2014.
24 Espeland and Stevens, “Commensuration as a Social Process,” 338.
25 D. Derek Wu, “Online Learning in Postsecondary Education: A Review of the Empirical 
Literature,” 2015, 1–45, https://doi.org/10.18665/sr.221027.
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official quality metric as a strategy to meet the goal of ensuring that 90% of 
online courses at Florida’s public universities bear a “high-quality” ranking.26 
According to FloridaShines, Florida’s statewide catalog of online courses of-
fered at public colleges and universities, 8,218 online courses were offered in 
the spring of 2018; certifying 90% of these courses through QM would cost 
the state nearly $7.4 million for that semester alone, assuming the subscriber 
rate.27 No such quality goal exists in Florida for other instructional modalities, 
nor does a specific committee exist in the state university system’s governing 
body to address other instructional modalities. In another example, in re-
sponse to a class action lawsuit in which former George Washington Univer-
sity students claimed that the quality of their online programs was inferior to 
that of their face-to-face counterparts, that institution now requires that all 
its online courses meet QM standards, all its instructional designers must take 
QM training, and faculty members “will have the option to take a Quality 
Matters seminar to recognize firsthand the importance of those standards.”28
Why does the particular preoccupation with course quality exist in rela-
tion to online courses, while there is seemingly little formal scrutiny for 500-
seat lecture halls or the learning outcomes resulting from underpaid, under-
supported, contingent faculty? The immediate, superficial explanation is that 
the public perceives the quality, value, or rigor of online courses as inferior to 
face-to-face courses,29 making the scrutiny deserved and appropriate. Howev-
er, this explanation overlooks the complexity of the issue, in which, I argue, 
the nature and vulnerabilities of the particular form of online courses are 
much more germane. Rather than an inherent inferiority to traditional face-
to-face teaching, I argue that the digital nature of online courses makes them 
more vulnerable to examination under the guise of quality improvement in a 
neoliberal climate increasingly focused on accountability and managerialism.
26 Florida Board of Governors, “Minutes, State University System of Florida, Innovati-
on and Online Committee, March 29, 2017,” 2017, 1–6, http://www.flbog.edu/
documents_meetings/0265_1080_8180_4.2.2IOC02a_Minutes March 29 2017 Mee-
tingFinal.pdf.
27 Florida Virtual Campus, “FloridaShines,” 2018, https://courses.flvc.org.
28 Mark Lieberman, “Rejecting Criticisms – and Addressing Them,” Inside Higher Ed, 
February 13, 2018, https://www.insidehighered.com/digital-learning/article/2018/ 
02/13/george-washington-university-announces- efforts-improve-online, par. 7.
29 Kim Parker, Amanda Lenhart, and Kathleen Moore, “The Digital Revolution and 
Higher Education,” Pew Research, no. 202 (2011): 29, https://doi.org/10.1017/
CBO9781107415324.004; Lydia Saad, Brandon Busteed, and Mitchell Ogisi, “In 
US, Online Education Rated Best for Value and Options,” Gallup News Service, 
2013, http://news.gallup.com/poll/165425/online-education-rated-best-value-
options.aspx.
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Before further exploring the idea of the vulnerability of online courses 
in this context, it is prudent for me to explain, briefly, how I conceptualize 
neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is a concept with many meanings (or non-mean-
ings) to many people; Clark lists some of these as including “states, spaces, 
logics, techniques, technologies, discourses, discursive framework, ideologies, 
ways of thinking, projects, agendas, programs, governmentality, measures, 
regimes, development, ethno-development, development imaginaries, global 
forms of control, social policies” and so on.30
Synthesizing the work of thinkers like Harvey,31 Peck,32 and Brown,33 
and put simply, I understand neoliberalism as a rationality that elevates and 
applies economic logic to all spheres of life and society, emphasizing compe-
tition as a “natural” allocator of resources and the market as determiner of 
value or worth. There are a variety of manifestations of this, including the 
reconfiguring of global financial capital; transfer of power and control from 
public entities to private; application of business concepts and processes to 
traditionally public sectors; and the entrepreneurialization and responsibiliza-
tion of institutions, groups, families, and individuals.
Neoliberal rationality has had a distinct influence on higher education. 
For instance, Olssen and Peters contend that neoliberalism has driven sig-
nificant changes in the academy, including a shift from collegial governance 
to hierarchical managerialism, increasing managerial specification over work-
loads and course content, and the erosion of faculty professionalism and au-
tonomy.34 Giroux suggests that the advent of neoliberalism has promoted a 
pedagogy that “strips education of its public values, critical contents, and civic 
responsibilities as part of its broader goal of creating new subjects wedded to 
the logic of privatization, efficiency, flexibility, the accumulation of capital, 
and the destruction of the social state.”35
30 John Clarke, “Living With/in and without Neo-Liberalism,” Focaal—European Journal 
of Anthropology 2008, no. 51 (2008): 138, https://doi.org/10.3167/fcl.2008.510110.
31 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, USA, 
2007).
32 Jamie Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010).
33 Wendy Brown, Undoing the Demos: Neoliberalism’s Stealth Revolution (Cambridge: MIT 
Press, 2015).
34 Mark Olssen and Michael A. Peters, “Neoliberalism, Higher Education, and the Know-
ledge Economy: From the Free Market to Knowledge Capitalism,” Journal of Education 
Policy 30, no. 3 (May 2005): 325.
35 Henry A. Giroux, “Bare Pedagogy and the Scourge of Neoliberalism: Rethinking 
Higher Education as a Democratic Public Sphere,” The Educational Forum 74, no. 3 
(2010): 185.
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Regardless of any given context, neoliberalism shapes and configures 
material conditions unevenly in spaces that are more or less prone to its ef-
fects; it is adaptable and predatory. For example, in the aftermath of Hurri-
cane Katrina in New Orleans, conservative elements swooped in to promote 
privatization policies, deregulation, voucher programs, and the fostering of 
so-called “entrepreneurial activity,”36 leading to, inter alia, the decimation 
of the public school system through the proliferation of charter schools 
owned and operated by private firms. In higher education, programs and 
departments that are less capable of generating revenue for the institution 
are constantly under the threat of defunding or altogether elimination.
Online courses are uniquely susceptible to this adaptable, predatory na-
ture of neoliberal rationality, albeit on a different scale than Hurricane Katri-
na, in that they are vulnerable to a particular kind of examination—one that 
cannot be conducted on face-to-face courses. To describe the technique of 
this examination, I will present what I find to be a useful analogy in concep-
tualizing college courses as living bodies. In some particular ways, any college 
course, regardless of modality, resembles a sort of living being; it begins at a 
particular moment, its components (students, instructors, materials, commu-
nications) interact, and it progresses and develops. It is made up of smaller 
living subunits, the course participants, who all act according to particular 
roles and motivations while contributing to the growth and movement of 
the bigger entity. In other words, the whole is more than the sum of the 
pieces. Finally, both the living being and the college course end. The living 
thing dies, its constituent organic elements recycled into the environment; 
the college course concludes, textbooks are sold, notes are discarded, and the 
institution awards each student a predetermined number of credits.
However, a distinct difference exists in the corporeal form of traditional 
face-to-face classes and online classes. Face-to-face courses are ephemeral and 
fleeting; the teacher and the students meet periodically in a physical space, 
carry out the physical and cognitive actions of teaching and learning, and 
disband, leaving no material indication or record of their presence. When the 
course concludes—when the living entity dies—there is no body left behind.
Online courses, in contrast, leave behind a digital cadaver, a tangible 
artifact of the teaching and learning experience that is stored on databases 
indefinitely. This digital cadaver is produced through the use of a learning 
management system, such as Blackboard Learn or Instructure’s Canvas. Dig-
itized versions of instructional materials, records of interaction and commu-
nication between instructors and students, stored examples of student work, 
36 Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason.
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and the structure and presentation of a course make up this artifact. These 
records, stored in perpetuity on databases and file servers, make online cours-
es more susceptible to examination and evaluation, procedures typical of and 
within neoliberal rationality. Without the presence of the instructor or stu-
dents, an auditor, from a distance, is able to examine the totality of the learn-
ing environment in what amounts to the equivalent of sitting through every 
moment of a face-to-face course and listening in on every conversation, but 
compressed in time to suit the auditor.37
Since QM reviews are conducted on “mature courses that have been 
taught previously,”38 they correspond in form and function to a particular 
type of audit carried out on the dead, the autopsy. In a medical autopsy, the 
major objective is “the establishment of final diagnoses,”39 and a QM review 
evaluates aspects of an online course design based on a rubric of standards. 
In either case, the audit is pathological in nature; the goal is to diagnose. 
The findings of a quality audit on a course cannot improve or change the 
educational experience for students post factum any more than the results of 
an autopsy can cure the dead. The audit, like the autopsy, exists solely for the 
sake of diagnosis.
Quality audit as autopsy is not necessarily a new concept. In Morley’s study 
on the relationship between power and quality assurance programs in the Unit-
ed Kingdom, one of her interviewees, an academic department head, described 
the futility of student teaching evaluations as an autopsy: “As far as I’m con-
cerned the autopsy model of quality, where you inspect the patient to see what 
they died of, and then think what you might do to the next patient is really not 
very helpful.”40
Of course, college courses are not living things in an actual biological 
sense, so this metaphor has its limits. Online courses that undergo revisions 
as a result of a quality audit may, in a sense, return to life for a new group of 
students, another unique characteristic of the digital nature of online courses, 
and it could remain for philosophical speculation whether the reborn course 
37 While face-to-face courses increasingly use a learning management system, this use is 
generally limited to storing a syllabus and materials that are used in the face-to-face 
environment, not the totality of the learning environment as in fully online courses. See 
John F. Gomez, “Higher Education Faculty Use of a Learning Management System in 
Face-to-Face Classes,” California State University, Stanislaus, 2015.
38 Quality Matters, “Preparing for a QM Course Review.”
39 Andrew J. Connolly et al., Autopsy Pathology: A Manual and Atlas, 2nd ed. (Philadel-
phia: Saunders Elsevier, 2009).
40 Louise Morley, Quality and Power in Higher Education (Berkshire: McGraw-Hill Edu-
cation (UK), 2003), 138.
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is a new body or a zombie of the old. But the idea of autopsy, particularly 
in the context of online education, where the remains of an online course 
assume a distinct corporeal form in its totality, the idea of autopsy takes on 
a greater physicality, a reduced level of abstraction. Importantly, the manner 
in which quality auditors enter, inspect, and evaluate the digital artifact of an 
online course reflects the pathological, diagnostic function of an autopsy and 
is distinct from dissection, which is exploratory, experimental, or analytical. 
As a process necessarily enabled by online teaching and learning technologies, 
this autopsic examination was foreshadowed by Rhoades, who suggested that 
instructional technologies could enable surveillance of course delivery, thus 
contributing to managerial control of pedagogy and curriculum while reduc-
ing faculty autonomy.41
Does Quality Matters Matter?
Perhaps the invasive and autopsic nature of the quality audit could be over-
looked or accepted if it resulted in substantive or meaningful positive changes 
for future students in revised iterations of audited courses, so a brief discussion 
of the literature on online course quality as it pertains to students’ educational 
experiences, particularly the literature surrounding QM, is apt. While QM 
purports to be research-based and to support QM-related research, much of 
their supporting research is QM-funded and unpublished,42 making critical 
evaluation of this research impossible and limiting the amount of literature 
that can be examined. However, based on the published findings, there is 
scant evidence suggesting that designing online courses to meet QM stand-
ards results in meaningful positive changes to learning outcomes or student 
perceptions of the course. Swan, Matthews, Boles, Bogle, and Day studied a 
graduate education course redesigned to meet QM standards and found that 
student grades increased after the redesign, although not significantly so, but 
measures of cognitive presence, social presence, and teaching presence based 
on the Community of Inquiry framework all remained relatively the same 
or dropped.43 Miner found no significant differences in student satisfaction, 
grades, or retention rates between pre- and post-QM certified course de-
41 Gary Rhodes, Managed Professionals: Unionized Faculty and Restructuring Academic 
Labor (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998), 185.
42 Quality Matters, “Curated Research,” 2017, https://www.qualitymatters.org/
node/253.
43 Karen Swan et al., “Linking Online Course Design and Implementation to Learning 
Outcomes: A Design Experiment,” Internet and Higher Education 15, no. 2 (2012): 
81–88, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.iheduc.2011.07.002.
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signs.44 Similarly, Aman found QM-certified courses did not positively affect 
retention rates or overall student satisfaction in comparison to noncertified 
courses.45 Hollowell, Brooks, and Anderson found that final exam scores in an 
Introductory Biology course actually fell four points immediately following 
implementation of QM standards in a course and were lower in two of the 
three post-QM terms than in the pre-QM version of the course.46
The mixed and largely disappointing findings on the impact of QM sug-
gest that the process does not result in substantive or meaningful positive 
changes to online learning environments. The much more substantial effect, 
then, of QM, and presumably other quality assurance regimes in online high-
er education, is the application of a disciplinary technology that normaliz-
es, homogenizes incommensurable human experiences, reduces pedagogical 
possibilities, and renders faculty and students as objects that can be evaluated 
and subjects that can be controlled.
Educational Criticism and Counter-conduct in  
the Culture of Quality
Given the threats and coercions presented by the culture of quality assurance, 
how can educators involved in online education—faculty members, instruc-
tors, instructional designers, course developers, and others—resist its nor-
malizing and pedagogically limiting regimes? Refusing to submit to processes 
of quality assurance, such as QM, is an obvious answer, but this may not be 
possible or easy for those in professional contexts that require submission 
and participation as a condition of employment or promotion. Furthermore, 
mere refusal or insubordination represents a negative engagement with the 
problem—we cannot merely turn our backs while the monstrosity grows. In-
stead, we can seek to engage in what Foucault calls “counter-conduct,” or the 
“struggle against the processes implemented for conducting others”—one 
44 Allison G. Miner, “The Effect of Quality Matters Certification on Student Satisfaction, 
Grades, and Retention at Florida International University” (EdD diss., Morgan State 
University, 2014), 137.
45 Richard R. Aman, “Improving Student Satisfaction and Retention with Online In-
struction through Systematic Faculty Peer Review of Courses” (PhD diss., Oregon 
State University, 2009).
46 Gail P. Hollowell, Racheal M. Brooks, and Yolanda B. Anderson, “Course Design, 
Quality Matters Training, and Student Outcomes,” American Journal of Distance Edu-
cation 31, no. 3 (2017): 1–10, https://doi.org/10.1080/08923647.2017.1301144
. Interestingly, despite the lackluster results of a QM-based intervention, the authors 
still seem to advocate the use of QM in faculty development.
The Autopsy of Quality in Online Higher Education 87
that has “a productivity, forms of existence, organization, and a consistency 
and solidity.”47 We must work to develop an alternative—a positive engage-
ment—to the disciplinary mechanisms of quality assurance.
However, the problematic understandings and applications of words like 
“quality” and “excellence” complicate the discussion related to the improve-
ment of teaching (and its complement, course design). The questioning of 
the ideas of quality and quality assurance in online higher education should 
not be conflated with or mistaken for a misguided idea that the goodness of 
teaching, including in online spaces, does not matter, or that we should not 
genuinely strive to engage students in the best possible learning and mean-
ing-making experiences. Indeed, the opposite: the desire to improve student 
learning experiences is virtuous and appropriate, but the ideas of “improving 
the quality of courses” or “striving for teaching excellence” are rendered hol-
low in the context of meaningless watchwords. How then, can we endeavor 
to improve (and help each other improve) the acts of design and teaching 
without resorting to reductionism or authoritarian measures of discipline and 
control—forms favored by and endemic to the corporate university?
This form of counter-conduct could materialize as any one of an infinite 
number of possibilities, but I want to speculate, optimistically, about the pos-
sibility of a self-supporting, non-hierarchical community of educators who 
support each other in the improvement of teaching. It may be helpful here to 
return to Readings and his call for a “community of thinkers” in the universi-
ty.48 In Rolfe’s The University in Dissent, his spiritual successor to Readings’ 
seminal work, he envisions this community as following a rhizomatic struc-
ture—one which resembles a botanical network of underground stems that 
expand horizontally, “an underground, acentred , non-hierarchical, transdis-
ciplinary network” of “thinkers come together temporarily in order to pursue 
specific short-term collaborative teaching and research projects.”49
These short-term projects of supporting each other’s teaching could draw 
from the ideas of educational connoisseurship and educational criticism, as put 
forth by Elliot Eisner.50 Connoisseurship, according to Eisner, is “the ability to 
make fine grained discriminations among complex and subtle qualities…. It can 
be displayed in any realm in which the character, import, or value of objects, 
47 Michel Foucault, Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the College de France, 
1977–1978 (New York: Picador, 2007), 200–201.
48 Readings, The University in Ruins.
49 Gary Rolfe, The University in Dissent: Scholarship in the Corporate University (New York: 
Routledge, 2013), 44.
50 Elliot W. Eisner, The Enlightened Eye: Qualitative Inquiry and the Enhancement of 
Educational Practice (New York: Teachers College Press, 2017).
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situations, and performances is distributed and variable, including educational 
practice.”51 The educational connoisseur, like the wine connoisseur, is able to 
“differentiate between the subtle and complex qualities”52 based on antecedent 
knowledge, an “understanding of the conditions that give rise to these quali-
ties.”53 Here, it is necessary to differentiate between “quality” and “qualities,” 
where the latter refers to “those features of our environment that can be experi-
enced through any of our senses”54; according to Eisner, the meaning we assign 
to qualities constitutes the content of experiences.
Contrary to the reductionism of checklists and rubrics conventional 
among quality assurance regimes, educational connoisseurship assumes a ho-
listic approach that respects the educational context, the background of and 
relationships between the teacher and students, and the particularities of the 
subject matter. Connoisseurship is a type of “epistemic seeing”; it is “the means 
through which we come to know the complexities, nuances, and subtleties of 
aspects of the world in which we have a special interest.”55 The dimensions ex-
plored by the educational connoisseur, according to Eisner, are the intentional, 
the structural, the curricular, the pedagogical, and the evaluative.56
Related to educational connoisseurship is the idea of educational crit-
icism. Criticism (not necessarily negative in this sense) is the published ac-
count of the connoisseur’s observations of a given educational phenomenon, 
generated for the purpose of assisting others. The educational critic’s task is 
to perform what Eisner calls a “mysterious feat”: to transform the particular 
qualities of a given learning experience, such as an online course, into a form 
that illuminates, interprets, and appraises them.57 According to Eisner:
Since there is no literal linguistic equivalent for qualities per se, the task cannot 
be simple translation. With no rules of equivalence, there is no one-to-one corre-
spondence of referent to symbol. Thus every act of criticism is a reconstruction. 
The reconstruction takes the form of an argued narrative, supported by evidence 
that is never incontestable; there will always be different interpretations of the 
“same” [course].58
51 Ibid., 63.
52 Ibid., 64.
53 Ibid., 65.
54 Ibid., 17.
55 Ibid., 68.
56 Ibid., 72–81.
57 Ibid., 86.
58 Ibid.
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In other words, educational experiences, as complex human activities, are 
open to multiple interpretations or perspectives, depending on the sensibili-
ties and perceptions of the connoisseur—a stark contrast to the rigid reduc-
tionism and universality of the QM rubric. Eisner suggests a structure for ed-
ucational criticism: the dimensions of description, interpretation, evaluation, 
and thematics, which each intersect with the dimensions of connoisseurship at 
the point of criticism. However, Eisner is clear to point out that these dimen-
sions “do not prescribe a sequence among the parts of an educational criti-
cism,” nor do they “imply that each is wholly independent of the others.”59
Essentially, educational criticism involves the holistic interpretation and 
feedback of a more practiced (or differently practiced) educator with the aim 
of improvement of the educational environment. However, rather than emu-
late an archetype rendered by a narrow rubric, education criticism fosters and 
supports pedagogical distinctiveness, the different capacities of teachers and 
students, the particular educational contexts of those learning experiences, 
and, importantly, academic freedom.
Crucially, what differentiates a process of educational criticism from audit 
is the relation of trust: unlike the audit, which exists in and because of the ab-
sence of trust, educational criticism enables the possibility of a dialog between 
the teacher and the connoisseur predicated on trust. Whereas the quality au-
dit is necessarily a disciplinary formation with dubious outcomes, educational 
criticism may have the potential to meaningfully improve student experiences 
in a context that is not dependent upon disciplinary relations, a dynamic of 
power, or the sour taste of accountability.
Eisner’s frameworks have already been successfully employed in online 
course environments in limited capacities.60 The challenge, then, is to devel-
op structures and communities around these ideas: self-supporting, self-reg-
ulating communities of educational connoisseurs—Readings’ “community of 
thinkers” put into practice.61 However, in the formation of such a communi-
ty, we must be careful not to reinscribe the bureaucratic, hierarchical forma-
tions of power and distrust.
To reemphasize, this is a single, highly speculative possibility for educa-
tors involved in online education to engage in counter-conduct in the face of 
quality assurance regimes. However, some sort of resistance is necessary, not 
59 Ibid., 88.
60 Kelvin Thompson, “Constructing Educational Criticism of Online Courses: A Model 
for Implementation by Practitioners,” 2005, https://doi.org/10.1007/s13398-014-
0173-7.2.
61 Readings, The University in Ruins.
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only because of the effects on teachers and instructional designers, but of the 
ultimate impacts on students who rely on the access to education enabled by 
online courses.
Online Education and the Diffusion of Access
The infiltration of pervasive and disciplinary quality assurance regimes is one of 
many articulations of neoliberalism in the distance learning space. Online educa-
tion is often positioned in terms of cost savings, revenue generation, competition, 
and branding, leading critics to question its roles in the corporatization of the 
university and the commodification of knowledge.62 To some, online education
is seen as a lever of neoliberal reform, an extension to the university of a cap-
italism that is now digital, global, and knowledge-based…online education is 
reified around political-economic interests which it is claimed, unequivocally, to 
represent. Commodification, commercialisation, and corporatisation understood 
as fundamental dimensions of the technology and its consequences for higher 
education and the university.63
However, educators who lament online education as a fait accompli may want 
to consider the original aims of distance education vis-à-vis the diffusion of ac-
cess to educational opportunity. Charles Wedemeyer, considered by many to 
be an early pioneer and visionary in the field of distance education,64 wrote:
We now know that intelligence and needs are distributed randomly throughout 
the world, our global village. Yet schools are distributed discretely. As a result, 
opportunity to learn has been uneven and unequal. Educational opportunity has 
historically been related to power—social, economic, political, military.65
62 Paule Chau, “Online Higher Education Commodity,” Journal of Computing in 
Higher Education 22, no. 3 (2010): 177–191, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12528-
010-9039-y; Kenneth J. Saltman, “The Right-Wing Attack on Critical and Public 
Education in the United States: From Neoliberalism to Neoconservativism,” Cul-
tural Politics: An International Journal 2, no. 3 (2006): 339–358, https://doi.
org/10.2752/174321906778531637; Edward Hamilton and Andrew Feenberg, “The 
Technical Codes of Online Education,” E-Learning 2, no. 2 (2005): 104–121, https://
doi.org/10.2304/elea.2005.2.2.1; Henry Giroux, “Neoliberalism, Corporate Culture, 
and the Promise of Higher Education: The University as a Democratic Public Sphere,” 
Harvard Educational Review 72, no. 4 (2002): 425–464.
63 Hamilton and Feenberg, “The Technical Codes of Online Education,” 105–106.
64 William C. Diehl, “Learning at the Back Door: Charles Wedemeyer and the Evolution 
of Open and Distance Education” (PhD diss, Pennsylvania State University, 2011).
65 Charles A. Wedemeyer, Learning at the Back Door: Reflections on Non-Traditional 
Learning in the Lifespan (Madison, WI: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), 99.
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Long before the Internet was an idea known outside computer science re-
search circles, Wedemeyer suggested a solution to this problem of access: 
“Wherever learners may live, however remote from instructional resources, 
whatever their socioeconomic condition, the ancient restrictions to access 
derived from a space-time-elite perception of learning can be overcome by 
various communications media.”66 In other words, distance education, today 
manifested primarily by online education, holds a certain liberatory poten-
tial—an ability to provide educational opportunity to learners who would not 
otherwise have access.
Crucially, however, by limiting pedagogical possibilities and rendering 
educators as objects that can be evaluated and subjects that can be controlled, 
the disciplinary modes imposed by regimes of quality threaten this liberatory 
potential of online education and reinforce the commodification and com-
mercialization of knowledge as part of the corporatization of the university. 
In order to embrace online education as a possible means of educational lib-
eration, educators ought to resist and engage in counter-conduct against the 
disciplinary forms of quality assurance.
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Abstract: Student affairs, a helping field focused on outside-the-classroom 
activities in higher education, has been traditionally associated with feminine 
gendered expectations. Using Judith Butler’s concept of gender performa-
tivity and Foucauldian discourse analysis, we investigated how men student 
affairs professionals use and perpetuate gender privilege in the workplace. 
We identified a cycle of discourse whereby men student affairs professionals 
deployed discursive tactics to obscure their benefit from male privilege while 
simultaneously garnering cultural status and social capital. Deconstructing 
these discursive nodes provided insight to the impact of conflicting gender 
discourses. We suggest our analysis can expose rules that regulate, perpetuate, 
resist, and oppress, which opens up new understandings and meanings for 
men student affairs professionals and their gender performances.
Keywords: gender, performativity, thinking with theory, Foucault, student affairs
This poststructural study investigated the performance of gender by cis1 men 
student affairs professionals in the context of competing expectations for ap-
propriate gender behavior. Student affairs, the portion of higher education 
1 All participants in this study were cis gender men and, though discursive environments 
affect trans and nonbinary communities differently, they too are trapped in a system 
regulating heteronormative and often binaristic gender performances; indeed, they are 
often more penalized (sometimes violently) for transgressing those normative expec-
tations.
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administration typically focused on outside-the-classroom activities for stu-
dents in college,2 enforces a conflicting set of expectations on men who work 
in the field. Historically, the work of student affairs has been associated with 
cis gender women and feminine-perceived activities such as caretaking3 and, 
since its inception, the work of student affairs has been intended to provide 
discipline, take responsibility for students’ well-being, and support readiness 
for the postcollege experience.4 Its history and contemporary norms within 
higher education, however, mimic the expectations of many other so-called 
“helping” fields of work in its ties to feminine ideals or roles.5
For cis men in student affairs, these feminine associations set up a gender 
role conflict. Genders are socialized along a discursive binary,6 and cis men are 
conditioned through that socialization to perform behaviors perceived as het-
eronormatively masculine.7 For men operating in a field with tasks associated 
with feminine roles,8 there is a conflict between the wider society’s discourse 
on masculinity and the professional discourses associating student affairs with 
femininity. This conflict produces competing ideologies and discursive nodes 
from which male student affairs professionals can (and are expected to) operate.9
In exploring gender performance, we are less concerned with the “truth” 
about privilege or statistics based on the numerical proportion of men in a field 
associated with women and instead are drawn to how gendered expectations, al-
lowances, and restrictions are known, deployed, perpetuated, and resisted within 
individual departments and the field of student affairs as a whole. In particular, 
we are concerned with how men navigate the concept of male privilege in a field 
that espouses values of social justice,10 and how men student affairs professionals 
work to enforce or undermine socially just concepts in student affairs work.
2 Student Affairs Professionals in Higher Education (NASPA), About Student Affairs.
3 Jennifer Duffy, How Women Impacted Student Affairs.
4 Jeff Doyle, Where Have We Come From.
5 Joan Williams, Unbending Gender.
6 Caroline Smith and Barbara Lloyd, Maternal Behavior.
7 Douglas Schrock and Michael Schwalbe, Men, Masculinity, and Manhood Acts.
8 Student Affairs Professionals in Higher Education (NASPA), What Is Student Affairs; 
Sarah Sturtevant, Ruth Strang, and M. McKim, Personnel Study of Deans.
9 To clarify, while we find the gendering of fields of work problematic (e.g., student affairs, 
nursing, and teaching as feminized and, for instance, construction work, engineering, 
and some tech fields as masculine), the field of work is not the unit of analysis of this 
study. Instead, we focus here on the men who work in such a field to explore gendered 
discourses. We situate the field as the context influencing their gendered performances.
10 ACPA and NASPA, Professional Competency Areas.
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In order to examine the experiences of men student affairs professionals, 
we have chosen to employ a technique from Jackson and Mazzei11 known as 
thinking with theory. Jackson and Mazzei issued a challenge to researchers to 
“accomplish a reading of data that is both within and against interpretivism.”12 
They asserted data cannot be confined by traditional qualitative interpretation 
and coding alone since all data is incomplete. Instead, they recommended 
an integration of methodology and philosophy that deconstructs data to ex-
amine why certain stories are told and others are not. In their discussion of 
qualitative and postqualitative research, Jackson and Mazzei13 used a variety 
of methodological lenses, looking to theory in order to unveil unique nodes 
of discourse and power in their research data.
Rather than sorting our participants’ thoughts into themes, our goal in this 
analysis is to “reverse the mode of analysis”14 and examine discursive practices 
as they relate to power, privilege, and gender performance. Within our data, we 
became aware of how the stories presented in our interviews could not be taken 
at face value. We realized the stories represented not only the content being 
told but also discursive nodes within which societal gender norms, power, and 
practice intersected. Thus, norms of gender, power, and practice in these nodes 
led our participants to present stories to us in certain ways, or through particular 
performances. Rather than interpreting the data and stories from our partici-
pants “free of context and circumstance,”15 our thinking with theory approach 
is designed to bring those undercurrents of the data to the forefront. Though 
student affairs is, in many ways, a unique field of disparate roles within university 
contexts, the gendered expectations set up throughout its history—as well as the 
conflict between male expectations and female roles—provide a space to explore 
gender performance and the relationship of competing discursive environments.
Discourse in Student Affairs
We begin with our own conceptualization of discourse and how we view theory 
in order to situate our analysis and discussion. Within this chapter, when we 
refer to “discourse” we refer to the discursive structure and organization of 
what can be said (and done). It encompasses not only what is stated, but also 
what is not stated. Discourse also refers to the set of rules understood (either 
consciously or subconsciously) by those who operate within specific fields of 
11 Alecia Youngblood Jackson and Lisa Mazzei, Thinking with Theory, vii.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, 95.
15 Alecia Youngblood Jackson and Lisa Mazzei, Thinking with Theory, vii.
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discourse. Kendall and Wickham, channeling Foucault, offered the explanation 
that discourse is “a corpus of ‘statements’ whose organisation is regular and sys-
tematic.”16 Discourse is both the production of statements, including both what 
is said and what is done, and the contextual rules determining what statements 
can be made. To assist in our understanding, we also apply Jackson’s17 notion 
of strategies and practices, where strategies refers to discursive tactics or designs 
that deploy discourse, while practices refers to how an individual interacts, does 
their job, and influences discourse through their work. For instance, a strategy 
may take form as an organizational mission statement, rules of the office, or oth-
er professional discourses designed to create workplace culture, while practices 
appear in employee interactions, job performance(s), speech, and dress.
In thinking with discourse, we begin with Butler18 and her concept of gender 
performativity. Butler described gender not as a static fact but rather an ongoing 
performance that is a “reiteration of a norm or set of norms.”19 Gender per-
formance occurs through how individuals communicate their perspectives on 
reality, carry out social activities, and enact social identities.20 In the context of 
Butler’s performativity, these performances produce gender as an effect of prac-
tice. For example, men dressing in a suit and tie, talking in a deep, projecting 
voice, helping a female coworker lift something heavy, or behaving in domineer-
ing ways associated with masculine leadership norms21 may reinforce the idea of 
their gender as man to both themselves and others. Behaviors not conforming to 
traditional societal expectations have the opportunity to be miscoded as another 
gender or to disrupt concepts of gender, particularly gender binary discourse.
Societal cues also work discursively to affirm “correct” behavior and po-
lice “incorrect” behavior. Friends, colleagues, family, and even strangers can 
be unwitting agents of gender socialization, both communicating and reifying 
perceptions of what is normal and expected. Butler’s22 concept meshes well 
with Jackson’s23 concept of practices, whereby how an individual engages in 
discursive practice simultaneously creates, deploys, and sustains their gender. 
The study of discourse and gender, therefore, is critical to understanding how 
gender is constructed and how specific contexts influence the performance of 
gender within those discursive contexts.
16 Gary Kendall and Gavin Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods, 42.
17 Alecia Youngblood Jackson, Fields of Discourse.
18 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter.
19 Ibid., 538.
20 James Gee, The Social Mind.
21 Adrianna Kezar, Expanding Notions of Leadership.
22 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter.
23 Alecia Youngblood Jackson, Fields of Discourse.
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Jackson and Mazzei employ Butler to examine performance in terms of 
“how gender identities get done as reiterative practices within discourse, power 
relations, historical experiences, cultural practices, and material conditions.”24 
Several elements of performance are relevant to our study, in particular how 
binary gender expectations (man/woman) are set up not just in appropriate 
performances for individuals, but also in career choices. A career choice serves 
as an act either perpetuating or disrupting notions of traditional gender. For 
men, student affairs work would not classify as an historically masculine career 
because student affairs has historically gendered expectations as a helping field.
As Jackson and Mazzei point out, Butler’s theory of performativity draws 
from Foucault’s conception of power relations and requires “normative identity 
categories”25 as a context for gender performance. In this study, the normative 
categories for men student affairs professionals compete; in other words, mas-
culine social norms and institutional social norms are in conflict. Butler’s work, 
through the lens of Jackson and Mazzei, helps us uncover how the performanc-
es (in this case, discursive acts that both reproduce and contextualize gender 
identity norms) create and limit discursive possibilities for the men in our study.
This study uses the contrast between student affairs work and societal 
gendered expectations to interrogate discursive practices. This contrast pro-
vides opportunity for disruption of typical, assumed discursive norms. It also 
creates the possibility for gender performance confusion for male student af-
fairs professionals socialized in multiple, competing discourses.
Gender in Student Affairs
Butler’s theory of performativity is rooted in poststructuralist understand-
ings. Poststructuralism focuses not on the meaning of language or discourse, 
but instead its function.26 For instance, Kendall and Wickham, channeling 
Foucault, noted that “medical discourses about ‘folly’ and ‘unreason’ pro-
duce the mentally ill person, penological discourses produce the criminal, dis-
courses on sex produce sexuality, and so on.”27 The performance of gender, 
then, is both influenced by and influences the discourses in which it operates.
In this study, it is therefore critical to discuss the historical context of stu-
dent affairs and how particular professions are gendered. Foucault stated that 
one of the goals of poststructuralism was to make “discourses visible.”28 Exam-
24 Alecia Youngblood Jackson and Lisa Mazzei, Thinking with Theory, 67.
25 Ibid.
26 Elizabeth St. Pierre, Poststructural Feminism in Education: An Overview.
27 Gary Kendall and Gavin Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods, 34.
28 Michel Foucault, Prison Talk, 38.
100 A. voyles, s. mCKinnon-Crowley, And b. e. buKosKi
ining the discursive structures of gender expectations and allowable gendered 
activities will help to unveil the impact of the performances of men student 
affairs professionals. Foucault reminded us that “truth isn’t outside power.”29 
The concept of what are appropriate gender actions and performances is condi-
tioned by the structures that dictate our conceptions of gender. Gender norms, 
both societally and in careers, impact our concepts of masculine and feminine. 
These contexts of gendered professions and student affairs specifically are sig-
nificant to how gender is produced and replicated. Jackson (2010) stated that 
her reasoning in using a Foucauldian poststructuralist lens was to reveal “com-
plex intersections among power, identity, change, and community to show they 
are imagined, idealized, and maintained.”30 Similarly, we looked to poststruc-
turalism in this study to better investigate the relationship between the gender 
performance of men student affairs professionals and the multiple competing 
gender norms in which they operate. Student affairs presents a compelling 
scenery for a discussion of male privilege, gender performance, and illustrations 
of power due to its rich history of conflicting gender norms.
Since the inception of student affairs, much of the work of practitioners in 
the field has been associated with stereotypically feminine tasks and roles.31 Stu-
dent affairs departments tend to be numerically women-dominated (NASPA and 
ACPA current membership has roughly a 2:1 ratio of women to men32) and, like 
many other “caretaking” professions, has continually carried gendered expecta-
tions and been dominated by women.33 Because student affairs typically consists 
of a wide range of nonacademic, student-centered portions of higher education, 
we looked to participants from housing and residence life, orientation and new 
student services, diversity initiatives, student conduct, student leadership, mental 
health services, recreational sports, sorority and fraternity life, and student activi-
ties. Primarily, these departments are focused on developing “life skills,” provid-
ing student services, and taking care of students. While our list is not exhaustive, 
it is representative of the breadth and range of student affairs work.
Furthermore, Duffy found that student affairs work followed a parental, fem-
inized narrative, while “intellectualism was considered masculine.”34 It follows 
that student affairs is a feminine counterpart to academic affairs, as positioned by 
29 Michel Foucault, Truth and Power, 131.
30 Alecia Youngblood Jackson, Fields of Discourse, 73.
31 Sarah Sturtevant, Ruth Strang, and M. McKim, Personnel Study of Deans; Jennifer Duffy, 
How Women Impacted Student Affairs.
32 Brenda Fogg, e-mail message to author, February 15, 2018; Alexis Wesaw, e-mail 
message to author, February 23, 2018.
33 Joan Williams, Unbending Gender.
34 Jennifer Duffy, How Women Impacted Student Affairs, 241.
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cultural and discursive forces. Jackson and Mazzei pointed out that our sense of 
structures in language and discourse is traditionally sorted into binaries (man/
woman, good/bad, etc.).35 Student affairs, following as a feminine counterpart 
to academic affairs, therefore serves as a backdrop that influences, produces, and 
limits the range of acceptable and unacceptable gendered behaviors.
Men are conditioned through these binaries of discourse to be “mascu-
line” and to demonstrate their masculinity through their chosen profession, 
which may pose a difficulty for white-collar workers, as Williams discusses:
Where blue-collar work is suffused with masculinity—it is dirty, and requires 
strength—white-collar work is clean, gender-neutral knowledge work unrelated 
to physical strength. This leaves white-collar men searching for ways to imagine 
their work as the appropriate arena in which to prove their manliness.36
Extending this analysis to our context, student affairs caretaking work does not 
qualify, discursively, as masculine under typical social norms. Men in the stu-
dent affairs field must therefore confront the issue of demonstrating manliness 
through their work on a regular basis. Because men experience a “strong, neg-
ative emotion associated with stereotypic feminine values, attitudes, and behav-
iors,”37 operating in a context where student affairs is associated with feminine 
values has the potential to produce dissonant messages for male professionals.
Jackson and Mazzei reminded us that Butler’s concept of performativity 
does not ask about intention or whether or not subjects intentionally make 
choices “by their own volition.”38 Instead, the social practices—in this case, 
doing the work of student affairs—produce the discursive possibilities. Jack-
son and Mazzei interpret Butler as saying that the subject becomes an effect 
of the discourse. This harkens back to the poststructuralist understandings of 
discourse from Foucault, in which practices and performances would play both 
a “conditioning and conditioned role.”39 In other words, the context produces 
the discursive possibilities of men’s performance of societally normative mascu-
linity, and their performances perpetuate those norms in a cyclical fashion. In 
student affairs, we are viewing multiple contexts, not only of society’s expecta-
tions of men but also of the institutional expectations of feminized behavior in a 
helping profession. The juxtaposition of role and societally normative gendered 
expectations complicates the performance of “maleness” within higher educa-
tion and the conditioning factors for the men in our study. These competing 
35 Alecia Youngblood Jackson and Lisa Mazzei, Thinking with Theory.
36 Joan Williams, Femmes, Tomboys, and Real Men, 698.
37 James O’Neil et al., Gender-Role Conflict Scale.
38 Alecia Youngblood Jackson and Lisa Mazzei, Thinking with Theory, 68.
39 Michel Foucault, Power and Strategies, 142.
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gender discourses produce competing expectations for men student affairs pro-
fessionals, which our thinking with theory approach helps us unravel.
Methodology
Our epistemology is feminist and poststructural in nature, concerned with how 
gender impacts both everyday interactions and interactions with larger societal 
structures, both explicit and implicit. We view “gender as a basic organizing 
principle that shapes the conditions”40 of people’s lives. In addition, we seek to 
avoid gender essentialism or exclusion in practicing these feminist assumptions. 
We both take seriously and attempt to avoid what Z Nicolazzo has termed the 
“deeply entrenched gender binary discourse”41 in educational and other envi-
ronments. We perceive all knowledge to be constructed by our experiences and 
interactions with the world,42 but we also contend that power and language 
shape how we know and what we can know. Language impacts what it is possi-
ble for us to think. Again, we do not claim to offer any truths; instead, we offer 
our analysis as a way to illustrate the way gender, power, and practice operated 
in these nodes; our findings can only ever be incomplete and partial.43
Analytic Approach
Our approach was designed to be fluid and follow a discourse analysis in-
formed by specific authors and concepts; we intertwined Butler44 and Fou-
cault45 with the framework of Jackson and Mazzei’s thinking with theory 
technique to reveal new possibilities into our reading and understanding of 
the experiences of men student affairs professionals. Specifically, our analytical 
approach stems from the movement of “postqualitative” research led by the 
work of Elizabeth St. Pierre, Alicia Youngblood Jackson, and Patti Lather. 
As Elizabeth St. Pierre noted in a recent work, “methodology should never 
be separated from epistemology and ontology (as if it can be) lest it become 
mechanized and instrumental and reduced to methods, process, and tech-
nique.”46 Similarly, we found we were unable to disconnect the idea of a dis-
course analysis from our conceptual and epistemological positionality.
40 John Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design, 29.
41 Z Nicolazzo, Imagining a Trans* Epistemology, 18.
42 John Creswell, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design.
43 Alecia Youngblood Jackson and Lisa Mazzei, Thinking with Theory.
44 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter.
45 Michel Foucault, Prison Talk.
46 Elizabeth St. Pierre, A Brief and Personal History of Post Qualitative Research, 3.
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Therefore, we are not overly concerned with the exterior trappings of the log-
ic of deterministic studies. Instead of constructing knowledge through traditional 
methodologies, we use a more adaptable approach that attempts to deconstruct 
the intent or assumed effects for the behaviors of the men in our study. We do this 
intentionally to examine how discursive contexts produce the subjects of our study 
and what performative acts the men in our study engage in that (re)produce their 
gender identity within the context of competing gendered expectations.
We approached this study using a thinking with theory analytic approach. 
Thinking with theory is designed to “describe the surface links between pow-
er, knowledge, institutions, intellectuals, the control of populations, and the 
modern state as these intersect in the functions of systems of thought.”47 This 
mode of inquiry allowed us to reach further into the discursive structures of 
student affairs and the intersection of competing gendered expectations and 
roles for men student affairs professionals.
Our approach is intentionally nontraditional. Thinking with theory allowed 
us to use Jackson and Mazzei’s work as a framework to investigate the inter-
sections between our data and Butler’s concept of performativity within webs 
of power. In her work, Butler recognized how power relations and structures 
serve to center discourse and how those webs of discourse create and limit 
opportunities for performance of gender through language and action. We em-
ployed the thinking with theory approach to decouple discursive contexts and 
interrogate how discourses of masculinity, student affairs, and individual actions 
reproduce, influence, resist, and fight one another. In particular, Butler’s con-
cept of gender performance allowed us to focus on gender as the predominant 
lens for a discourse analysis of the experiences our participants shared with us.
To collect our data, we contacted potential participants from a large, re-
search-intensive public institution in the southern United States by sending 
e-mails to the research team’s campus contacts. The site institution is a large, 
research-intensive public university, chosen for convenience and research fa-
miliarity with its norms. Most participants had experiences in non-southern 
states (work or growing up) and did not consider themselves “Southerners.” 
While the southern context came up at times for specific participants, the 
researchers did not find southern norms and practices to be a fruitful avenue 
of analysis. To be included in the study, participants had to identify as a man 
and have full-time work responsibilities related to student affairs (we did not 
require participants to work in traditional student affairs areas or units). To 
put our participants in dialogue with each other, we conducted two focus 
groups in 2016, each lasting approximately one hour. As we are interested in 
47 Alecia Youngblood Jackson and Lisa Mazzei, Thinking with Theory, 55.
104 A. voyles, s. mCKinnon-Crowley, And b. e. buKosKi
discourse not merely as words but as social forces, it was important to provide 
a situation in which participants could interact with each other and use the 
dialogue to build their collective knowledge about masculinity in their work.
Analytic Techniques
In our analysis, we employed a thinking with theory approach48 with our data 
in order to “expose pernicious logic”49 regarding gender performance of men 
student affairs professionals. To accomplish our analysis, we plugged one text 
into another,50 meaning that we worked with chunks of traditional data from 
our focus groups and engaged in a process whereby we examined these data 
as manifestations of theoretical concepts in poststructuralism. The process of 
plugging data into theoretical concepts allowed us to better understand not 
only the participants’ interpretations of their own experiences but also addi-
tional discursive ramifications that they might not note themselves. By view-
ing our data through the lenses of theory and using this technique, we were 
better able to understand the discursive forces surrounding the narratives our 
participants presented. As Jackson and Mazzei reminded us, the concept of 
plugging in requires “an intimacy with both the data and the theory,”51 so we 
turned to specific poststructuralist authors with whom we were familiar and 
whose work spoke to the intersection of gender performance and discourse to 
create a strategy for a poststructuralist discourse analysis.
Beginning from Butler’s52 concept of gender performativity, we then de-
veloped a series of guiding questions with which to interact with our partici-
pants’ stories, thoughts, and feelings about their work and gender in student 
affairs. While Butler was our starting place for uncovering discursive process-
es, we could not avoid the connection to Foucault. Not only does Butler’s 
work stem from Foucault’s theory of power relations,53 but Foucault’s54 no-
tion that power is intrinsic in all institutions guides our understanding of the 
discursive structures in which these men’s gender performance takes place. 
The societal structures of hegemonic masculinity, intertwined with the fem-
inine ideals of student affairs, create a discursive web of power relations im-
pacting the possibilities and limits of participant discourse. Each practice and 
48 Alecia Youngblood Jackson and Lisa Mazzei, Thinking with Theory.
49 Kelly Clark/Keefe, Invoking Mnemosyne, 26.
50 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, A Thousand Plateaus.
51 Alecia Youngblood Jackson and Lisa Mazzei, Thinking with Theory, 5.
52 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter.
53 Alecia Youngblood Jackson, Fields of Discourse.
54 Michel Foucault, Prison Talk.
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production of their gender reinforces or resists dominant discourses and has 
the potential to impact power relations for all genders working within the 
discursive realm of student affairs.
Combining the work of Jackson55 with methodological considerations 
from Foucault56 and discourse critique methods from Kendall and Wick-
ham,57 we used the following questions to guide our analysis:
1. What historical conditions form and deploy discourses of work and 
gender?
2. How is discourse in student affairs surrounding gender produced and 
regulated?
3. What strategies or practices are present in the participant data that 
illuminate or obfuscate particular discursive nodes?
4. What strategies or practices are present in the participant data that 
perpetuate or resist dominant discursive structures?
5. How do particular strategies and practices of discourse impact power 
relations and gender performance in student affairs?
Using these questions with the data allowed us to discover discursive pro-
cesses and webs for the men student affairs professionals in our study. Most 
compelling among the emergent processes in our work were narratives of 
absolution from privilege and a cycle of privilege. These processes were not 
necessarily known or considered by our participants. Instead, they represent 
our understanding of discursive machinations through the convergence be-
tween theory and data. Their emergence provides a glimpse of the discursive 
structures present in the student affairs field and ways in which gender per-
formance is intertwined, both conditioned and conditioning, of discursive 
contexts and power relations.
Trustworthiness
To examine the experiences of the men in our study from a lens of production 
and performance rather than intent, we first conducted the discourse analysis 
using the guiding questions above. We then engaged in significant peer debrief-
ing through national and regional presentations at student affairs and higher 
education conferences and with members of the NASPA (Student Affairs Pro-
fessionals in Higher Education) Men and Masculinities Knowledge Community, 
55 Alecia Youngblood Jackson, Fields of Discourse.
56 Michel Foucault, Body/Power.
57 Gary Kendall and Gavin Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods.
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where the authors have been involved as members and leaders for several years. 
The purpose of these member-checks58 was to investigate further the contexts of 
the gendered expectations for both men and student affairs professionals as well 
as the intersection of those identities. Turning to Maxwell’s guiding principles 
of research design, these efforts embody not just a triangulation member-check-
ing strategy, but also his call for long-term involvement, which provides “more 
complete data about specific situations and events than any other method.”59 
These member-checks helped us refine our discursive analysis.
Positionality and Limitations
We are insiders and outsiders to this work. The authors include one White cis 
man who works full-time in student affairs and teaches on an adjunct basis 
for a student affairs/higher education program, one White cis woman who 
is a doctoral student in that same program who works part-time in student 
affairs, and one queer cis White woman who is full-time faculty in that same 
program and conducts research using intersectional lenses. Our positionalities 
give each of us partial access to the potential worldviews of our participants 
and their contexts, and our working relationships, developed over the past 
four years, yielded rich discussions throughout our analytic process, these 
debriefings60 were critical to our analytic approach; however, our interactions 
and analysis are intrinsically intertwined with our own subjectivities and his-
tories as professionals and researchers.
The study is also limited because we could not control or observe all dis-
courses operating for men student affairs professionals through our interac-
tions with the data. Even though we investigated discourse, power, and gen-
der in student affairs, we also work within the frameworks of those discourses, 
which may have concealed discourses surrounding us. In addition, countless 
other discursive processes could have been uncovered.
Jackson notes that her analytical categories “are not contained. Instead, 
the descriptions are meant to show how these conditions intersect, combine, 
and fracture to produce discourse.”61 Similarly, although we name discursive 
processes in this chapter, we do not view these as all-inclusive, comprehensive, 
or ubiquitous. Our analysis was designed to draw attention to competing dis-
courses and how they create/limit opportunities for gender performance, and 
our findings are not meant to prescribe a set of ideal recommendations for 
58 Joseph Maxwell, Qualitative Research Design.
59 Ibid., 110.
60 Ibid.
61 Alecia Youngblood Jackson, Fields of Discourse, 79.
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navigating gender universally. Foucault62 cautioned that there are always hid-
den discourses, and we acknowledge these themes are merely the discursive 
nodes our data and theory most prominently displayed. Our findings reflect 
an analysis of men in our study, and should not be read as an assertion that all 
men in student affairs operate at all times in the manner we describe below.
Findings
The two discursive processes we identified, absolution from privilege and the cycle 
of privilege, work in concert to perpetuate discursive strategies and practices that 
support male privilege within student affairs, even though it is a numerically 
women-dominated field with feminine gendered expectations. These processes 
do not arise from traditional qualitative interpretation like coded themes would, 
but instead emerged as consistent among our participants in terms of gender 
performance and discursive context. These processes are not intended to be 
all-inclusive of men in student affairs everywhere, but instead to reveal the dis-
cursive power relations present in how these men perform gender. As Foucault 
stated, it is important to “try to locate power at the extreme points of its exer-
cise.”63 What Foucault is referring to here is that rather than look for a top-down 
framework for power, we should investigate how power and discourse impact 
the extremities of a discursive web. The men in our study represent those edge 
points for student affairs. We therefore have provided these processes as findings 
to help conceptualize the discursive trends and machinations impacting the men 
in our study through the context of competing binary discourses.
Paradoxically, the way male student affairs professionals perpetuate dis-
course involves obfuscating their benefits from male privilege by highlighting 
the emotional gender-role conflict of being a man in a field with feminine ex-
pectations, as well as taking advantage of opportunities male privilege provides. 
This juxtaposition within student affairs makes the field a fertile ground for 
exploration of gender conflict and is also the discursive process by which male 
student affairs professionals deploy, maintain, and support male privilege.
“A White, Straight Guy Just Tip-toeing Through the Land 
of Privilege”: Absolution from Privilege
Absolution from privilege is a process involving men first acknowledging they 
are recipients and beneficiaries of unearned male privilege, then following 
62 Michel Foucault, Truth and Power.
63 Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, 97.
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those statements with a number of diversion strategies. The acknowledgement 
of privilege is a critical step in this discursive theme, because our participants 
were aware that student affairs is seen as a field focused on social justice64 and 
that they were men in a field of primarily women. The combination of those 
external discursive forces frequently led the men in our study to start their 
answers or interject into their stories acknowledgments of their own privilege.
Our participants deployed their male privilege like camouflage,65 wearing 
it when they wanted to fit in with student affairs values and blend in with their 
coworkers. However, they expressed discontent when their camouflage was 
ineffective or when their gender identity was a detriment rather than a ben-
efit to them. They also wanted the ability to remove their camouflage at will 
and receive the full advantage of the career opportunities available to them 
as men. Primarily, we saw men pivot from acknowledging their male privilege 
to talking about the difficulties or struggles of other minoritized identities, 
some of which they possessed, including racial, ethic, and sexuality identities.
Our participants acknowledged their privilege, which they perceived to 
be a tool for social justice. One participant Tim, who identified as a White, 
heterosexual man,66 also expressed concern that his experience as a “White, 
straight guy just tip-toeing through the land of privilege” meant he was re-
quired to learn empathy for students with experiences different than his own. 
In a similar vein, Nathan, a Latino, heterosexual man, commented, “compar-
atively to women, we probably have it easier just because of the privilege that 
is associated with being a man…[in student affairs] we show more care to 
students than we will with each other.” The participants in our study all ex-
pressed an awareness of privilege, and their comments regarding their actions 
presented this awareness in terms of learned enlightenment.
This enlightenment requires them to share the good news with those less 
fortunate and with a less developed, empathetic perspective on social justice. 
As a discursive tactic, Tim and Nathan’s processes assisted them in framing 
their own behaviors as enlightened and present their identities as “the good 
guys” who understand privilege. Naming privilege functioned to disarm its 
presumed impact in the men’s lives. Though Tim’s opinions were shared 
among our participants, Tim spoke at length and with the most clarity about 
these topics. By associating privilege with other White men, Tim, for instance, 
then disassociated himself with that group and aligned his actions with those 
64 ACPA and NASPA, Professional Competency Areas.
65 Camouflage is a type of false front, a concept discussed below.
66 We have used our participants’ own language throughout in describing their identities.
Absolution and Participation in Privilege 109
outside the privileged group. His strategy camouflaged his own privilege and 
adopted a discursive tactic of social justice to absolve himself from privilege.
Our participants also used privilege as a weapon when their camouflage 
was ineffective. Privilege manifested in a desire to model positive behavior 
for male students. As men in the study noted a perceived need of mentor and 
a “male role model” for male students, they tended to give more attention, 
support, and time to male students over students of other genders, perpetu-
ating a cycle of privileged resources and efforts. Our participants disavowed 
behaviors contrary to the espoused social justice orientation of the student 
affairs field at a surface level, but they also absolved themselves from the privi-
lege they claimed, noting they were, as Tim said, “not allowed to be offended 
along our lines of privilege.” This use of masculine privilege as a weapon of 
the enlightened man to justify behavior is reminiscent of imperialism.
The combination of Tim’s disassociation from privilege and his perceived 
need to wield privilege to help other men sets up a discursive context situating 
Tim as absolved from privilege in multiple ways. Tim’s actions and words are 
designed to allow him to escape negative ramifications as well as neutralize 
the possibility of student affairs professionals associating with privilege writ 
large. This absolution from privilege creates a context whereby his wielding of 
power is justified when helping other men who are less educated. This strate-
gic use of privilege to benefit the unenlightened supports the discourse of the 
“oppressed male student affairs practitioner” while simultaneously affirming 
the validity of a paternalistic approach to education. Thinking with theory, 
we then see Tim’s false fronts—the simultaneous disavowal of privilege while 
reaping its benefits—build into a notion of what is true. As Foucault67 noted, 
truth (knowledge) is an effect of power. By focusing on his situation in a 
women-dominated field as an ally for men, who need an ally and role model, 
Tim then perpetuated a discursive environment suggesting men in his situa-
tion are not privileged but rather entitled to additional support and mentor-
ship. At the same time, this narrative of “men needing support” obscures the 
effects of privilege and enhances the ability of Tim to benefit from privilege 
under the cloak of absolution. The use of a student-centric discursive strategy 
both affirms and disguises male privilege.
In addition, we observed our participants reference times where the con-
flicting gender roles and hegemonic expectations of gender in the workplace 
positioned them as “other.” Ineffective camouflage was difficult for our par-
ticipants to accept. Workplace conflict took the form of disagreements over 
the appropriate manner of expressing emotions, office gossip, and clothing 
67 Michel Foucault, Truth and Power.
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choice. Our participants were conscious about the ways in which men and 
women student affairs professionals were allowed to perform their masculini-
ty within the profession. John, a White, heterosexual man, said the following: 
“I see even women I know who are in [high-level] positions or president 
positions, as well as men I see at the high levels exhibiting high levels of 
stereotypical masculine traits.” John did not personally believe he possessed 
these traits, which has led to comments from superiors that he was “too nice” 
and was allowing those he supervised too much leeway. He conveyed this 
“felt gender based” as female colleagues did not receive similar feedback. 
John’s behavior, which would have been acceptable if a female student affairs 
professional performed it, unintentionally resisted the dominant discursive 
paradigm and created a feeling of inadequacy; in other words, he was policed 
for not performing his gender is a stereotypically masculine manner.
Alternatively, men student affairs professionals can also police gender 
themselves, as Michael, a White, gay man discussed:
Sometimes I’m the person [in a staff of mostly women] that’s calming everyone down 
and being the rock for the staff. I’m tired of playing that role…where I’m constantly 
[saying] “…Let’s bring it back down…. Yelling does not mean that there’s a concern, 
it just means that they are expressing a difficult emotion…” it helps me because I stay 
away from the gossip of the office…. It has been helpful to stay away from the gossip 
but also sometimes have to kind of be the one that says “no, this is not okay.”
As a man in a staff of primarily women, Michael perceived his role as man-
aging and translating staff and student emotions. Heightened emotion ex-
pressed through “yelling” is permissible in Michael’s role as a male student 
affairs practitioner, and he felt obligated to redefine and reframe the “difficult 
emotion” to make it acceptable to female staff. This translation effort was 
tiring, and he also found it difficult to engage in female-coded behavior such 
as gossip. Michael expressed similar assumptions as John but from the reverse 
perspective. Michael removed his camouflage, accepted masculine norms re-
garding emotion, but became exhausted by the process. In this sense, Michael 
is embracing traditional expectations of leadership (and male leadership),68 
but becomes exhausted by doing so in competition with female norms serv-
ing as a backdrop for his behavior.
The concept of conflicting emotional requirements for men created the 
discursive space for a false front (camouflage), or diversionary tactic. Men 
student affairs professionals, appropriating the gendered expectations that 
position emotionality as feminine, were able to shift conversations from the 
68 Adrianna Kezar, Expanding Notions of Leadership.
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privileges and benefits of being a man to the emotional, societal difficulties 
of being a man. While discursive forces are at play for all sides of this context, 
participants acknowledged their privilege and discussed feelings of inadequa-
cy and gender-role conflict in order to shield themselves from conversations 
about male privilege. In thinking with Foucault,69 this behavior then func-
tioned to make the forces of male privilege invisible, which perpetuated the 
assumption of male-coded behaviors as normative in our concepts of leader-
ship, professionalism, and appropriate male and female behavior.
Our participants’ camouflage of male privilege failed when they were un-
able to participate in the same social spaces with the same reception as their 
women coworkers. They experienced a disconnect between their expectation of 
belonging in any space and their coworkers’ reaction to their presence. Casual 
social interactions were closed to them, for example. They may have expressed 
less interest in gossip than their women coworkers, as Michael noted, or they 
could be interested but not feel welcome in those conversations. Lack of con-
versational inclusion manifested in a sense of “missing out on important parts 
of the office dynamic,” a comment Tim made in response to Michael’s obser-
vation. Tim was dissatisfied with his ability to participate in female-coded office 
conversations like “gossip.” He was especially concerned with being left out of 
conversations and missing opportunities to bond with his female colleagues; he 
used a parallel from a typically masculine setting, the military, to express what is 
lacking in his office dynamics. Tim’s expectation for his camouflage to work in 
all aspects of life was thwarted. Thus, our participants felt lost without access to 
the full range of tools they expected their privilege to provide.
Other participants commented on their own conscious changes in com-
munication styles within the student affairs field. Matthew, a gay, Asian Amer-
ican man, had to make shifts to speaking more slowly, smiling more, and 
using phatic expressions to connect with women colleagues. He made these 
shifts to serve his career goals, framing the change as “a type of very indirect 
power in student affairs” in which men, especially men of color, were required 
to “impress White women to be able to do as well as a [White] man in this 
field.” Our participants made or perceived the need to change their conver-
sational norms to achieve a sense of belonging in a field that seems unwel-
coming to them. Conscious of their privilege, they also monitored their own 
language to avoid labels like “mansplainer.”70 Their presence in a numerically 
women-dominated field led to code-switching to fit perceived norms.
69 Michel Foucault, Prison Talk.
70 Jessica Coccimiglio, What is Mansplaining?
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Participants also experienced difficulty in wearing appropriate attire and 
evaluating the clothing of others as appropriate. The lack of a clearly defined 
dress code for office-appropriate attire for women irritated participants, caus-
ing discomfort in addressing sartorial concerns to women colleagues. The 
clear articulation of acceptable dress for men provided an unpleasant contrast 
with the fuzzy boundaries of acceptable dress for women. Adam, a hetero-
sexual, Black man, participated in rewriting dress code policies and noted the 
language was straightforward for men’s clothing but for women, “it was all 
over the place.” He was upset about the perceived lack of equality in dress 
code, and asked “why is it okay for you to wear open toed shoes but as a male 
I can’t, and where are those expectations coming from?” Adam reported that 
upon complaining about the disparity in gender expectations, his supervisor 
told him, “Well, if you want to wear man capris and sandals, go ahead.” This 
comment was a challenge to Adam’s complaint of inequality and to his mas-
culinity, a challenge he declined to accept. Even though he expected “equal-
ity,” Adam was given the opportunity to resist dress norms, but he opted to 
support this aspect of gender relations and preserve his masculinity.
When office behavior and norms did not directly benefit our participants, 
they were confronted with an uncomfortable challenge to their expectations. 
The tensions our participants experienced between male privilege they pos-
sessed in and outside of student affairs and the social justice orientation of the 
field manifested itself in quotidian experiences including clothing and interac-
tions. Our participants felt required to adhere to strict dress codes based on 
their gender, a limit not present for their women colleagues. The benefit of 
unthinkingly wearing clothes with the expectation it will be acceptable and ap-
propriate for the occasion is reserved for men. Clothing and gossip are the sites 
at which our participants’ privilege (their camouflage) failed them and caused 
complaint. When our participants were confronted with seeming inequality of 
clothing, a marker of belonging inscribed on the body, they were forced to 
reckon with an area in which their behavior was not seen as normative.
The discursive theme of absolution from privilege functions to pivot from 
privilege to victimhood and intersectionality, which served as discursive false 
fronts. Because “knowledge is an effect of power,”71 the perpetuation of false 
fronts creates a sense of knowledge that men are not as privileged and are not 
a dominating gendered force. By presenting the difficulty of their own gen-
der performance, the participants were able to quickly shift discourse within 
the focus group away from narratives and forces of male privilege that might 
permeate their working roles, even in (and perhaps more so because of) their 
71 Alecia Youngblood Jackson and Lisa Mazzei, Thinking with Theory, 49.
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positioning within a feminized professional environment. In reexamining our 
discourse analysis questions, the practice of creating these false fronts perpet-
uates dominant discursive structures. Though the men in our study may have 
resisted specific gendered practices related to emotionality, clothing, or other 
methods, they did so within a context of erasing knowledge and spotlight-
ing their own privilege as men. Whereas our task in this analysis is to make 
“discourses visible,”72 the purpose of these false fronts was the opposite. For-
getting and obscuring are powerful discursive tactics reinforcing traditional 
gender norms and traditional notions of leadership and power that support 
men. Furthermore, these actions perpetuate the regulation of gender for men 
student affairs professionals, situating behavior in both traditional masculine 
norms and in an absolution of privilege, the combination of which is, again, 
the forgetting of the impact privilege has.
Thinking back to Clark/Keefe’s73 concept of pernicious logic, the false 
front stories the participants told us operate on faulty logic. While gender-role 
conflict is presented as a significant issue, the perpetual machine of male priv-
ilege is largely ignored or minimized by the men in our study in favor of 
discussing their own gendered struggles. It is also important to recognize 
Foucault74 was mindful that individuals cannot have power and intention-
ally control subjects. Though the men in our study benefitted from the way 
gender performance and false fronts advanced their power relations, power 
branches out “deeply into social networks.”75 The discursive practices and 
structures surrounding and within higher education and student affairs in 
particular produce the circumstances presenting men as superior, to which 
the men in our study were responding.
“I Can Chime In, Because I’m the Only One Here”:  
Cycle of Privilege
The second major discursive theme we investigated was a cycle of privilege for 
our participants, which consisted of practices continually taking advantage of 
privilege, both consciously and subconsciously. Despite the absolution narra-
tive above, which provided participants with discursive tactics to become one 
of the “good guys” who understand privilege and can be considered an ally, 
our participants also indicated (perhaps unknowingly) an eagerness to make 
72 Michel Foucault, Prison Talk.
73 Kelly Clark/Keefe, Invoking Mnemosyne.
74 Michel Foucault, Prison Talk.
75 Alecia Youngblood Jackson and Lisa Mazzei, Thinking with Theory, 51.
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gains from their privilege. Participants frequently spoke about being able to 
get more attention in meetings or on projects due to their gender. They also 
had at least some awareness of their upward mobility and promotional bene-
fits of gender.
For instance, Matthew indicated he was readily willing to give his per-
spective, stating, “I think that generally men are just more likely to give it 
[our opinion], and we don’t really wait around to be asked.” Matthew’s as-
sertion harkens back to Butler’s76 concept of gender as performance. Mat-
thew’s recognition of a social expectation for men to give their opinions, 
combined with his choice to give his opinion freely, produces expectations for 
men within student affairs. This also speaks to Foucault’s77 concept of pow-
er/knowledge. Though the gendered expectations are set up that create this 
framework, Matthew actively and deliberately participated in the framework 
and perpetuates privilege through his gendered actions of speaking up and 
offering his opinion first, on top of, or over the opinions of staff members 
from other genders. As Foucault put it, power “is a machine in which every-
one is caught.”78 Other participants echoed Matthew’s notion, with Rufus, 
a heterosexual, biracial male, framing it as a responsibility: “I can chime in, 
because I’m the only one [man] here.”
Michael, too, felt it was his responsibility to “chime in,” not because 
he was speaking as the only man, but because as a man it was important for 
him to play the part of “calming everyone down and being the rock for the 
staff.” While Michael assumed this responsibility due to his privilege as a man, 
he also felt it was burdensome. Both the perceived experiences of having to 
speak up for men or calming women created opportunities for men to take 
advantage of male privilege that permit men to exhibit traditionally masculine 
behaviors and take control of meetings or situations. Some of our participants 
expressed confliction and a nod to self-awareness. John, for instance, mused 
on whether he should always provide his perspective or if that was not needed 
because “we are in this, like, male society,” and Tim felt some anxiety over 
potentially being seen as “the problem” or a “mansplainer.” Nevertheless, a 
trend of speaking up and its connection to upward mobility was evident in the 
actions and words of our participants.
Despite these sensitivities the men mentioned, participants were also 
aware of a societal, discursive expectation that men should be ambitious, but 
women should not. Despite an awareness of societal gendered expectations, 
76 Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter.
77 Michel Foucault, The Eye of Power, 156.
78 Ibid., 156.
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participants also expressed a need to, as Matthew put it, “look out for number 
one.” Participants were aware that playing by gendered norms would help 
them progress. For example, John stated that focusing on “actual student 
affairs work” (i.e., work associated with feminine stereotypes) was a disad-
vantage “when it comes to rising up the ranks and getting access to power.” 
Though our men were able to state the social justice values of the field and 
acknowledge their own privilege, their individual discursive actions betrayed a 
covert acknowledgment of societal gendered expectations and an understand-
ing of the discursive workings described by the great leader theory79 that per-
petuated their own privilege and upward mobility by rewarding traditionally 
masculine traits and leadership ideals.
Men in our study also asserted women were to blame, at least partially, 
for their (women’s) lack of upward mobility, blaming women for career stag-
nation. Matthew, for instance, referred to his women colleagues as “content.” 
This notion of contentedness contrasted with notions of work–life balance 
struggles applicable to all genders mentioned by Matthew. As Tim put it, “I 
think women have that same exact [work-life balance] challenge in student 
affairs.” Tim equivocated his positioning and that of his female colleagues, 
while also privileging in his conversation his own struggles as a man. Taken in 
combination, these sentiments demonstrate how men in our study acknowl-
edged their privilege then painted the conditions in which they and women 
work as the same. This framing functioned to create discursive space for men 
to perform actions perpetuating male privilege.
The numerical difference in the genders of the field also played into a 
victimization false front for participants. Rufus felt women had “the majority 
voice” and stated the conceptualization and focus in student affairs was on 
women, White women in particular. Michael’s comments on the overrep-
resentation of women in student affairs also pointed toward perceived emo-
tional disadvantages in the field because of women’s “majority voice.” As 
Michael put it, he felt he was “being the one that constantly is managing the 
emotions of a female-dominated staff.” These discursive flourishes from our 
participants created additional space for men to rationalize speaking up in 
meetings, “taking charge,” and performing traditional masculine leadership 
traits that benefit them via male privilege, while also establishing women as 
an underclass struggling to control emotions or be appropriately ambitious, 
thereby further justifying the need for men to take charge. While actions such 
as speaking up in a meeting or taking charge of a project may seem minor, 
79 Adrianna Kezar, Expanding Notions of Leadership.
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these are actions men could instantly identify with upward mobility and ca-
reer success, which is the driving force behind their engagement in them.
Discussion
This cycle of absolution/advantage follows Foucault’s80 power/knowledge 
phenomenon, whereby the participants’ work and life contexts produce dis-
cursive circumstances for their actions, which then perpetuate the knowledge 
around what creates promotional opportunities. As we uncover more of the 
discursive web, we discover how the absolution from privilege phenomenon 
feeds the cycle of privilege. Similar to how Foucault81 saw power and knowl-
edge as perpetuating one another, the same synergistic relationship works 
with these two discursive processes. By acknowledging privilege, men create 
a discursive space (allowance) to speak up and take charge. By then taking 
charge, these men are rewarded under traditional gendered norms whereby 
men are perceived as natural leaders.
That men in this study were able to speak to their own privilege and take 
advantage of speaking up suggests these two sets of gendered expectations 
are dissonant while, in actuality, they work in concert to benefit male student 
affairs professionals. These two discursive strands form a doublet of abso-
lution/advantage whereby even practices and strategies seemingly aimed as 
absolution perpetuate advantage. This doublet plays, as Foucault put it, both 
a “conditioning and a conditioned role.”82 Men must acknowledge their own 
privilege due to the norms of discourse in student affairs and, when they 
do, are rewarded. When they are rewarded, it provides opportunities to take 
advantage of privilege. When thinking with this doublet as a phenomenon 
of discourse, it follows that men are prevalent in leadership positions despite 
their lack of overall numbers in student affairs.
Thinking again with Kendall and Wickham’s83 interpretations of dis-
course, the combination of the absolution narratives and the cycle of privilege 
allowed the men in our study to continually perpetuate the unsaid social and 
discursive rules situating the concept of man as leader, even in a feminized 
profession. Bourdieu and Passerson’s84 concept of cultural capital helps us 
80 Michel Foucault, Prison Talk.
81 Michel Foucault, Body/Power.
82 Michel Foucault, Power and Strategies, 142.
83 Gary Kendall and Gavin Wickham, Using Foucault’s Methods.
84 Pierre Bourdieu and Jean-Claude Passeron, Reproduction in Education, Society and 
Culture.
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to further our understanding of how power and knowledge perpetuate one 
another within the discursive nodes of student affairs. Thinking with cultur-
al capital, we saw that the men in our study were able to gain cultural and 
discursive capital by performing gender as a “self-aware man.” By presenting 
their own knowledge of privilege, they were able to cast shadows over that 
very privilege. They could be perceived as positive, contributing allies because 
they performed an awareness of male privilege, which diverted the spotlight 
away from how male privilege assisted them in upward mobility and social 
and cultural value, similar to Williams’85 concept of the glass escalator. This 
parallels Deil-Amen and Rosenbaum’s reference to the concept of cultural 
capital as an implicit understanding and requirement for “certain knowledge 
and skills,”86 though they investigated differences between students of vary-
ing socioeconomic status, not genders.
In our study, the concept of cultural capital is useful in understanding how 
male student affairs professionals (un)knowingly use discursive frameworks 
positioning men as leaders to their advancement. The combined discursive 
function of these two emergent themes is to pull focus toward identities and 
practices of male student affairs professionals who are in the margin, while 
obfuscating the benefits of male privilege that saturate their work regardless 
of espoused values; in other words, “every social order rests on a forgetting 
of the exclusion practices through which one set of meanings has been insti-
tutionalised and various other possibilities…have been marginalized.”87 This 
process thereby not only ostensibly dismantles patriarchal processes but also 
ensures the perpetuation of discursive structures supporting men.
Conclusion and Implications
The purpose of this study was to investigate the performance of gender by 
men student affairs professionals and to unveil the interconnections between 
societal expectations of masculinity, the historical positioning of student af-
fairs as feminine, and how those contexts create the men in our study as 
effects of structures of power and discourse. The men in our study navigated 
their male privilege in ways that both obfuscated their privilege and enhanced 
the impacts of male privilege. In a field that espouses social justice as a value, 
these contradictions suggest that for the men in our study, that value is more 
a veneer than a core tenet. And while the intent of these men student affairs 
85 Christine Williams, The Glass Escalator.
86 Regina Deil-Amen and James Rosenbaum, Social Prerequisites of Success, 122.
87 Michael Shapiro, Textualizing Global Politics, 321.
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professionals may be rooted in gender equity and inclusivity, their discursive 
practices and strategies serve to continually reproduce hegemonic gendered 
expectations and possibilities for all genders.
The narrative and discursive tactics here may present a rather grim story 
where men doing caretaking work are shamed for how they navigate gender 
performance, but this analysis is not intended to castigate male student affairs 
professionals. Rather, our purpose is to point to the “paradoxical nature of the 
relationship between language and reality.”88 As Foucault reminds us, “truth 
isn’t outside power.”89 The experiences of the men in our study, through their 
discursive strategies and practices, showcase the way in which privilege is both 
perpetuated and lived. The men in our study did not necessarily benefit from 
privilege equally, but their actions and language also assisted in deploying a 
continually confusing set of gendered expectations for men. The conflicting 
pressures propagate discursive circumstances obfuscating practices of privi-
lege. The men in our study were rewarded and reinforced in submitting to 
and perpetuating those discursive strands themselves.
Our analysis reveals how a field, situated in feminine ideals and practices and 
espousing social justice values, still can operate as a hierarchical system of exclu-
sion. We might expect men working in a higher education caretaking profession 
to resist performing gender to enhance their male privilege, but this poststruc-
tural analysis suggests gender performance functions in the opposite. Those 
(presumed) positive notions for the field can further align truth, power, and 
discourse to perpetuate privilege for men and oppression for all other genders.
Returning to Jackson and Mazzei’s90 thinking with theory, a more tra-
ditional viewpoint of this study would have perpetuated the very discursive 
structures we investigated. A traditional subjectivist qualitative analysis would 
have presented the men’s constructions of their own identities, experienc-
es, and feelings as unproblematic and disconnected from discursive context. 
While traditional techniques are useful, here they had the potential to obscure 
the perpetuation of male privilege that our poststructural analysis excavated. 
Through a series of practices and strategies in a discursive web, participants 
were offered further benefits from male privilege by both camouflaging their 
privileges and presenting false fronts of other marginalized identities.
This study serves to open up the discussion rather than to provide a de-
terministic conclusion. As Butler reminded us, “gender is not a performance 
that a prior subject elects to do, but gender is performative in the sense that 
88 Maggie MacLure, Discourse in Educational Research, 3.
89 Michel Foucault, Truth and Power, 131.
90 Alecia Youngblood Jackson and Lisa Mazzei, Thinking with Theory.
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it constitutes as an effect the very subject it appears to express.”91 The gender 
performance of these men in student affairs is therefore not just conditioning 
of the environment, but also conditioned by it. The performances that these 
men engage in are influenced by the competing contexts of masculine societal 
norms and feminized professional norms. If we can continue to expose the 
rules of gender performance operating to regulate, perpetuate, resist, and 
oppress, then new understandings and meanings for men student affairs pro-
fessionals and their gender performance are possible.
References
ACPA—College Student Educators International, & NASPA—Student Affairs Adminis-
trators in Higher Education. (2015). Professional Competency Areas for Student Af-
fairs Educators. Washington, DC: Authors.
Bourdieu, Pierre and Jean-Claude Passeron (1977). Reproduction in Education, Society 
and Culture. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
Bové, Paul A. (1990). Discourse. In F. Lentricchia (Ed.), Critical Terms for Literary Study 
(pp. 55–58). Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
Butler, Judith (1996). “Imitation and Gender Insubordination.” In A. Garry and M. 
Pearsall (Eds.), Women, Knowledge, and Reality: Explorations in Feminist Philosophy 
(2nd ed., pp. 371–387). New York, NY: Routledge.
Butler, Judith (1997). Excerpt from “Introduction to Bodies that Matter.” In R. Lancaster 
and M. di Leonardo (Eds.), The Gender Sexuality Reader (pp. 531–542). New York, 
NY: Routledge.
Clark/Keefe, Kelly (2010). Invoking Mnemosyne: Art, Memory, and the Uncertain Emer-
gence of a Feminist Embodied Methodology. Rotterdam, NL: Sense Publishers.
Coccimiglio, Jessica (2015). “What is Mansplaining? The Origins (and Misuse) of 
the Term.” Make Use Of. Retrieved from http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/
mansplaining-origins-misuse-term.
Creswell, John (2013). Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design: Choosing among Five 
Approaches (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Deil-Amen, Regina and James E. Rosenbaum (2016). “The Social Prerequisites of Suc-
cess: Can College Structures Reduce the Need for Social Know-how?” The Annals of 
American Academy of Political and Social Science, 586.
Deleuze, Gilles and Felix Guattari (1987). A Thousand Plateaus: Capitalism and Schizo-
phrenia (B. Massumi, Trans.). Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
Doyle, Jeff A. (2004). “Where Have We Come from and Where Are We Going? A Review 
of Past Student Affairs Philosophies and an Analysis of the Current Student Learning 
Philosophy.” The College Student Affairs Journal, 24(1), 66–83.
91 Judith Butler, Imitation and Gender Insubordination, 380.
120 A. voyles, s. mCKinnon-Crowley, And b. e. buKosKi
Duffy, Jennifer (2010). “How Women Impacted the Historical Development of Student 
Affairs.” The College Student Affairs Journal, 28(2), 235–250.
Foucault, Michel (1972). The Archaeology of Knowledge (A. M. Sheridan, Trans.). New 
York, NY: Harper & Row.
Foucault, Michel (1980a). Prison Talk (C. Gordon, Trans.). In M. Foucault, Power/
Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977. C. Gordon (Ed.). 
(pp. 37–54). New York, NY: Vintage Books. (Reprinted from Magazine Litteraire, 
101, June 1975).
Foucault, Michel (1980b). Body/Power (C. Gordon, Trans.). In M. Foucault, Power/
Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977. C. Gordon (Ed.). 
(pp. 55–62). New York, NY: Vintage Books. (Reprinted from Quel Corps?, Septem-
ber/October 1975).
Foucault, Michel (1980c). Two Lectures (K. Soper, Trans.). In M. Foucault, Power/
Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977. C. Gordon (Ed.). 
(pp. 78–108). New York, NY: Vintage Books. (Reprinted from Microfisica del Potere 
by M. Foucault, 1977: Turin).
Foucault, Michel (1980d). Truth and Power (C. Gordon, Trans.). In M. Foucault, Pow-
er/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977. C. Gordon (Ed.). 
(pp. 109–133). New York, NY: Vintage Books. (Reprinted from Microfisica del Potere 
by M. Foucault, 1977: Turin).
Foucault, Michel (1980e). Power and Strategies (C. Gordon, Trans.). In M. Foucault, 
Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977. C. Gordon 
(Ed.). (pp. 134–145). New York, NY: Vintage Books. (Reprinted from Les Revoltes 
Logiques, 4, 1977).
Foucault, Michel (1980f). The Eye of Power (C. Gordon, Trans.). In M. Foucault, Pow-
er/Knowledge: Selected Interviews and Other Writings 1972–1977. C. Gordon (Ed.). 
(pp. 146–165). New York, NY: Vintage Books. (Reprinted from Le Panoptique, by J. 
Bentham, 1977, Paris, FR: Belfond).
Gee, James P. (1992). The Social Mind: Language, Ideology and Social Practice. New York: 
Bergin & Garvey.
Jackson, Alecia Youngblood (2010). “Fields of Discourse: A Foucauldian Analysis of 
Schooling in a Rural, U.S. Southern Town”. In K. A. Schafft and A. Y. Jackson (Eds.), 
Rural Education for the Twenty-First Century: Identity, Place, and Community in a 
Globalizing World (pp. 72–94). University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University 
Press.
Jackson, Alecia Youngblood and Lisa A. Mazzei (2012). Thinking with Theory in Quali-
tative Research: Viewing Data across Multiple Perspectives. New York, NY: Routledge.
Kendall, Gary and Gavin Wickham (1999). Using Foucault’s Methods. Thousand Oaks, 
CA: Sage Publications.
Kezar, Adrianna (2002). “Expanding Notions of Leadership to Capture Pluralistic Voic-
es: Positionality Theory in Practice.” Journal of College Student Development, 43(4), 
558–578.
Absolution and Participation in Privilege 121
MacLure, Maggie (2003). Discourse in Educational and Social Research. Philadelphia, PA: 
Open University Press.
Maxwell, Joseph (2013). Qualitative Research Design: An Interactive Approach (3rd ed.). 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Nicolazzo, Z. (2017). “Imagining a Trans* Epistemology: What Liberation Thinks Like 
in Postsecondary Education.” Urban Education. Advanced Online Publication.
O’Neil, James, B. J. Helms, R. K. Gable, L. David, and L. S. Wrightman (1986). “Gen-
der-Role Conflict Scale: College Men’s Fear of Femininity.” Sex Roles, 14(5), 335.
Schrock, D. and M. Schwalbe (2009). “Men, Masculinity, and Manhood Acts.” Annual 
Review of Sociology, 35, 277–295.
Shapiro, M. (2001). “Textualizing Global Politics.” In M. Wetherell, S. Taylor and S. J. 
Yates (Eds.), Discourse Theory and Practice: A Reader. London: Sage.
Smith, Caroline and B. B. Lloyd (1978). “Maternal Behavior and Perceived Sex of Infant: 
Revisited.” Child Development, 49, 1263–1265.
St. Pierre, Elizabeth A. (2000). “Poststructural Feminism in Education: An Overview.” 
Qualitative Studies in Education, 13(5), 477–515.
St. Pierre, Elizabeth A. (2014). “A Brief and Personal History of Post Qualitative Re-
search: Toward ‘Post Inquiry’.” Journal of Curriculum Theorizing, 30(2), 2–19.
St. Pierre, Elizabeth A. and A. Y. Jackson (2014). “Qualitative Data Analysis After Cod-
ing.” Qualitative Inquiry, 20(6), 715–719.
Student Affairs Professionals in Higher Education (NASPA). (2018). “About Student Af-
fairs.” Retrieved from https://www.naspa.org/about/student-affairs
Sturtevant, Sarah, Ruth Strang, and M. McKim (1940). A Personnel Study of Deans of 
Women in Colleges, Universities, and Normal Schools. New York, NY: Teachers College 
Press.
Williams, Christine L. (1992). “The Glass Escalator: Hidden Advantages for Men in the 
‘Female’ Professions.” Social Problems, 39(3), 253–267.
Williams, Joan C. (2000). Unbending Gender: Why Family and Work Conflict and What to 
Do about It. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
Williams, Joan C. (2010). “Femmes, Tomboys, and Real Men: Placing Masculinity at the 
Core of a Feminist Analysis.” In K. T. Bartlett and D. L. Rhode (Eds.), Gender and 
Law: Theory, Doctrine, Commentary (5th ed.). New York: Aspen Publishers.

6.  Melancholia and the Public
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Abstract: In these preliminary reflections, I propose a re-reading of left-lean-
ing political projects’ attachment to the liberal idea of the “public.” I will 
argue that this attachment is a wounded one that forces nostalgia for the past 
and prevents dealing with present realities. I want us to attend to this notion 
of the public by attending to some ideas in psychoanalysis, particularly Sig-
mund Freud’s and specifically those of mourning and melancholia. This read-
ing does not purport expertise in psychoanalysis and does not offer any kind 
of psychological diagnosis. I intend on reading psychoanalysis as allegory, as 
offering us imaginative devices for thinking about the present.
Keywords: the public, democracy, liberalism, Freud
In dealing with, and being discouraged by, the various global projects pro-
moting consumerism, corporatization, marketization, privatization, neoliber-
alism, and other projects seeking to undermine the State,1 since I started my 
academic career over 20 years ago in public higher education, I have been re-
flecting on the question of what is “public” in public higher education.2 And 
so this essay, while generated by a concern with higher education, is really a 
1 Each of the projects I mentioned at the start of this essay has its own logic, but for the 
sake of an economy of words, I will group them in this essay mostly under the term 
“privatization.”
2 I use the term “public higher education” in this essay even though that term may not be 
recognized by all readers. In the United States, public higher education means higher 
education established, supported, and controlled by its political governments; in the 
rest of the world, the term “national” higher education or postsecondary education 
might be used instead of “public higher education.”
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reflection on the idea of the “public” and the appeal such an idea has for those 
of us on the left side of the political spectrum.
As a term, “public” originates from the Latin “populus,” or people, it-
self deriving from “pubes,” or “adult men,” but its authority lies in its claim 
to represent a social whole, even though many historical people have been 
excluded from projects justified under its name (indeed, “pubes” did not 
include women or children).3 For sure, the term has an empirical compo-
nent—it has stood for actual individuals—but the exclusions associated with 
it belie its claims to represent everyone. So, it may be that the idea of the 
public is just that, an idea, a fantasy, and perhaps a technology (i.e., a device 
used to do something) for rationalizing actions and reactions. As an idea it is 
also tied to another idea, that of “democracy,” and, in fact, the two ideas are 
inextricably associated with each other.
Of course, the idea of democracy itself should be in question too, as it has 
been claimed in liberal as well as in totalitarian societies, in capitalist and in 
socialist ones, as both supporting individualism and communitarianism, and 
serving as synonym for singularity as well as typicality.4 Much like the idea of 
the public, therefore, the idea of democracy is also a fantasy or technology. At 
any rate, in higher education, privatization is justified and contested by calls 
for the “public good,” the “public interest,” or similar liberal ideas. Those ad-
vocating privatization argue that it is in the public’s interest to make institu-
tions of higher education efficient, which happens through competition and 
marketization.5 Those arguing against privatization in higher education, how-
ever, argue that the public’s interest is hardly served, and is even threatened, 
by privatization.6 The idea of the “public” thus seems to serve both sides of 
the privatization debate in higher education. But what kind of debate is this?
I propose this essay as a call for philosophers of education to reconsider 
what is “public” in advanced liberal societies. I appreciate the difficulty of this 
task, since the question of what is “public” is considerably more slippery than 
3 See Bruce Robbins, “Public,” in Keywords for American Cultural Studies, eds. Bruce 
Burgett and Glenn Hendler (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 183–187, 
183.
4 Nancy Ruttenburg, Democratic Personality: Popular Voice and the Trial of American 
Authorship (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 10.
5 For a nuanced argument along these lines, see Matthew T. Lambert, Privatization and 
the Public Good: Public Universities in the Balance (Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 2014).
6 For what is still, in my opinion, the best example of such an argument, see Sheila 
Slaughter and Gary Rhoades, Academic Capitalism and the New Economy: Markets, 
State, and Higher Education (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2004).
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one first imagines. It implies something other than liberal notions of the State 
but also something other than the selfish desires of any particular individual 
or groups of individuals. Yet, the question of what is public, or what is a pub-
lic, has repeatedly been debated and the idea critiqued by many scholars and 
commentators. Indeed, when one attends to these critiques, one may con-
clude that the constant questioning of what constitutes “public” is probably 
what distinguishes liberalism from something else.
Liberalism, we know, is a political philosophy that emphasizes individual 
rights and freedoms.7 A liberal government is one premised on such logic. 
And thus it is the relationship between the individual and her government 
that is the overriding concern of liberal thought. In its classical forms it was 
characterized by a belief that the pursuit by each individual of his or her 
private interests ultimately leads to a system of voluntary cooperation that 
benefits society as a whole.8 Classical liberalism promoted the sanctity and 
sovereignty of the individual; a government, therefore, was justified to the ex-
tent that it could foster individual interests by, paradoxically, governing little. 
A government was required to take a stance of laissez faire, and, when at all 
possible, leave the individuals to their own devices. The “public” under this 
logic was likely what Jürgen Habermas understood as private citizens coming 
together to form a public to promote their interests vis-à-vis the State.9 It is 
in this public’s interest to have a laissez faire government that interferes only 
to resolve conflicts among private citizens.
In later forms, liberalism justified the promotion of social and col-
lective interests, without which individual interests could not be main-
tained.10 A government under such a view, therefore, had a greater role 
to play in the affairs of individuals, since it had to ensure that the pursuit 
of their interest by some people does not impinge on that of others.11 In 
7 See Nikhal Pal Singh, “Liberalism,” in Keywords for American Cultural Studies, eds. 
Bruce Burgett and Glenn Hendler (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 
139–145, 140. For a good discussion of the variations of liberal thought and the 
challenges associated with them, see Michael Sandel, ed., Liberalism and Its Critics 
(New York: New York University Press, 1984).
8 Gerald F. Gaus, “Public and Private Interests in Liberal Political Economy, Old and 
New,” in Public and Private in Social Life, eds. Stanley I. Benn and Gerald F. Gaus 
(London: Croom Helm, 1983), 183–221, 183.
9 See Jürgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry 
into a Category of Bourgeois Society, trans. Thomas Burger with Frederick Lawrence 
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1989, c. 1962).
10 Gaus, “Public and Private Interests,” 184ff.
11 Because of this, I would put the modern liberal ideas associated with figures like Ronald 
Dworkin and John Rawls in this category. See Ronald Dworkin, “Liberalism,” in Li-
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this later version of liberalism, the public begins to be understood, not as 
private individuals coming together to form a public, but as a transcendent 
(of any particular historical being) collective needing the protection of a 
government.
If my reading of liberalism is even remotely correct, liberalism cannot 
simply reflect a description of institutional arrangements or societal values; it 
is also, perhaps primarily, a term we use to represent particular kinds of polit-
ical rationalities that espouse different views about the relationship between 
individuals and their governments. Understood in terms of political ration-
alities about individuals and their governments, we may say that liberalism is 
characterized by an incessant critique of itself and its institutions.12 And so it 
must by definition pose but, paradoxically, leave unanswered in any definitive 
sense the question of what a public is, and thus what it wants or needs.
So, does a “public” exist? What is “public?” In asking these questions, I 
am doing nothing particularly original, and, actually, my asking these ques-
tions makes me a good liberal in the sense I just indicated. As liberals, 
we must have angst over this question, or, rather, what an answer to this 
question might portend, not only for our imagination of ourselves as a 
public of any sort, or of ourselves as protecting something public, but more 
specifically for our professional identity as philosophers who are politically 
predisposed to collective interests. This angst is particularly keen, I think, 
because we are also thinking, and experiencing, as I suggested at the start, 
some things we have been calling privatization and a host of other projects 
that undermine, overtly or covertly, slowly or quickly, more or less, any-
thing approaching a public, that is, something that is not entirely reducible 
to a statist or a selfish interest.
So, again, in having said all this, I have said nothing, or nothing particu-
larly interesting. Many readers will have heard this before and will do so time 
and again, proving, perhaps contrary to certain points of view, that liberalism 
is alive and well, to the extent, that is, that it brings itself and its institutions 
under relentless and seemingly crippling critique. I join this chorus of cri-
tique, but I will also admit that I am growing weary of hearing a lament 
for something public that also fails to reflect on the attachment we have to 
this concept. How can we think the “public” via some understanding of this 
beralism and Its Critics, ed. Michael Sandel (New York: New York University Press, 
1984), 60–79; John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2005, c. 1993).
12 See generally Michel Foucault, “History of Systems of Thought, 1979,” Philosophy & 
Social Criticism 8 (1981): 349–359.
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attachment, and then, and only after then, how might we determine the ex-
tent of its usefulness as a mantra for political action? I can offer no definitive 
answers, of course, because liberalism prevents any, and because we must first 
think of why we need such a concept in the first place. Why do we want—
need—the idea of the public? Why are we so attached to this idea, and what 
are the consequences of such an attachment?
In these preliminary reflections, I want to propose a reading of this at-
tachment via a reading of narratives that traffic in attachments. I want us to 
attend to this notion of the public by attending to some ideas in psychoa-
nalysis, particularly Sigmund Freud’s and specifically those of mourning and 
melancholia, an attention that in combining what might seem like disparate 
ideas will, I hope, make us rethink all of them. This reading, in other words, 
seeks to show what will happen to the idea of the public if we read it via ideas 
in psychoanalysis and, conversely, what happens to psychoanalytic ideas if we 
juxtapose them to those of the public. Before doing this, I will readily ad-
mit that I am not purporting expertise in psychoanalysis and in the accepted 
meanings of any of its concepts, and I certainly do not want to offer any kind 
of psychological diagnosis. I intend on reading psychoanalysis as allegory, as 
offering us imaginative devices for thinking about the present, which in turn 
provides psychoanalysis with its allegories. Before moving on to a reading of 
Freud, let me state my reasons for engaging in such reading.
In line with Lee Edelman’s call that queer politics must reject the vision 
of the future, and the protection of the child that subtends it, because of the 
abjections such visions require, I too think that it might be time to think what 
might appear unthinkable: “the space outside the framework within which 
politics as we know it appears and so outside the conflict of visions that share 
as their presupposition that the body politic must survive.”13 My reading of 
melancholia asks philosophers of education to question their attachments to 
the “public,” and, perhaps that we, in a sense, “kill off the public.” In sever-
ing our ties to the idea of the public, might there be new ones that attend to 
ruptures in privatization instead of seeing it as all-consuming, and to reinvest 
our energies in new attachments that contain the traces of the public but that 
do not resort to a paralyzing nostalgia for the past that comes at the expense 
of the present?
As I see it, rightwing and neoliberal politics, while using the liberal lan-
guage of the “public interest,” clearly have detached themselves from some of 
the presuppositions about the public to which left-leaning politics still clings 
13 Lee Edelman, No Future: Queer Theory and the Death Drive (Durham, NC: Duke Uni-
versity Press, 2004), 3.
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and defends, such as consensus, community, and democracy. Interestingly, if 
I am correct, the political left becomes conservative by seeking to preserve a 
nostalgia for the public, while the political right is radical, breaking entirely 
with traditional liberal values. But could it be that by releasing themselves 
from the idea of the public that left-leaning projects might gain a renewed 
radicalism? I hope so.
Melancholic Attachments
In his 1917 essay, “Mourning and Melancholia,” Freud suggests that melan-
cholia is a pathological form of mourning.14 Both concepts represent symp-
toms of grief arising from attachments to lost objects, whether those objects 
are persons, things, or ideals. Melancholia takes the physical form of intense 
self-hatred and aggression, which can be present in mourning but only tem-
porarily. Freud further distinguishes mourning from melancholia by indicat-
ing that mourning ends when an individual severs his attachment to the lost 
object and reinvests his libido in a new object.15 The mourner goes through 
a process of testing reality in which she remembers why the lost object was 
dear to her and, most important, that it no longer exists. When the work of 
mourning is completed, the ego becomes free and uninhibited again.
With melancholia, however, there is an inability to break one’s attach-
ment to the lost object, and the object is retained as part of one’s psyche. The 
ego becomes identified with the lost object, initiating what Freud calls a “crit-
ical agency,” or a superego, that attacks the ego for failing to live up to the ob-
ject. The melancholic cannot acknowledge reality, that is, that the object has 
indeed been lost. Thus, as Judith Butler reads it, melancholy entails a foreclo-
sure of the social world that has been eclipsed by a psychic one.16 The “real” 
14 Sigmund Freud, “Mourning and Melancholia,” in Collected Papers, Volume IV (Lon-
don: The Hogarth Press, 1956, c. 1917), 152–170.
15 For those readers not familiar with psychoanalytic language, providing a few definitions 
of terms I use in this essay is in order. Sigmund Freud divided the mind into the ego, 
superego, and id. The ego is what is understood as reason; the id refers to the pas-
sions; and the superego refers to conscience. If properly controlled by the ego, the id 
and superego lead to happiness, but a failure by the ego to control either the id or the 
superego can lead to physical or psychic pain. See Lucy Freeman and Marvin Small, The 
Story of Psychoanalysis (New York: Pocket Books, 1960), 113. The libido, Freud said, is 
analogous to hunger; it is “force by means of which the instinct…[e.g., hunger] achieves 
expression.” See Sigmund Freud, A General Introduction to Psychoanalysis, trans. Joan 
Riviere (New York: Washington Square Press, 1965), 322.
16 Judith Butler, The Psychic Life of Power: Theories in Subjection (Stanford: Stanford Uni-
versity Press, 1997), 134.
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social world is rejected and an internal world emerges that is structured in 
ambivalence, which means that the subject directs antithetical feelings (such 
as affection and hostility) toward the object. This ambivalence prevents the 
work of mourning because while part of one’s psyche wishes to detach itself 
from the object, another part upholds it. Freud suggests that it is only by de-
claring the object dead and offering the ego the benefit of continuing to live 
that the ego can give up its object. So for him, ironically, each single conflict 
of ambivalence, in disparaging its object, in denigrating it, even, as it were, in 
“slaying” it, loosens the fixation of the libido to it. Stated differently, only by 
“killing off the object” can one survive as a subject.
The process of mourning involves a testing of reality that confirms that 
the lost object has indeed been lost. With melancholia such a “reality check” 
cannot take place, and a close reading of Freud’s text suggests why. For 
Freud, melancholia involves a “loss of a more ideal kind,” indicating that 
melancholia is reserved for such losses that, by their very definition, cannot be 
perceived directly, such as ideals. If social ideals cannot be easily checked by 
reality, does that mean that melancholia is a structural condition of societies, 
and that the process of mourning those ideals is unlikely ever to end? Indeed, 
Freud indicates that the subject will not know precisely what about the object 
has been loved and lost. Melancholia, therefore, might not be a condition for 
recuperating a loss but a condition for negating a lack. As Slavoj Žižek argues, 
melancholia masks that the object is lacking in the first place.17 Indeed, as I 
indicated earlier in this essay, the conception of the public was premised on 
exclusions from the start, and so, perhaps, lament for the public has always 
been premised on the fact of its absence.
Before we reconsider this allegory in light of our concern with the public, 
let me elaborate further on mourning and melancholia. Freud’s later work 
suggests that the distinction between mourning and melancholia was not as 
neat as he first understood it. In The Ego and the Id, Freud appears to say that 
melancholia makes mourning possible.18 While previously Freud understood 
as pathological an ego that identifies with its lost objects, later he seems to 
argue that the very formation of the ego involves such identification. Thus, 
as Tammy Clewell explains, the ego necessarily reflects an embodied history 
of lost attachments.19
17 Slavoj Žižek, “Melancholy and the Act,” Critical Inquiry 26, no. 4 (Summer 2000): 
657–681, 661.
18 Sigmund Freud, The Ego and the Id. Standard Edition 19 (1923): 12–66 (London: 
Hogart Press).
19 Tammy Clewell, “Mourning Beyond Melancholia” Freud’s Psychoanalysis of Loss,” 
Journal of American Psychoanalytic Association 52, no. 1 (2004): 43–67, 56.
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If in “Mourning and Melancholia” Freud indicates that an individual 
must sever one attachment to make another, in The Ego and the Id he argues 
that only upon the condition that the lost object becomes internalized can 
the process of mourning ever be accomplished and new attachments created. 
Freud, then, appears to collapse the distinction between mourning and mel-
ancholia, making melancholic identification integral to the process of mourn-
ing. In his later work, Freud is indicating that only by internalizing the lost 
Other can one become a subject in the first place. Working through the loss, 
Clewell suggests, no longer depends on breaking one’s attachment to the 
lost other; it depends on taking the lost other into the structure of one’s own 
identity, a form of preserving the lost object in and as the self.20
To read melancholia as a pathological form of mourning would mean 
that one must reject the Other, or the social, in favor of an individual capable 
of being a-social. But to even think this requires that one imagine the im-
possible: something without any social definition whatsoever. What appears 
to us like the individual is actually the effect of socially regulated norms in 
disguise. Freud himself seemed to acknowledge this. In Civilization and Its 
Discontents, he explains that what characterizes “civilization” more than any-
thing else—more even than its technology—is the manner in which social 
relationships are regulated, “relationships which affect a person as a neigh-
bor, as a source of help, as another person’s sexual object, as a member of a 
family and of a State.”21 The replacement of the power of the individual by 
the power of the community constitutes the decisive step in civilization. It is 
impossible to overlook, he argues, the extent to which civilization is built up 
on a renunciation of instincts. Civilization aims to bind every member of the 
community together in a libidinal way, and it employs every means to that 
end. It favors every path by which strong identifications can be established 
between the members of the community so as to strengthen the communal 
bond by relations of friendship.
So, if the social is what determines the individual, and thus what consti-
tutes the ego, then melancholia, which rejects the social world and replaces 
it with an internal one, and which was originally understood as a reproach of 
the self, can now be read as a refusal to see the social in the self. This under-
standing of melancholia as a refusal to see the social in the self now allows 
us to identify the lost ideal that cannot be grieved in melancholia: The ideal 
of the individual as a self-enclosed, willing entity, the ideal of the sovereign 
20 Ibid., 61.
21 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and Its Discontents, trans. and ed. James Strachey (New 
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961, c. 1930).
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individual—the liberal subject. Such is the ideal we have inherited from our 
Western ancestors, handed down for centuries and pounded into our brains 
and bodies by years of socialization in families, in churches, in schools, in 
almost every institution we have set up to regulate our behavior without the 
use of physical force. This is an individual who exercises agency, who has intel-
ligence, who can be held responsible, who has obligations. This ideal not only 
informs our personal identities, but also our sense of ourselves as collectives, 
and thus as what counts legitimately, and perhaps paradoxically, as a public, 
as I hope to explain later in this essay. This ideal cannot be mourned, at any 
rate, because to do so will involve a disintegration of everything we hold dear: 
Morality, the law, the contract, and myriad institutions premised on the ideal 
of the sovereignty of the subject.
To make of melancholia a simple “refusal” to grieve its losses conjures up 
a subject who might be something without its attachments, that is, one who 
voluntarily extends and retracts his or her will. Indeed, as Clewell indicates, 
Freud’s original concept of mourning involves less a lament for the passing of 
a unique other and more a process geared toward restoring a certain economy 
of the subject.22 Yet from the start, an ego is something “other than itself,” and 
we can see now that what melancholia represents is that only by internalizing 
an Other as oneself can one become something at all. The social terms which 
determine social existence only appear to reflect individual autonomy, and so, 
as Butler explains, it is only by forfeiting the notion of such autonomy that 
social existence becomes possible; only such forfeiture releases the ego from 
its melancholic foreclosure of the social. To accept the “trace” of the other in 
one’s ego is to embark on a process of mourning that is never complete, for a 
severance of the other will only dissolve the ego. In recognizing that there can 
be no final severance of attachments without dissolving the ego, as one sees 
with right-leaning politics, Freud’s later work suggests a different alternative 
than the one he originally proposed, that is, the completely “killing off” of the 
Other: The mourn\er can now affirm the endurance of ambivalent bonds to 
those loved and lost others as a condition of his own existence.
How might this allegory of attachment and loss allow us to reconsider 
the attachment we have for the idea of the public? While the concepts of 
mourning and melancholia have limitations in their usefulness for reading 
social life,23 they do seem to me to provide fertile ground for reimagining our 
22 Clewell, “Mourning Beyond Melancholia,” 47.
23 For a very interesting, if too psychology-ist, attempt of applying such concepts to social 
life, see Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich, The Inability to Mourn: Principles of 
Collective Behavior, trans. Beverley R. Placzek (New York: Grove Press, 1975).
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lingering commitment to social ideas that have undergone such substantial 
reconceptualization that they no longer seem to serve their original purposes. 
In this present time, with a systemic undermining of many of the social bonds 
that once held individuals together (such as the nation-state, the “public,” 
the school, and so on), the commitment to the “public good” starts to read 
like a wounded attachment, that is, a melancholic attachment to an object 
that is no longer justifiable as a coherent ideal for bringing people together 
under a common set of goals.
I hope to use this allegory of loss as a way of rethinking the grounding 
of our ground itself, that is, liberalism and the concepts that come from (or 
have been redefined by) it, such as the State, the market, the public, the 
private, and even that of the individual. One of the things we have learned 
from thinking of the forces reshaping higher education, for example—pri-
vatization, marketization, consumerism, and so on—is that the individual, 
the market, the private, the public, and the state have all become invested 
in one another, so that it is now more and more difficult to draw a line that 
distinguishes each from the others. It seems as if market logic has prevailed 
in reshaping the other concepts in its own image, but if it has, it has done so 
at an expense, at a loss, so to speak, since it can no longer guarantee that it 
is distinct from the others, and thus it is always vulnerable to an interjection 
by the others. At any rate, the grounds that grounded our sense of our-
selves, individually and socially, have been lost. We have lost our grounding 
as liberal subjects; we might now feel that we are, as it were, in an abyss.
The critique of the liberal agentic subject has been pervasive.24 But the 
allegory of attachment and loss I just narrated might allow us to read, more 
narrowly, liberalism’s attachment to the idea of the public, a reading which 
sees it, I propose, as a series of melancholic attachments. Its constant critique 
of itself suggests the ambivalence that characterizes melancholic violence. Let 
24 For just a few examples, see Stanley I. Benn and Gerald F. Gaus, eds., Public and Private 
in Social Life (London: Croom Helm, 1983); Graham Burchell, “Liberal Government 
and Techniques of the Self,” in Foucault and Political Reason: Liberalism, Neo-liberalism 
and Rationalities of Government, eds. Andrew Barry, Thomas Osborne, and Nikolas Rose 
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1996), 19–36; Judith Butler, Senses of the 
Subject (New York: Fordham University Press, 2015); Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau, and 
Slavoj Žižek, Contingency, Hegemony, Universality: Contemporary Dialogues on the Left, 
2nd ed. (New York: Verso, 2011); Barbara Cruikshank, The Will to Empower: Democratic 
Citizens and Other Subjects (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999); Nikolas Rose, 
Powers of Freedom: Reframing Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1999); Alfredo Saad-Filho and Deborah Johnston, eds., Neoliberalism: A Critical Reader 
(London: Pluto Press, 2005); Larry Siedentop, Inventing the Individual: The Origins of 
Western Liberalism (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2014).
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me take as illustration two classic American narratives of the public, each writ-
ten very closely to each other and that can be said to be in conversation with 
the other. Walter Lippmann argued in The Phantom Public that the notion of 
the public is nothing but an abstraction, a “phantom,” since the public does 
not have the tools or the time to be engaged in every issue affecting it. Public 
decisions are simply the wishes of those few individuals invested in particular 
issues. The only thing the public can do, and not very effectively, is to decide 
which of the interested parties will win out. It cannot reflect deeply on issues 
because neither can it know all the particulars, nor is it interested in them.25
John Dewey in The Public and Its Problems takes exception to Lippmann’s 
foreclosure of the public, not because he was naive enough to believe it exist-
ed, but because he held out hope for its possibility. Dewey did argue that the 
public remains inchoate and unorganized, but only because decisions needing 
systematic responses are so wide and complex, the technical matters so spe-
cialized, and the details so many and so shifting that the public cannot iden-
tify and maintain itself. Dewey claims that the problem is not that there is no 
public, as Lippmann argued, but that there are too many publics, with diver-
gent desires preventing them from coming together as an integrated whole. 
The public will remain “in eclipse” until the “Great Society” is converted into 
the “Great Community,” which is the coming together of different publics as 
an integrated whole.26
These two narratives, seemingly in contradiction, at least in their conclu-
sions, represent for me things other than themselves, and it is about this other 
thing that I would like readers of this essay to speculate. Let me propose a 
start, one which I already proposed: The narratives reflect a structural angst in 
liberalism over the question of the public. It matters less to me what Dewey 
and Lippmann said specifically about the public; it matters more to me that 
their texts can be read as attacks of each other’s positions on the subject. If 
Lippmann’s narrative reflects a kind of hostility toward the ideal of the public 
that grounds our form of government, then Dewey’s narrative reflects an 
antithetical affection for this ideal, and read together these texts reflect the 
ambivalence that characterizes melancholia in liberalism. Liberalism, in this 
essay, is characterized by a relentless critique of itself and its institutions, and 
as such it is structurally melancholic, bound to ambivalent views of itself and 
its ideals. These ideals cannot be mourned and severed because while parts of 
liberalism seek to dispense with them, other parts uphold them.
25 Walter Lippmann, The Phantom Public (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2002, 
c. 1927).
26 John Dewey, The Public and Its Problem (Columbus: Swallow Press, 1954, c. 1927).
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But there is a deeper ideal in liberalism that it cannot sever without dis-
solving itself: The sovereign individual, an illusion that grounds the ground 
we stand on. We may agree that the public does not stand for the state or 
for the selfish desires of any individual, but it does stand for the idea of pri-
vate individuals coming together to form a public, as Habermas explains. For 
Habermas, the “bourgeois” public sphere was a sphere of private individuals 
coming together to form a public to debate state authority over the rules that 
governed private commodity exchange and social relations. The medium for 
these debates was the individual’s uses of their reason; the venues were insti-
tutions set up for public participation (e.g., parliament, the press, journals, 
coffee houses, salons, etc.).27 Habermas’ critique of the failure of the public 
sphere is premised on the notions that all kinds of interests and individuals 
now lay claim to the public, and that powerful private interests dominate the 
state. These changes no longer allow for public debate based on rational argu-
ments.28 At root in this argument about the public is the idea of the sovereign 
individual.
For all the talk of a suppression of selfish interests in our conception of a 
public, we must grant that it forms itself voluntarily, for to argue otherwise 
strips individuals of their sovereignty and establishes totalitarianism or des-
potism of some kind. The public is premised, not primarily on acceptance 
of common interests or adherence to common goals, but on the fiction of 
the sovereign individual, one with the ability to choose (and, for us, one we 
hope chooses to suppress selfish desires for the good of the community). 
Lippmann, it must be noted, rejected the idea of the public, not because he 
believed the notion of the individual underlying it is a fiction, but because 
the individual is too busy to exercise his will rationally. Dewey’s elaboration 
of the public understood an individual who sees in himself an obligation to 
contribute to the decisions that will direct her actions. Both narratives reflect 
a melancholic attachment to the sovereign subject.
Having said that these conflicting narratives about the public reflect a 
narrative of loss characterizing liberalism’s ambivalent attachment to the lib-
eral notion of a sovereign individual, I would like us to avoid the conclusion 
that the answer lies simply in severing this attachment and obtaining another. 
Thus, this re-reading of liberalism, and the public as one of its ideals, via psy-
27 Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere, 27.
28 For critiques of the idea of rational debate, see Craig Calhoun, Habermas and the Public 
Sphere. For a different argument, but similarly premised on the idea of rational debate, 
see Hanna Arendt, The Human Condition, 2nd ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1998, c. 1958).
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choanalysis now allows us to re-read psychoanalysis itself. For psychoanalysis 
cannot be read as reflections on psyches irrespective of these social attach-
ments, irrespective, that is, of these mourned ideals. Freud’s original concep-
tualization of mourning was premised on the model of the unified subject, 
and so the replacement of the lost object with a substitute seemed rather a 
non-problematic process, socially speaking, that is. Freud, at least originally, 
assumed the Western notion of a subject separate and distinct from others; 
he assumed, in other words, the sovereignty of the subject. Psychoanalysis, 
therefore, can only be read allegorically, for any reading of it as reflecting in-
ternal unities, separate and distinct from others, grounds it on a fiction.
Mourning the Public
Going back to the problem, giving up the attachment to the idea of public 
would require that we sever our attachments to others, that we gain independ-
ence from the social terms and relationships that make us who we are. Doing 
that is not only impossible but melancholic and thus potentially destructive. 
The neoliberal, neoconservative, or nationalist ability to grieve successfully the 
ideal of the public, if you will, and to reinvest libidos in other attachments, 
such as, for example, those of the market, nation/party, or organized religion, 
respectively, illustrates most violently what this radical independence from the 
other actually does. We must acknowledge lost ideals, but we cannot sever them 
from ourselves, for their incorporation into our lives is what defines us.
The concept of the public, premised on liberalism’s ambivalent stance 
toward a sovereign subject, embodied in the individual or in the public as a 
collection of such individuals, has to be recognized as a lost ideal. I propose 
this allegory of mourning and melancholia, therefore, as a rethinking of what 
the public might mean for philosophers of education now, how they might 
incorporate that ideal into new attachments, ones that recognize the trace of 
that ideal in what we might become. They must avoid, according to Wendy 
Brown, what Walter Benjamin coined as “left melancholy,” an epithet for 
the revolutionary hack who is more attached to a particular political analysis 
or ideal, even to the failure of the ideal, than to seizing possibilities for radi-
cal change in the present.29 By clinging nostalgically to some imagined past, 
leftist politics around higher education are left only with defending a welfare 
state that confronts neither the contradictions within it nor the dominations 
that take place through it. Following Brown, what might be left of the po-
29 Wendy Brown, “Resisting Left Melancholy,” boundary 2, 26, no. 3 (1999): 19–27, 20.
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litical left are ghostly spirits attached to a dead past, looking backward and 
punishing itself for doing so.30
A melancholic refusal to acknowledge such loss might prevent us on the 
political left from seeing the possibilities of reinvesting that ideal. That is, the 
“public” cannot be an assumed transcendent (and thus under attack); it must 
be fought for, invented, and forged constantly, in every moment and in every 
space. This may mean refusing to attach all hopes in political institutions. It 
will mean reinvesting energy and work in different institutions; if not always 
in the institutions of higher education that have been co-opted by neoliberal 
projects, for example, then in nonorganized gatherings, such as blogs, clubs, 
and so forth. We cannot presuppose a public good that is now in danger of 
being lost; we must fight for one that never existed. We must insist against all 
politically acceptable reason on inefficiency and on waste, for acceptance of 
such logic installs neoliberal projects. If institutions of higher education are to 
maintain any semblance of a “public” space, we must rethink the ideals that 
require normalization and consensus and focus more extensively on provid-
ing opportunities for dissension, for serendipity, for interlocutory possibilities 
whose consensus or democratic potential cannot be guaranteed in advance. 
While we must mourn the ideal of the public, we cannot sever our attachment 
to it, for such ideals make us what we are, which only may be the embodi-
ments of histories of lost attachments, which we must mourn in an endless 
but necessary process of becoming something.
30 Ibid., 26.
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Abstract: This essay seeks to promote a philosophical-theoretical reflection on the 
interrelationship of the abductive reasoning of Peirce with the philosophical ideas 
of the counter-education project of Gur-Ze’ev. This is expressed in the question: 
Is abduction the most widely used type of reasoning in diasporic philosophy and 
counter-education? Starting from this question, we present the basic concepts 
of the authors, and then initiate an approximate dialogue between the central 
concepts. We believe it is possible, through the characteristics demanded by the 
principles proposed by Gur-Ze’ev, to conclude that abductive reasoning is the 
predominant mode of logic in diasporic philosophy and of counter-education.
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Introduction
Thinking about education today is a sinuous and complex issue. It is a sinuous and 
complex phenomenon because we live in times of struggle, especially in the face of 
the dismantling of the initial and continuous education of teachers, of investment 
in the structure of schools and of policies granting access and supporting the per-
manence of students in schools and universities. A prime example of this is Brazil, 
where there is an attempt to implement new policies curbing neutral discussions 
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about gender, social and political issues in classrooms, which have a direct impact 
on teachers, since they might be denounced by students and parents, and prose-
cuted if they are perceived to do so (cf. Guilherme and Picoli 2018); the newly 
elected government has also signalled that it is against student quotas at universities 
for minorities and vulnerable individuals, which can be perceived as an attempt to 
disassemble social policies that facilitate social mobility in the country (cf. Santos 
et al. 2013). This goes against the UNESCO report, The Dakar Framework for 
Action—Education for All: Meeting our Collective Commitments, adopted by the 
World Education Forum in Dakar, Senegal, from 26 to 28 April 2000:
Adult and continuing education must be greatly expanded and diversified, and 
integrated into the mainstream of national education and poverty reduction strat-
egies. The vital role literacy plays in lifelong learning, sustainable livelihoods, good 
health, active citizenship and the improved quality of life for individuals, communi-
ties and societies must be more widely recognized. Literacy and continuing educa-
tion are essential for women’s empowerment and gender equality. Closer linkages 
among formal, non-formal and informal approaches to learning must be fostered 
to respond to the diverse needs and circumstances of adults. [Thus,] [s]ufficient 
resources, well-targeted literacy programmes, better trained teachers and the inno-
vative use of technologies are essential in promoting these activities. The scaling up 
of practical, participatory learning methodologies developed by non-government 
organizations, which link literacy with empowerment and local development, is 
especially important. The success of adult education efforts in the next decade will 
be essentially demonstrated by substantial reduction in disparities between male/
female and urban/ rural literacy rates. (UNESCO 2000: 16)
This was reiterated in the UNESCO report, Incheon Declaration: Education 2030:
On this historic occasion, we reaffirm the vision of the worldwide movement for 
Education for All initiated in Jomtien in 1990 and reiterated in Dakar in 2000—
the most important commitment to education in recent decades and which has 
helped drive significant progress in education. We also reaffirm the vision and 
political will reflected in numerous international and regional human rights trea-
ties that stipulate the right to education and its interrelation with other human 
rights. We acknowledge the efforts made; however, we recognize with great con-
cern that we are far from having reached education for all. (UNESCO 2017: 5)
Recognizing the important nature of our role as educational thinkers, we 
will seek in this text to bring to light the thinking of two theorists, namely 
Charles Sanders Peirce (1839–1914) and Ilan Gur-Ze’ev (1955–2012). We 
will explore Gur-Ze’ev’s ideas, particularly his understanding of diasporic phi-
losophy and counter-education, which demand a pragmatic attitude towards 
the truth; that is, as we shall demonstrate, Gur-Ze’ev, following the Frankfurt 
School, denies absolute truths professing that they are conditioned by society, 
culture and the historical moment (Gur-Ze’ev 2005). We maintain that this 
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should lead us to an alternative way of thinking because there is a need to 
refute a ‘safe base’, which is directly connected to absolute truths, demand-
ing of us the adoption of provisional ‘hypotheses’ and thus encouraging our 
creativity. This understanding reminds us of Peirce and his three modes of 
reasoning, and particularly of his concept of abductive reasoning. This is that 
kind of reasoning that is “[…] the only logical operation that introduces any 
new idea” (CP 5.171). Our central aim in this chapter is to reflect on the 
following question: Is abduction the most widely used type of reasoning used 
in diasporic philosophy, and by counter-education?
Gur-Ze’ev’s Diasporic Philosophy and Counter-Education
Ilan Gur-Ze’ev (2016) emphasizes that his general conception of Critical 
Theory arises by way of the thinkers of the Frankfurt School, especially Ador-
no and Horkheimer. He points out that he sought from the outset a con-
struction of Critical Theory that challenged critical hegemonic discourse, as 
well as bringing to light certain aspects of Critical Theory itself, such as its 
earlier focus on positive utopia, which later was pushed aside in favour of 
negative utopia. That is to say, according to Gur-Ze’ev the Frankfurt School 
has two phases between the 1930s and 1970s, which are characterized by: (i) 
“a positive optimistic utopianism” and (ii) “a negative pessimistic utopian-
ism” (cf. Gur-Ze’ev 1998: 119). This understanding is important because it 
will help us make sense of Gur-Ze’ev’s philosophy of education, as he places 
Critical Pedagogy, the pedagogical branch of Critical Theory, as being direct-
ly related to the first phase of Critical Theory and to positive utopia, whilst 
positioning himself and his counter-education project as being immediately 
associated with the second phase, and to the notion of negative utopia—thus 
denying the need for a guiding truth, because it can become something that 
blinds the critical spirit. This means that Gur-Ze’ev sought to interpret and 
implement Critical Theory in the field of education in a direct re-articulation, 
re-conceptualization of Critical Pedagogy; and we believe that it was in the 
book Diasporic Philosophy and Counter-Education (2010) that the author de-
voted himself more fully to bringing to light his main contributions to con-
temporary education, to the principles which we wish to engage with in this 
text, namely, diasporic philosophy and counter education.
In diasporic philosophy, Gur-Ze’ev (2005) conceives of the diaspora—in 
the broad sense of the word—as the nomadic human in relation to being 
in the world, to thought and to existence itself. The aim of this as a philo-
sophical notion, of diaspora, is to encourage the human exodus from eman-
cipatory dogmatic conceptions that are presented as easy solutions to our 
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problems, and which must be implemented in our search to implement a 
utopia; Gur-Ze’ev seeks to release people from the normalizing ways of think-
ing. An example of such a way of thinking is Critical Pedagogy. This is the 
Critical Pedagogy that is connected to the first phase of the Frankfurt School 
and seeks to implement a utopia, such as Freire’s vision of the liberation of 
an enlightened, oppressed poor (Freire 1970: 48–49); McLaren’s through a 
socialist democracy (McLaren 1998: 458); Giroux’s through a democracy of 
differences (Giroux 1991: 60) (cf. Yaakoby 2012: 16; Guilherme and Mor-
gan 2018). Gur-Ze’ev seeks to distance himself from this critical pedagogy. 
What is common to each of these narrow visions of reality is, according to 
Gur-Ze’ev, that one side oppresses, whilst the other is oppressed; and even 
when the oppressor tries to engage with its own oppression, or the oppressed 
manages to somehow transform the situation so that it is less oppressing, 
they will ultimately be unsuccessful—these events have happened again and 
again in history, and the oppressor–oppressed dichotomy continuous to exist. 
I note that Gur-Ze’ev’s reading is fundamentally based in Benjamin’s nega-
tive utopia and pessimism about history. This is a potential problem as once a 
positive utopian ideal is created and a goal is to be achieved, then it becomes 
impossible to criticize and revise the ideal because doing so puts the project in 
danger. Thus, utopias cease to be an end and become the foundational prin-
ciple on which an entire methodology and philosophy is constructed. In this 
respect, Critical Pedagogy becomes crystallized, adopting an absolute truth, 
whilst Gur-Ze’ev’s counter-education project remains open to new possibili-
ties, malleable in dealing with current and new issues and situations.
Gur-Ze’ev opposes any unique ‘truth’—due to the mutability of things 
ontological and epistemological—and sees in the distant horizon the impos-
sibility of establishing a solid foundation for ideas and actions, factors which, 
were they to be established, would destroy critical and creative alternatives in 
human thought and action. Hence, Gur-Ze’ev maintains that “[i]t is a cen-
tral dimension of ‘counter-education’ within the framework of present-day 
Diasporic philosophy: while refusing any dogma, it reintroduces the exiled 
seriousness toward that which is called ‘redemption’ in Christian theolo-
gy”. As Adorno observed, “it is even part of my good fortune not to be a 
house-owner”, as Nietzsche had already written in the Gay Science. Today we 
should have to add: “it is part of morality not to be at home in one’s home” 
(Gur-Ze’ev 2005: 346).1 In this quote, Gur-Ze’ev is rejecting positive utopia, 
1 On the same vein, see LACLAU, Ernesto. On populist reason. London and New York: 
Verso, 2005. LACLAU, Ernesto; MOUFFE, Chantal. Hegemony and socialist strategy: 
towards a radical democratic politics. London: Verso, 1985.
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ideals, in favour of negative utopia, which is to be understood as a rejection of 
absolute truths and subscribing continuously to a critical attitude. Following 
the second phase of the Frankfurt School, Gur-Ze’ev (2005, 2010a, 2010b) 
gives up on positive utopia in favour of a negative utopia because any act that 
seeks to establish an absolute truth is an act inherent to instrumental reason 
(i.e. a practical form of reason that seeks to achieve an end), which seeks to 
homogenize thought, the cultural industry, to confer an air of similarity to 
all (Adorno and Horkheimer (2002). As Horkheimer (2002: 28) says: this 
search for normalization turns, for example, the so sought-after emancipation 
to its opposite, that is, “… a ‘magical’ entity that is accepted rather than in-
tellectually understood”. Hence, the human being moves away from critical 
thinking and returns to an instrumental form of reasoning, returning to the 
very condition from which he tried to escape.
Gur-Ze’ev’s views serve as a motivation for us to rethink many contempo-
rary attitudes and values, including important issues, such as ‘democracy’. We 
might for instance ask: is democracy a positive utopia? Aren’t we in search of an 
absurd project forever comprised of the oppressed and the oppressor? Evidently 
these questions alone would yield extensive work. However, in asking them and 
bringing such issues to light, our intention was simply to show that it is possible 
to think of alternative visions that can lead us to think of other paths, as well as 
to move us away from normalizing views, and in this case totalitarian regimes; 
it is possible to envisage wider perspectives that go beyond sharp divisions. 
Thus, we must sharpen our critical thinking, and this is to get out of our com-
fort zone, which is the sole purpose of diasporic philosophy. This means that 
those who follow diasporic philosophy know that their role in the world lies in 
the perpetual desire to maintain the ability to criticize and to self-criticize, and 
this is to be done without searching for a sure foundation, a ‘promised land’, 
that is found in objective and absolute truths. The diasporic philosopher, the 
diasporic teacher, aspires to help individuals to acquire critical tools that will 
offer, through their own action and autonomy, alternative and creative ways to 
understand issues. This is Gur-Ze’ev, as already mentioned, subscribing to the 
second phase of the Frankfurt School, defending the notion of negative utopia.
We believe it is worth noting here that diasporic philosophy seeks to unite 
our responsibilities to the ability to respond critically to the challenges faced by 
us. Moreover, it requires that this responsiveness considers the ‘alterity of the 
Other’; that is, consider the diversity and difference of the Other, the unique-
ness of the Other’s identity that is above simple characteristics or mere cultural 
specifics (Yaakoby 2012). In view of this, we understand that the philosophical 
foundations of Gur-Ze’ev (2005, 2010a, 2010b) are important in the area of 
education, especially contemporary education committed to a humanistic form 
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of education; perhaps, even to a form of global citizenship education, if it is un-
derstood as a form of transformative education with a focus on living peacefully 
with the Other. That is, as the UNESCO (2015: 15) affirms:
Global citizenship education aims to be transformative, building the knowledge, 
skills, values and attitudes that learners need to be able to contribute to a more 
inclusive, just and peaceful world. Global citizenship education takes ‘a multifac-
eted approach, employing concepts and methodologies already applied in other 
areas, including human rights education, peace education, education for sustain-
able development and education for international understanding’ and aims to 
advance their common objectives. Global citizenship education applies a lifelong 
learning perspective, beginning from early childhood and continuing through 
all levels of education and into adulthood, requiring both ‘formal and informal 
approaches, curricular and extracurricular interventions, and conventional and 
unconventional pathways to participation’.
According to Gur-Ze’ev (2010a), counter-education is the intellectual result 
of a combination of disquiet and moral concerns, as well as a unique encoun-
ter with a non-emotional intimacy, that is, critical. Gur-Ze’ev sees his educa-
tion project as the result of a constant discomfort with the hegemonic and 
absolutizing theories. It seems to us that this understanding aims to alert and 
empower the human being to identify possible fallacies that lie in a normal-
izing ideal, and in achievements that will happen ‘automatically’—this ‘ide-
al’ approach avoids the necessary and ongoing angst involved in valid critical 
thinking. Therefore, counter-education to Gur-Ze’ev (2005) comprises edu-
cational activities that do not try to transcend the negativity embedded in the 
second phase of the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School. In other words, 
for Gur-Ze’ev (2010a), counter-education is present in acts that, starting from 
the principles of diasporic philosophy, in their core refuse any notion that seeks 
to standardize education; that do not encourage, or that hinder students from 
developing their critical capacity, with regard to their personal concerns, be this 
connected to the world, to their own life or to their own ‘self’.
At this point it is important that we return to the issue of instrumental-
ized rationality to more fully express the principles of counter-education. In 
accordance with Adorno and Horkheimer (1985), economic capital seeks, 
through cultural industry, the instrumentalization of consciousness; that is, 
through unrealizable promises, fanaticizes human reasoning, with a view to 
an impossible horizon to be achieved and to act on without ‘thinking’. This 
tendency ends up engulfing critical reason, denying it under the guise of a 
utopia of ‘freedom’—and this is whether it is through one’s way of thinking, 
acting or merely ‘consuming’. Adorno and Horkheimer (2002: 113) exem-
plify this by pointing out that:
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This principle requires that while all needs should be presented to individuals 
as capable of fulfillment by the culture industry, they should be so set up in ad-
vance that individuals experience themselves through their needs only as eternal 
consumers, as the culture industry’s object. Not only does it persuade them that 
its fraud is satisfaction; it also gives them to understand that they must make do 
with what is offered, whatever it may be. The flight from the everyday world, 
promised by the culture industry in all its branches, is much like the abduction 
of the daughter in the American cartoon: the father is holding the ladder in the 
dark. The culture industry presents that same everyday world as paradise. Escape, 
like elopement, is destined from the first to lead back to its starting point. En-
tertainment fosters the resignation which seeks to forget itself in entertainment.
As we have already noted, Gur-Ze’ev criticizes Critical Theory and its first 
phase, the positive utopia phase, by connecting it to the use of instrumental 
reason. This is a rejection of ultimate and absolute truths because when one 
believes or subscribes to a final truth, by having the ‘ideal’ as an ultimate 
goal, one loses ability to criticize this ‘ideal’, which forces one to partake in 
a mechanized approach. This is so because according to Gur-Ze’ev (2005) 
when one asserts a positive utopia, an ‘ideal’ to be realized as a goal, one 
incurs the danger of turning this ‘ideal’ into the very foundation of one’s ap-
proach, of one’s philosophy. This is similar to what the economic capital and 
cultural industry does in society when it normalizes our way of thinking and 
fanaticizing certain concepts; the fashion industry imposes on us the latest 
trends in clothes and our desire to buy them, instrumentalizing our way of 
thinking, and Freireans continuously advocate the liberation of the oppressed 
as a mantra without much reflection.2 The crucial point here, being driven 
by Gur-Ze’ev, is not that we should not buy the latest trend in fashion or 
advocate the liberation of the oppressed; rather, it is that we should be critical 
about it to the point of ascertaining that this is what we desire or that this is 
a valid position to hold. Moreover, we should not just be critical of proposi-
tions (i.e. I is critical of X), we should also be self-critical. Everything must be 
criticized so to verify its validity, and nothing should be out of bounds to our 
critical attitude because to regard some as non-criticizable would be arbitrary.
Gur-Ze’ev (2010a) applies this philosophical understanding to the field of 
education, thus conceiving of his counter-education project. Due to its focus 
on a sharp critical capacity, the project aims at revealing that being validly crit-
ical cannot be characterized by naively offering simple ‘democratic consensus’ 
under the guise of freedom and emancipation; rather, the true critical attitude 
2 Guilherme and Morgan (2018: 792) note that: “A prime example is the Freireanism 
found in some academic circles in Brazil and abroad, which regard criticism of Paulo 
Freire’s thought and their own Freireanism as heresy (cf. Weiler 1996; Brayner 2015).”
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is a conscious awakening of one’s difficulties and impossibilities that must be 
faced and dealt with maturely. This non-promise of ‘democratic consensus’, 
of ‘emancipation’, is what characterizes Gur-Ze’ev’s notion of nomadism, di-
aspora and love of life, which in turn serve as a foundation for the ability to 
criticize, to unravel weak foundations, that are incompatible with society and 
reality. Ultimately, and because of this foundational everlasting critical attitude, 
counter-education encourages the emergence of new creative and philosophical 
possibilities in educational environments (Gur-Ze’ev 2010a); in other words, 
“[d]iasporic counter-education, in this respect, is an attempt to present the pos-
sibility of thinking and of responsible improvisational co-poiesis in an era which 
deconstructs, ridicules or fetishizes holiness and the kind of respond-ability 
which conditions transcendence from ecstatic sinking toward some-thing to 
becoming some-one who is rich and free to the degree of refusing the temp-
tation to return ‘home’ into the continuum of an aimless symbolic and di-
rect emancipating violence or, alternatively, to the harmony of nothingness as 
presented by the suggestive powers of capitalist ‘success’ and other powerful 
drugs” (Gur-Ze’ev 2010a: 19). The idea of the ‘homelessness’ in education—
of being continuously engaged in a critical attitude and not subscribing to ab-
solute ideals—is very powerfully characterized by Gur-Ze’ev (2011: 38–39) in 
his analogy of the Orcha (i.e. the Caravan in Hebrew). He says:
In the Hebrew language ‘Orcha’ means a convoy of camels and humans with 
their belongings moving in an endless desert towards their destiny. The ‘Orcha’ 
is an improvised movement that is to find/create its own destiny…. The ‘Orcha’ 
is never totally determined by territorial sovereignty, not even by commanding 
knowledge and people. It is a kind of togetherness-in-movement […].
This Orcha is not a negative process. It rests on the positive notion of people 
constantly in communion, one with the other, with the group, constantly 
questioning, discussing and seeking, developing new and dynamic relation-
ship ideas, refusing to accept the simple and ‘end in itself ’. In ‘practical terms’, 
we might ask: what would an environment be like where counter-educational 
action is prioritized? As a possible answer to this question, we turn to the 
studies of Tova Yaakoby, who, referring to the writings of Gur-Ze’ev, indi-
cates some principles that suggest the praxis of diasporic education. To Yaako-
by (2012: 92–93), counter- education values the subject, that is, the human 
being must be at the centre of life, and not as an object to be manipulated 
for the sake of normalization in education and life. This education, there-
fore, aims to allow individuals to lose their bonds and define their own path; 
that is to say, counter-education aims at guiding individuals to seek creative 
alternatives and possibilities for their future whilst urging them to denounce 
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and renounce the deceptive consciousness of a ‘sweet home’. The diasporic 
subject has historical consciousness; however, she faces the future and the 
presence as an un-happened moment, as something full of potential (Yaakoby 
2012: 92–93). This reminds us of Peirce’s warning that we should not fall 
into crystallization (cf. Peirce 2012)—and we shall return to this below.
Thus, counter-education encourages a creativity that refuses to give in to 
the commonly accepted, allowing for genuine creation in our educational set-
tings, fertilized by sensitivity to various difficulties, imagination with regard 
to possibilities, hope for the future and commitment to the self-construction 
of the individual. Further, it must be noted that in diasporic education, cre-
ativity is coined as ‘improvisation’, manifesting itself as the doing of each 
diasporic subject. ‘Improvisation’, in order to conceive something new and 
unexpected, is the heart of this movement. That said, ‘improvisation’ should 
not be understood as lack of preparation or amateurism, but as creativity 
and criticality so sharp that it can handle the most varied situations. These 
aspects of diasporic life represent the aesthetic dimensions of existence, which 
allow for and justify rational and ethical liberation. ‘Improvisation’ and the 
‘improviser’ can be associated with the arts and the artist, such as music and 
a professional jazz player, who so knows his field of work that he is able to 
‘improvise’ beautiful ‘pieces of music’. In connection with this Guilherme 
and Morgan (2018: 793) comment on the action of Gur-Ze’ev’s ‘improvis-
er-teacher’ whilst comparing to Freire’s ‘political-teacher’:
This means that Gur-Ze’ev’s improviser-teacher is critical, encourages criticism 
and everything can be the subject of critique, and this process brings about 
changes in reality; however, the improviser-teacher does not offer positive utopi-
as, such as Freire’s liberation by enlightening the oppressed poor, and as such the 
improviser-teacher overcomes a crucial weakness faced by Freire’s political-teach-
er. That is, the political-teacher can become the propagandist of an ideological 
view (i.e. the liberation of the oppressed by enlightening the poor), and as a con-
sequence of this, of using subjects as a means to an end (i.e. using the oppressed 
poor to achieve the goal of liberation, but constraining this within a very narrow 
form of liberation).
The above not only illustrates counter-education, it also provides the over-
view for counter-educators and counter-teachers. It seems to us that ‘impro-
viser-teachers’ do not rely primarily on deductive and inductive logic, since 
both in one way or another attempt to normalize thinking. There seems to be 
a different kind of logic at play in counter-education and improvisation, and 
thus we now turn to Peirce’s abductive reasoning.
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Is Abduction the Form of Reasoning in Diasporic 
Philosophy and Counter-Education?
We have the intuition that Peirce’s abductive reasoning is the mode of logic 
that most frequently emerges in diasporic philosophy. For Peirce, abduction is 
the inference on which creative reasoning is structured, as well as a particular 
form of self-organized, dynamic systems (Gonzales and Haselager 2002: 22); 
and he defines inference as a “[…] controlled adoption of a belief as a con-
sequence of other knowledge” (CP 2,442). To make better sense of Peirce’s 
understanding of abductive reasoning, it is important to understand how it 
comes about. Peirce argues that a habit is consolidated through inferential 
relations, and this leads to the formation of rules that stabilize our actions. 
However, when a habit is shaken, becoming unsafe or unproductive because 
of changes and resistances that reality imposes on it, the permanence of such 
behaviour is problematic. The ‘strange’ behaviour, the ‘unsafe’ habit, gen-
erates uncertainties about the validity of our beliefs connected to it—beliefs 
which previously were held to be true. This forces us to establish a new belief, 
engaging in a dynamic movement seeking to correct and expand concepts, so 
as to acquire new beliefs and habits, which is done through the articulation 
of logical inferences (Cocchieri and Moraes 2009: 9). It is important to note 
that there are three kinds of inferences: (i) deduction; (ii) induction; and (iii) 
abduction (cf Douven 2017). Deductive inferences occur when premises lead 
to a conclusion and the truth of the premises guarantees the truth of the con-
clusion. For instance:
All Xs are Ys
Ɵ is X
Hence, Ɵ is Y.
The above example is the classic modus ponens (i.e. P→Q; P; Q) and is a pri-
mary deductive rule of inference.3 In the case of inductive inference the prem-
ises do not necessarily guarantee the conclusion, and for matters of space, we 
could argue that they are based on previous empirical ‘statistical’ knowledge. 
For instance:
The majority of people in Quebec speak both French and English
Jerome is from Montreal, Quebec
Hence, Jerome speaks both French and English
3 Another classic example is modus tollens, which is expressed negatively: P→Q; ¬ Q; 
¬P. If it is sunny, then the sky is clear; the sky is not clear; thus, it is not sunny.
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Whilst it might be true that Jerome is a typical Quebecois and speaks both 
French and English, which would make the above a sound argument, he may 
also be part of the minority of Quebecois who only speak French. Thus, in in-
duction there is a degree of uncertainty because the validity of the premises is 
not necessarily carried to the conclusion. However, as Douven (2017) notes:
The mere fact that an inference is based on statistical data is not enough to clas-
sify it as an inductive one. You may have observed many gray elephants and no 
non-gray ones, and infer from this that all elephants are gray, because that would 
provide the best explanation for why you have observed so many gray elephants and 
no non-gray ones. This would be an instance of an abductive inference. It sug-
gests that the best way to distinguish between induction and abduction is this: 
both are ampliative, meaning that the conclusion goes beyond what is (logically) 
contained in the premises (which is why they are non-necessary inferences), but 
in abduction there is an implicit or explicit appeal to explanatory considerations, 
whereas in induction there is not; in induction, there is only an appeal to ob-
served frequencies or statistics. (I emphasize ‘only,’ because in abduction there 
may also be an appeal to frequencies or statistics, as the example about the ele-
phants exhibits.)
Thus, it is clear that abductive reasoning is connected to a particular mode of 
logic: Inference of the Best Explanation. In fact, Lipton (2000: 184) notes 
that “the model of Inference of the Best Explanation” is designed to give a 
partial account of many inductive inferences, both in science and in ordinary 
life. One version of the model was developed under the name ‘abduction’ by 
Charles Sanders Peirce early in this century, and the model has been consid-
erably developed and discussed over the last twenty-five years. Its governing 
idea is that explanatory considerations are a guide to inference, that scientists 
infer from the available evidence to the hypothesis which would, if correct, 
best explain the evidence. The same is done by individuals in their ordinary 
lives. Thus, unlike ordinary reasoning that always associates itself with a par-
ticular inference (thus inductive) or to a general and sound argument (thus 
deductive), abduction forces the individual to think in a singular way and for 
himself, making it more difficult for his way of thinking to be normalized 
whilst facilitating, in contrast, the idea of pursuing a unique and distinct path. 
Summing up: (i) in deduction the validity and truth of the conclusion are 
guaranteed by the premises; (ii) in induction the validity and truth of the 
conclusion are not guaranteed by the premises, and it is based on ‘statistics’; 
and (iii) in abduction the validity and truth of the conclusion are not guaran-
teed by the premises, but differently from induction, there is an appeal to be 
creative and to seek the best explanation—thus, thinking ‘outside-the-box’.
It is important to note at this point that, according to Peirce, abductive 
reasoning is connected to feelings and emotions, it is the sensual ingredient 
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of thinking (Peirce 2008), and for this reason, abduction is “[…] the only 
logical operation which introduces any new idea” (CP 5.171). Further, Peirce 
believes that “[c]reative thinking seems to oscillate between well-established 
beliefs and doubts or surprises that shake them, initiating the process of form-
ing new beliefs, which will enable the substitution of previous beliefs” (CP, 
5.524, emphasis added). Peirce’s characterization makes us think of ‘a gut 
feeling’ or ‘intuition’ anchored on evidence. We can argue that these ideas are 
also central to Gur-Ze’ev’s counter-education project because for respect and 
appreciation of diversity and difference, of respect for the Other, an openness 
that is manifested as creativity and improvisation is required; and for this to 
happen, the individual must be immersed in the task emotionally and ration-
ally. As Gur-Ze’ev (2005: 354) says, education requires “a manifestation of 
love and a concrete realization of joy and creativity, tikun olam”. We draw 
attention to Gur-Ze’ev’s use of the concept of Tikun Olam (i.e. תיקון עולם), 
which in Hebrew means ‘repair of the World’, a central tenet of Judaism. 
It means that we, human beings, must engage in actions that will ‘repair’, 
improve the world, make it more perfect. Once again, in this aspect, there is 
an emotional attachment to the task, an utter desire to fulfil it, whilst also a 
demand that reason be applied in our endeavour to excel, and ‘perfect’ reality.
Further, abductive reasoning, in its attempt to create a new belief, gives 
the individual new ways of creating and self-organizing thought, which con-
sequently create new habits and understandings that are consistent with ac-
tual experience. The constant self-creation, self-organization, refuses to allow 
our minds to crystallize, that is, they do not end up as ‘immutable thought 
material’ (Peirce 1974). In addition, it is noteworthy that abductive thinking 
is the mode of argument that is most closely related to the Peircean concept 
of fallibilism, banishing the idea of absolute certainty (Ibri 1992). This means 
that both fallibilism and abduction serve as impetuses to the idea of a constant 
‘renewal’ through creativity, and this is closely related to understanding that 
everything must be criticized, something so strongly defended by Gur-Ze’ev. 
When we criticize something, when we self-criticize, we have the opportu-
nity to ascertain that things are correct (or incorrect) and to reach new con-
clusions on the basis of the evidence we have at hand—the close affinity of 
Peirce’s abductive reasoning and of Gur-Ze’ev’s critical attitude is clear. Both 
require a letting go of the moorings, an opening to present and future expe-
riences, a release from foundations; both require a nomadic existence. There-
fore, it becomes very evident to us that Gur-Ze’ev’s diasporic philosophy and 
Peirce’s philosophy have strong approximations, particularly in connection to 
their notions of critical attitude and improvisation, and abductive reasoning. 
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In developing their ideas they exhaust the need for a utopia, for ‘a promised 
land’, in favour of a dynamic and ever creative ‘homelessness’.
Conclusion
Gur-Ze’ev’s (2005, 2010a, 2010b) philosophical and educational concepts 
encourage us to (re)think education today, from mundane daily issues that 
might happen in classrooms throughout the world, to the very idea that the 
educational system is instrumental in the normalization of individuals. Gur-
Ze’ev invites us, through his discussions on diasporic philosophy and coun-
ter-education, to incorporate and develop a new state of thinking and acting, 
a critical and creative way of thinking, which refuses the comfort of positive 
utopias, of ideals. This rejection of positive utopias encourages us to live a 
nomadic life so that everything must be criticized, and self-reflection and crit-
icism are very much part and parcel of this process, so to ascertain its validity, 
which in accordance with Frankfurt School’s dictums is always related to so-
cio-political and historical contexts. In education, the image of the Orcha, the 
caravan encapsulates our journey through knowledge, feeling comfortable 
and momentarily at a safe-stop, and then soon after pursuing new pastures 
and unknown destinations.
Those who are well acquainted with Gur-Ze’ev’s writings will agree that 
he is not always quite clear in his arguments due to his constant insistence in 
using poetic language, and by reference to our imaginary—and in this respect, 
we have to keep some of his allusions in this chapter to be faithful to him. 
However, sometimes there is also a lack of clarity in defining some concepts, 
such as, what it means to be critical and improvising. There is no evidence in 
Gur-Ze’ev’s writings that he personally refers to abductive reasoning; howev-
er, here, Charles Sanders Peirce’s three reasoning modalities help to clarify his 
concepts: deduction, induction and abduction, of which abduction clearly of-
fers the greatest assistance. This abductive modality of reasoning is responsi-
ble for creativity, and requires that the individual develop new habits through 
new ways of thinking, whilst also avoiding the crystallization of thought—as 
we argued, this is also encouraged by diasporic philosophy and counter-ed-
ucation as they encourage individuals to avoid normalization, to be creative 
and to seek new ways of thinking. Moreover, because the mode of reasoning 
is prone to identify fallibility, stimulating creativity and an intellectual richness 
in its search for new solutions, it has proved to be the only kind of inferen-
tial judgement that does not require a priori foundations, a departure point, 
guaranteeing in this way a permanent capacity to criticize. This is something 
crucial to understanding diasporic education, to the non-instrumentalization 
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of reason and to the action of the improviser-teacher. In summation, the 
answer to our original question is that whether Gur-Ze’ev himself explicitly 
refers to abductive reasoning or not, we have demonstrated that there is clear 
and strong evidence that abduction is the mode of reasoning in diasporic 
philosophy and counter-education.
It is also important to note that this theoretical discussion provides us 
with the foundations for an enquiry of a more practical nature. That is to say, 
in practical terms, what does this mean for education, particularly Higher 
Education? We started this chapter by stating that education is a sinuous and 
complex phenomenon because we live in times of struggle, especially in the 
face of the dismantling of the initial and continuous education of teachers, 
of investment in the structure of schools, and of policies granting access and 
supporting the permanence of students in schools and universities. We men-
tioned the case of Brazil, where there is an attempt to implement new policies 
curbing neutral discussions about gender, social and political issues in class-
rooms, which have a direct impact on teachers, since they might be denounced 
by students and parents, and prosecuted if they are perceived to do so. The 
attempt to implement these policies is being spearheaded by the Movimento 
Escola Sem Partido (i.e. School Without Party Movement), which now finds 
parallels in other countries—for instance, in Germany the AfD (i.e. Alterna-
tive für Deutschland) far-right party called for an Aktion Neutrale Schulen 
(i.e. Action Neutral Schools). Fundamentally, these endeavours represent an 
attempt to curb the actions of teachers, and the scope of education. This is so 
because teachers would become unable to put to discussion a whole range of 
important subjects, confining education to the mere instruction of a certain 
kind of knowledge that has been previously vetted by families (i.e. so that this 
knowledge does not go against family values). Our discussion on Gur-Ze’ev’s 
improvisation and Peirce’s abduction is very pertinent here. If these move-
ments are successful in implementing their respective projects, there would 
be an impediment to critique, and creativity. As we have already argued, when 
we criticize something, when we self-criticize, we have the opportunity to 
ascertain that things are correct (or incorrect) and to reach new conclusions 
on the basis of the evidence we have at hand—and the close affinity of Peirce’s 
abductive reasoning and of Gur-Ze’ev’s critical attitude is very evident with 
regard to this. Further, the understanding that everything must be criticized 
enables us to develop our creativity by finding alternatives, thinking outside 
the box and, thus, to seek a constant ‘renewal’, transforming and improv-
ing ourselves and society. This means that opportunities for critique, and the 
consequent development of creativity, must be offered by teachers, schools 
and the educational system. However, movements such as Escola Sem Par-
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tido (i.e. School Without Party) and Aktion Neutrale Schulen (i.e. Action 
Neutral Schools) would have important and negative implications insofar as 
the offering of opportunities to engage in critique in educational contexts is 
concerned. This is so because if we curb the scope of what can be discussed in 
the classroom, something that these movements could do aleatorily and arbi-
trarily, then we also curb opportunities to develop critique and creativity. In 
fact, as Peirce would argue, this would represent a crystallization of thought. 
Consequently, if these movements are successful, then a poorer conception 
of education would be implemented. Finally, we believe that their refusal to 
allow everything to undergo a process of critique might demonstrate a fear 
that their own beliefs and values do not stand on solid foundations as well as 
an endeavour to implement a process of normalization of individuals within 
the confines of a particular worldview.
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Response to “Melancholia and  
the Public”: Melancholia for  
the Individual, but Not the Public, 
of Higher Education
jerry lee rosieK And AlexAnder b. prAtt, 
university oF oregon
In his article, Melancholia and the Public, Ben Baez (this volume) identifies 
an important foundational issue related to contemporary conversations about 
higher education—the idea that access to quality post-K–12 education is a pub-
lic good or what some would call an educational commons (Bowers, 2006; 
Means, Ford, & Slater, 2017). Since the 1980s, we have seen the gradual shift in 
the public perception of higher education from a public good to a private com-
modity. Public university budgets in the United States, for example, have de-
clined and university budgets are increasingly reliant on tuition revenue (Mitch-
ell, Leachman, Masterson, & Waxman, 2018), making college education less 
affordable to large segments of the population. It is not an exaggeration to say 
that the increased cost of educational opportunity combined with stratification 
of wealth in our country is reaching the level of a crisis for our democracy.
Benjamin Baez does not address these issues at a practical level, by talking 
about alternative university funding strategies or about building political coa-
litions that might support universities. Instead, befitting a philosophy journal, 
he examines a shift in political ontology that has contributed to these practical 
problems and asks what has happened to our general relation to liberal notions 
of the public that used to underwrite our investment in shared projects like 
higher education.
In pursuit of this end, Baez gave an account of why it seems more diffi-
cult to muster a commitment to projects for the public good in contemporary 
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liberalism. The last century has seen repeated critiques and deconstructions of 
the idea of a unified and unifying public good. Our world is full of nationalist, 
ethnocentric, patriarchal appeals to a common good that mask the privileging 
of some interests over others or serve as a pretext for terrible forms of violence.
Much of this violence has been done under the cover of the alleged ex-
pansion of liberal democratic politics, often into communities that have not 
asked for it. As a consequence, the liberal ideal of a common good has be-
come tarnished and subject to warranted suspicion.
Baez refers to the liberal commitment to a conception of the public good 
as a “wounded attachment”—one that is no longer “justifiable as a coher-
ent ideal” and thus cannot effectively bring people together as a community. 
Nonetheless, he argues that this conception of the public good is essential to 
the functioning of liberal democracies. He uses the concept of melancholia 
found in psychoanalytic theory to understand the complex dynamics of this 
wounded attachment. We find this application intriguing and helpful in the 
effort to simultaneously sustain a commitment to democratic politics and to 
critically analyze our enactment of those commitments.
“The Public”
Before addressing the details of Baez’s argument, we feel it will be important 
to consider the compromised history of the concept of the “public” in Amer-
ican social discourse in a bit more detail than “Melancholia and the Public” 
does. The “public” referred to by the author seems to be that of Habermas 
who stated, “By ‘the public sphere’ we mean first of all a realm of our social 
life […]. Access is guaranteed to all citizens” (Habermas, Lennox, & Len-
nox, 1974, p. 49). “Citizens,” he explains, “behave as a public body when 
they confer in an unrestricted fashion—that is, with the guarantee of freedom 
of assembly and association and the freedom to express and publish their 
opinions-about matters of general interest” (ibid.). This understanding of the 
concept of a “public” is directed at only certain populations, specifically those 
that have been allowed to express and have heard a public opinion, and those 
for whom the rights of freedom of speech and of assembly have never been in 
question. This assumption of the general applicability of a concept is not new, 
but rather falls in line with a long history of ideologies that elide the social 
experience of communities subject to things like imperial settler colonialism 
and institutionalized white supremacy.
Critiques of this erasure at the heart of liberal conceptions of social ame-
lioration can be readily found in a variety of critical literatures, such as critical 
race theory (Delgado & Stafancic, 2001), feminist theory (Butler, 1997), 
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and Indigenous studies (Coulthard, 2014; Simpson, 2017). So, the point 
we make here is not new. But in order to avoid reproducing a pernicious si-
lence, we mention these critiques here. Baez defines liberalism as “a political 
philosophy that emphasizes individual rights and freedoms” and a “liberal 
government is one premised on such logic.” This individualism is not just an 
abstract fiction, which the author acknowledges. It is an actively functioning 
part of the current machinery of white supremacy. It an essential component 
of the contemporary reincarnation of racist social policy behind the guise of 
“color-blindness” (Bonilla-Silva, 2006; Rosiek & Kinslow, 2016). This focus 
on individualism as a foundation for social order also renders mute any con-
tentions that structural racism exists in a way that cannot be overcome by an 
individual’s force of will (Leonardo, 2013). The term “public” and its liberal 
roots have not included and in some cases actively excluded Black, Indige-
nous, Latinx, or even female Americans until well into the twentieth century, 
and access to it is still barred to many groups in the twenty-first century.
It is possible that these conditions are exactly what Dr. Baez had in mind 
when entering into this reflection on the need for a process of mourning the 
notion of a public good that underwrites a collective commitment to higher 
education. If a conversation is going to be had about re-energizing the concept 
of the “public,” however, it is necessary to acknowledge explicitly the way that 
concept has served to erase and exclude large numbers of people. Otherwise, the 
nostalgia for the “public” referred to in this article reinscribes the presumption 
of a privileged white subjectivity and fails to foreshadow the necessary criteria of 
inclusiveness by which the merits of any reconstructed notion of the public must 
be assessed. Having now made an effort to distance our response from what we 
felt was a problematic silence in the article, we now take up directly its argu-
ments about the utility of psychoanalytic notions of melancholy and mourning 
for projects of reinvigorating public support for higher education.
Two Necessities
In this article, Baez uses the classic debate on liberal politics between Walter 
Lippmann and John Dewey to illustrate the implications of the disillusion-
ment with the ideal of a public good and of a public generally. Lippmann 
argued that the concept of a public was a “phantom,” an abstraction with 
no real or stable referent and with which we would do well to dispense. The 
author draws a parallel between this and Freud’s theory of loss and mourn-
ing. A healthy process of mourning, according to Freud, involves severing an 
attachment to a lost object of affection, so as to enable new emotional attach-
ments to be made. Lippmann’s solution, then, is read as a recommendation to 
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mourn the concept of a “public” and move on with the practice of democracy 
without the comfort of such illusions. This has the appeal of reconciling ra-
tionality, historical evidence, and democratic process.
Dewey’s position is to retain a commitment to the ideal of a public and a 
public good, even though our understanding of the boundaries of the public 
and what constitutes a public good is always subject to critique and revisions 
within a well-functioning democracy. Dewey argues that a liberal democracy 
requires sustaining a state of ambivalence toward even our most cherished val-
ues, so those values can be modified as social conditions change. Baez draws a 
parallel between this and Freud’s theory of melancholia—a form of patholog-
ical grief that cannot let go of a lost object of affection, and so becomes mired 
in attachment to an idealized fantasy that can never be realized. This has the 
advantage of preserving a notion of the common good, but at the apparent 
cost of delusion and dissolution.
Baez favors Dewey’s attachment to the public good and seeks to theorize 
how this commitment can be understood as constructive. He finds that un-
derstanding in some of Freud’s later work, where Freud allows that in some 
cases grief is not something we get past, but that it becomes integrated into 
our identity. Seen in this way, the attachment to the lost ideal of a public good 
is not pathological but is the enabling condition for the practice of fallibilism 
that is necessary to liberal democracy. This is the first necessity Baez cites re-
lated to the idea of a public good.
He then goes a step further. In addition to the illusion of a public and a 
shared good being necessary to democracy, Baez adds a second necessary illu-
sion—that of the sovereign individual.1 He argues that without a notion of 
the sovereign individual, voluntarism is impossible. Without voluntarism the 
ideal of citizens suppressing selfish interests for the sake of a common good 
becomes “totalitarianism or despotism of some kind.” This second necessity 
is the more foundational, he argues.
Two Concerns
The application of psychoanalytic conceptions of melancholy to the analysis 
of democratic citizen subjectivity is not new. Scholars such as Paul Gilroy 
(2001), Judith Butler (1997), Slavoj Žižek (1997), Wendy Brown (2003), 
1 We won’t bother here to recite the enormous body of empirical and critical research that 
has left the idea of an autonomous citizen subject in tatters. Baez presumes knowledge 
of this literature and refers to this idea as “an illusion that grounds the ground we stand 
on.”
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Flatley and Flatley (2009), Bonnie Honig (2017), and many others have tak-
en up this connection. The widely felt sense that the concept of melancholy 
is applicable to the topic of liberal democratic citizenship is itself a symptom 
of the malaise it seeks to diagnose. There is clearly a way in our contemporary 
times that we adhere to liberal political practices out of a habit that at times 
appears to be a fetish, certainly not a genuine conviction that the possibility 
of democracy is real. Yet abandoning those habits seems unwise, in a way that 
makes them seem like something other than an illusion in need of dispelling.
Most of the aforementioned literature focuses on the possibility of a more 
radical left politics. This article, on the other hand, is focused on the possibili-
ty of a liberal political practice. Nonetheless, the article would have benefitted 
by locating its intervention within the context of this broader literature on 
the melancholia of left politics in Western democracies. Butler’s Psychic Life of 
Power (1997), for example, points out that part of the challenge for Western 
democracies is the fact that some people’s experiences are erased from the 
shared vocabulary of public discourse. Without a vocabulary to name forms 
of social harm, its victims are unable to mourn their social loss and are con-
signed to a form of disempowered political melancholia. In other words, it 
is not just melancholia about the prospects of shared interests or our votes 
making a difference that is at play, it is also the discursive erasure of whole 
classes of experience as outside the boundaries of acceptable citizenship that 
erodes the viability of our democratic communities. Such erasure, according 
to Butler, requires the intervention of a certain form of identity politics that 
names the loss of exclusion so that the desire for inclusion and participation 
can be severed from the current political order and reattached to a new more 
inclusive vision of democratic practice. In its current form, “Melancholia and 
the Public” does not provide a pluralistic view of the different kinds of melan-
cholia we can experience in the pursuit of democratic community.
It would have been preferable that some gesture had been made that 
acknowledged the broader literature on the relation between the subject and 
left/liberal politics. Our first concern is that failing to do so just reinforc-
es the reputation of liberal political theorists working out of the pragmatist 
philosophical tradition as willfully refusing to acknowledge and engage more 
critical social theory. We believe this is a division that is no longer useful and 
that progressive political efforts can ill afford.
Our second concern relates to the second necessity mentioned above as 
part of this chapter’s argument. The author essentially states without defense 
that the sovereign individual is necessary for a conception of voluntarism that is 
at the heart of the liberal political project, and therefore this individualism must 
be retained as a commitment lest totalitarianism result. On the other hand Dr. 
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Baez acknowledges individualism is a fiction. The sense of loss that comes with 
the acknowledgment that the individual subject is a fiction is at the heart of 
the melancholia the chapter discusses. This melancholia cannot be addressed in 
the traditional way psychoanalytic scholars have discussed—through severance 
and reattachment to a new ideal—because the liberal individual as currently 
imagined is presumed to be necessary for democratic political practice.
This is not an argument, it is an observation that the premise of the neces-
sity of an individual subject has implications for a psychoanalytic conception 
of the connection between subjectivity and politics. It requires, according to 
Baez, looking to later Freudian theory that sees melancholia as a potentially 
constructive relation—not simply a disempowering one. We find the explo-
ration on these terms interesting and well thought out. However, we are not 
persuaded by the original premise—that voluntarism requires individualism.
It seems to us that the voluntarism the essay claims is necessary to the 
liberal political project is neither identical to nor necessarily connected to 
the individualism. At the very least, the assertion of this essential connection 
needs justification.
Now, since this entire conversation is premised on the idea that the sov-
ereign individual subject is a fiction, that justification would not come from a 
claim about the true nature of human subjectivity. Instead it would involve a 
more pragmatic justification of the sort—if we presume X then that makes Y 
possible. More precisely, since the claim is that only a presumption of the sov-
ereign individual subject makes liberal democracy possible, the justification 
would have to take the form—Y is possible only if we presume X. In order to 
refute this stronger claim, one need only convince that it is possible for some 
other precondition to make democracy possible.
We think many such conceptions of the democratic citizen subject are 
possible. One recently emerging theorization of the relation between knowl-
edge, subjectivity, and ontology can be found in new materialist philosophy 
of science. New materialists, such as Vicky Kirby (2011), Karen Barad (2007), 
Jane Bennett (2010), Hillevi Taguchi (2012), Ezekiel Dixon-Román (2017), 
and others, reconceptualize individual agency as something that emerges 
through relational intra-actions. Individual agency and anything resembling 
voluntarism, then, would be real, but constrained.
This constraint, however, is not a mechanical constraint that therefore 
gives lie to the voluntarism or lends itself to a totalitarian determinism. Ac-
cording to new materialism, the constraint is located in the coemergence of 
nonhuman agency. There is a reality beyond the human that is substantive 
and real, but that reality is itself protean, not stable or final, and therefore puts 
no final limit on possibility—social or material. The implication here is that 
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while the individual subject may not be entirely sovereign, neither is it abso-
lutely determined. Our agency is dependent on our co-constitutive relation 
with other agents, including nonhuman agents.
In her book Vibrant Matter political theorist Jane Bennett (2010) ob-
serves how “Dewey presents the members of a public as having been inducted 
into rather than volunteering for it” (p. 101). Publics form around shared 
problems which individuals do not choose to have. This condition renders 
the origins and efficacy of individual intentions indeterminate, always blended 
with the activities and trajectories of agents, including nonhuman systems and 
beings. Bennett (2010) goes on to conclude “if human culture is inextricably 
enmeshed with vibrant, nonhuman agencies, and if human intentionality can 
be agentic only if accompanied by a vast entourage of nonhumans, then it 
seems that the appropriate unit of analysis for democratic theory is neither the 
individual human nor an exclusively human collective but the (ontologically 
heterogeneous) ‘public’ coalescing around a problem” (p. 108).
Since Baez seems interested in Dewey and the pragmatist philosophical 
tradition, it may be worth pointing out that resources for this kind of agential 
realism can also be found in the later work of Charles Sanders Peirce. Peirce 
theorized that some form of agency is possessed by all parts of reality and that 
agency is enacted through processes of material semiosis. Peirce’s semiotic 
theory is far too Byzantine to elaborate on here in this brief response chap-
ter, but it is worth pointing out that Peirce thought even ideas have agency. 
Peirce argued that ideas like truth and right
…are instances of ideas which either have, or are believed to have, life, the power 
of bringing things to pass here below…[believers] hold that it is the idea which 
will create its defenders and render them powerful…. It is a perfectly intelligible 
opinion that ideas are not all mere creations of this or that mind, but on the 
contrary have a power of finding and creating their vehicles, and having found 
them, of conferring upon the, the ability to transform the earth. (Peirce, Houser, 
Kloesel, & Peirce Edition Project, 1998, p. 123)
Similar accounts of nonhuman agency and its co-constituting relation with 
human agency can be found in some versions of Indigenous philosophy 
(Bunge, 1984; Deloria, Deloria, Foehner, & Scinta, 1999; Kimmerer, 2017; 
Rosiek, Snyder, & Pratt, 2019).
These agent ontologies permit an acknowledgment of the porousness of 
the individual to outside influences, but not in the way Marxist conceptions 
of ideology and poststructuralist conceptions of discourse make individual 
agency a pathetic fiction. Individual agency within agent ontologies has more 
the character of an experience that waxes and wanes, depending on context, 
but is real and consequential. And voluntarism has less the character of a 
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choice made by a free-floating subject, and more the character of choices 
about whom (which agents) we seek co-constituting relations—a question 
of who we seek to serve, without the guarantee that the service will be wel-
comed or conditions will enable that service. This is a form of contingent vol-
untarism without the fiction of an antecedent individual subject from which 
an aggregate public could be generated.
So what would this have to do with the politics and practice of higher 
education? How would it provide a framework for envisioning effective re-
sponse to the contemporary assaults on higher education? It would permit 
a reject of the ideal of absolute individualism that underwrites the market 
economics turning higher education into a private commodity as opposed to 
a public good. Within an agent ontology and its contingent voluntarism, in-
dividuality is not possible without a co-constituting relation with some more 
general idea and a community—perhaps a public—that sustains the liveliness 
of that idea. This kind of individualism and pluralism is reconciled through 
a recognition of the need for multiple and conflicting guiding ideas to be in 
circulation—multiple publics. Institutions of higher education are the incu-
bators of this necessary resource. They encourage the generation, refinement, 
and continuing evolution of the ideas that make individualism effective and 
pluralism possible. In this way the public and the personal good are inextrica-
bly tied together. And the pursuit of such is neither melancholic nor self-de-
ceived. Instead, it requires us to expand our conception of who and what is 
included in our conception of a “public.”
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